If a baby/fetus has a mind, in my books it should be accorded rights—more and more so as it develops. I fail to see, moreover, where the dividing line ought to be in your view. Not to slippery-slope you but—why stop at infants?
The standard answer is that at that point there is no longer a conflict with the rights of the women whose body the infant was hooked into. We don’t generally require that people give up their bodily autonomy to support the life of others.
We don’t generally require that people give up their bodily autonomy to support the life of others.
The complication here is that a responsible, consenting adult tacitly accepts giving up her bodily autonomy (or accepts a risk of doing so) when she has sex. That’s precisely the same reason men are required to pay child support even if they didn’t wish for a pregnancy. (Yes, I see the asymmetry; yes, it sucks).
Case-by-case reasoning is probably a good thing in these circs, but unless the mother was not informed (minor/mental illness) or did not consent, then the only really tenable reason for a late-term abortion I can think of is health. In which case the relative weighing of rights is a tricky business, a buck I will pass to doctors, patients & hospital ethics boards.
but unless the mother was not informed (minor/mental illness) or did not consent,
This is already a significant retreat from your previously stated position. (“not unless it’s going to kill you” after 24 weeks)
The complication here is that a responsible, consenting adult tacitly accepts giving up her bodily autonomy (or accepts a risk of doing so) when she has sex.
That’s a hell of an assertion. I don’t really see any reason to accept it as other than a normative statement of what you wish would happen.
That’s precisely the same reason men are required to pay child support even if they didn’t wish for a pregnancy. (Yes, I see the asymmetry; yes, it sucks).
As you say, there is an asymmetry. Garnishing a wage is a bit different, and seems appropriate to me.
Case-by-case reasoning is probably a good thing in these circs,
Yes, it is, so long as it is reasoning rather than assertions that this case is different. We have to specify how it is different, and how those differences make a difference. The easiest way for me to do this is to use analogies. This is dangerous of course, as one must keep in mind that they can ignore relevant differences while emphasizing surface similarities.
So, in this case the relevant specialness you’re calling out is that a risky activity was knowingly engaged in that created a person who needs life support for some time, as well as care and feeding far after that. So I’m going to try to set up an analogous situation, but without sex being the act (which I think is irrelevant) coming into the mix. This will also mean another difference: the person will not be “created” except metaphorically from a preëxisting person. I personally don’t see how that would be relevant, but I suppose it is possible for others to disagree.
Suppose a person is driving, and crashes into a pedestrian. This ruptures the liver of the pedestrian. A partial transplant of the driver’s liver will save the pedestrian’s life. Is the driver expected to donate their liver? Should it be required by law?
Note that the donor’s death rate for this operation is under 1%. When we compare this to the statistics for maternal death, we see it is similar to WHO’s 2005 estimate of world average of 900 per 100,000, though developed regions have it far lower at 9 per 100000.
This is already a significant retreat from your previously stated position. (“not unless it’s going to kill you” after 24 weeks)
Is it? I suppose it is. I contain multitudes. No, honestly, I just didn’t name all my caveats in the previous post (my bad). Clearly there are two people’s interests to take into consideration here. Also, as I noted, that was an ethical rather than legal argument. I don’t have any strong opinions about what the law should do wrt this question.
That’s a hell of an assertion. I don’t really see any reason to accept it as other than a normative statement of what you wish would happen.
I don’t think it’s unreasonable, although you’re right it’s not a fact statement. But I think it’s a fairly well-established principle of ethics & jurisprudence that informed consent implies responsibility. Nobody has to have unprotected sex, so if you (a consenting adult) do so, any reasonably foreseeable consequences are on your shoulders.
Suppose a person is driving, and crashes into a pedestrian. This ruptures the liver of the pedestrian. A partial transplant of the driver’s liver will save the pedestrian’s life. Is the driver expected to donate their liver? Should it be required by law?
