Just to make sure I understand this: is “whether it’s correct to put babies in a blender for fun” moral subject matter?
Not necessarily, it may or may not be taken up as a moral question. We can, for example, study just how much fun it is and leave aside the question of its moral significance. If you’re reasoning about whether or not it’s right in some moral sense to put babies in a blender, then you’re doing something like moral reasoning, but if this were purely in the hypothetical then I think it would fall short. If you were seriously considering putting babies in a blender, then I think I’d want to call it moral reasoning, but in this case I think you could obviously be praised or blamed for your answer (well, maybe not praised so much).
and to blame good people is itself good.
That’s definitely not clear to me.
Sorry, typo. I mean’t ‘to blame good people (or to blame people for good actions) is bad.’ It shows some praiseworthy decency to appreciate the moral life of, I donno, MLK. It shows real character to stick up for a good but maligned person. Likewise, it shows some shallowness to have praised someone who only appeared good, but was in fact bad. And it shows some serious defect of character to praise someone we know to be bad (I donno, Manson?).
I agree that it’s possible for me to call Sam “good” or “bad” based on some aspect of their reasoning, as above, though I don’t really endorse that usage.
What’s the difference between agreeing here, and endorsing the usage?
OK, so just to be clear, you would say that the following are examples of moral reasoning...
“It would be fun to put this baby in that blender, and I want to have fun, but it would be wrong, so I won’t”
“It would be wrong to put this baby in that blender, and I don’t want to be wrong, but it would be fun, so I will”
...and the following are not:
“In general, putting babies in blenders would be fun, and I want to have fun, but in general it would be wrong, so if a situation arose where I had a baby and a blender and could put one inside the other with impunity, I would not do so, all else being equal.”
“In general, putting babies in blenders would be wrong, and I don’t want to be wrong, but in general it would be fun, so if a situation arose where I had a baby and a blender and could put one inside the other with impunity, I would do so, all else being equal.”
Yes? No?
If so, I continue to disagree with you; I absolutely would call those last two cases examples of moral reasoning. If not, I don’t think I’m understanding you at all.
What’s the difference between agreeing here, and endorsing the usage?
If A is some object or event that I observe, and L is a label in a language that consistently evokes a representation of A in the minds of native speakers, I agree that it’s possible for me to call A L. If using L to refer to A has other effects beyond evoking A, and I consider those effects to be bad, I might reject using L to refer to A.
For example, I agree that the label “faggot” reliably refers to a male homosexual in American English, but I don’t endorse the usage in most cases because it’s conventionally insulting. (There are exceptions.)
‘to blame good people (or to blame people for good actions) is bad.’ It shows some praiseworthy decency
Incidentally, here you demonstrate one of the behaviors that causes me not to endorse the usage of calling Sam “good” or “bad” in this case. First you went from making an observation about a particular act of reasoning to labeling the reasoner in a particular way, and now you’ve gone from labeling the reasoner in that way to inferring other facts about the reasoner. I would certainly agree that the various acts we’re talking about are evidence of praiseworthy decency on Sam’s part, but the way you are talking about it makes it very easy to make the mistake of treating them as logically equivalent to praiseworthy decency.
People do this all the time (e.g., fundamental attribution fallacy), and it causes a lot of problems.
Not necessarily, it may or may not be taken up as a moral question. We can, for example, study just how much fun it is and leave aside the question of its moral significance. If you’re reasoning about whether or not it’s right in some moral sense to put babies in a blender, then you’re doing something like moral reasoning, but if this were purely in the hypothetical then I think it would fall short. If you were seriously considering putting babies in a blender, then I think I’d want to call it moral reasoning, but in this case I think you could obviously be praised or blamed for your answer (well, maybe not praised so much).
Sorry, typo. I mean’t ‘to blame good people (or to blame people for good actions) is bad.’ It shows some praiseworthy decency to appreciate the moral life of, I donno, MLK. It shows real character to stick up for a good but maligned person. Likewise, it shows some shallowness to have praised someone who only appeared good, but was in fact bad. And it shows some serious defect of character to praise someone we know to be bad (I donno, Manson?).
What’s the difference between agreeing here, and endorsing the usage?
OK, so just to be clear, you would say that the following are examples of moral reasoning...
“It would be fun to put this baby in that blender, and I want to have fun, but it would be wrong, so I won’t”
“It would be wrong to put this baby in that blender, and I don’t want to be wrong, but it would be fun, so I will”
...and the following are not:
“In general, putting babies in blenders would be fun, and I want to have fun, but in general it would be wrong, so if a situation arose where I had a baby and a blender and could put one inside the other with impunity, I would not do so, all else being equal.”
“In general, putting babies in blenders would be wrong, and I don’t want to be wrong, but in general it would be fun, so if a situation arose where I had a baby and a blender and could put one inside the other with impunity, I would do so, all else being equal.”
Yes? No?
If so, I continue to disagree with you; I absolutely would call those last two cases examples of moral reasoning.
If not, I don’t think I’m understanding you at all.
If A is some object or event that I observe, and L is a label in a language that consistently evokes a representation of A in the minds of native speakers, I agree that it’s possible for me to call A L. If using L to refer to A has other effects beyond evoking A, and I consider those effects to be bad, I might reject using L to refer to A.
For example, I agree that the label “faggot” reliably refers to a male homosexual in American English, but I don’t endorse the usage in most cases because it’s conventionally insulting. (There are exceptions.)
Incidentally, here you demonstrate one of the behaviors that causes me not to endorse the usage of calling Sam “good” or “bad” in this case. First you went from making an observation about a particular act of reasoning to labeling the reasoner in a particular way, and now you’ve gone from labeling the reasoner in that way to inferring other facts about the reasoner. I would certainly agree that the various acts we’re talking about are evidence of praiseworthy decency on Sam’s part, but the way you are talking about it makes it very easy to make the mistake of treating them as logically equivalent to praiseworthy decency.
People do this all the time (e.g., fundamental attribution fallacy), and it causes a lot of problems.