It’s a reasonably good analogy I guess. There are two separate questions here: what should the law do, and what should the driver do. I don’t think anybody wants the law to require organ donations from people who behave irresponsibly. However, put in the driver’s shoes, and assuming the collision was my fault, I would feel obligated to donate (if, in this worst-case scenario, I am the only one who can).
There is a slight disanalogy here though, which is that an abortion is an act, whereas a failure to donate is an omission. It’s like the difference between throwing the fat guy on the tracks and just letting the train hit the fat guy.
which is that an abortion is an act, whereas a failure to donate is an omission
I’m curious to the reasoning on what the difference is, except maybe that, no better options being available (it seems) we use omission as the default strategy when consequences are not within our grasp (as watching and gathering more information will at least not worsen your later ability to come to a conclusion, with the only caveat that then it may be too late to act).
“Suppose a person is driving, and crashes into a pedestrian. This ruptures the liver of the pedestrian. A partial transplant of the driver’s liver will save the pedestrian’s life. Is the driver expected to donate their liver? Should it be required by law?”
For organ transplantations, the body biochemistries of the organ donor and acceptor must be somewhat compatible, otherwise the transplanted organ gets rejected by the immune system of the acceptor. The best transplantation results are between the identical twins. For unrelated people, there are tests to estimate the compatibility of organs, and databases. A conclusion: The driver is not generally expected to donate their liver, because in the majority of the cases, it would not help the victim.
Imagine an alternate universe, where all the human bodies are highly compatible for transplantation purposes.
Yes, I believe it might become a social norm in this alternate universe, or even a law, that the driver must donate their liver to the victim.
Suppose a person is driving, and crashes into a pedestrian. This ruptures the liver of the pedestrian. A partial transplant of the driver’s liver will save the pedestrian’s life. Is the driver expected to donate their liver. Should it be required by law?
This depends mostly upon whether you think that law should enforce doing actions which save lives with insignificant risk to the actor.
If yes, then this (quite special) case is clear-cut, given a few assumptions (liver matches and is healthy, is not already scheduled for another similarly important surgery, etc. etc.). However, at least as far as I know, this is not the case.
And I doubt it will be soon (simply did not think about whether it should yet). Just an example: In Austria by default all deceased people are potential donors—you have to file an explicit opt-out. This is quite different than for instance in Germany. Therefore we have a relatively good “source” of organs. However, though sometimes under discussion, Germany has not changed its legislation, even with the possibility to compare the numbers. Maybe for religious reasons, or freedom of whomever. I didn’t follow it that close...
If such simple matters (we are talking about already medically dead persons) do not change within years, what can be expected for such, really fundamental, decisions?
Just an example: In Austria by default all deceased people are potential donors—you have to file an explicit opt-out.
I am very much in favour of this sort of policy; it would do no end of good.
The effect of pretending to have opt-out organ donation is small. Austria is unique in really having opt-out organ donation (everywhere else, next of kin decide in practice), so it’s hard to judge the effect, but it’s not an outlier. In the 90s, Spain became the high outlier and Italy ceased being the low outlier, so rapid change is possible without doing anything ethically sensitive. graph. More Kieran Healy links here.
“Reform of the rules governing consent is often accompanied by an overhaul and improvement of the logistical system, and it is this—not the letter of the law—that makes a difference. Cadaveric organ procurement is an intense, time-sensitive and very fluid process that requires a great deal of co-ordination and management. Countries that invest in that layer of the system do better than others, regardless of the rules about presumed and informed consent.”
In our country, we have an opt-out donation, but I guess the relatives can have a veto. I have seen a physician on TV, who said some scary things openly. Our doctors are standardly overworked and underpayed. Imagine a doctor, who, towards the end of the long shift, sees a patient dying with some of the organs intact. If he decides to report the availability of the organs, he creates an extra, several hours work for himself and others, paperwork included. There is either none or very little financial reward for reporting the organs, I do not remember exactly. They might feel heroic for the first couple of times, but, eventually, they resign and stop making these reports, after they work long enough.
I have seen this on TV cca 3 years ago, do not know the current situation.
The driver could instead be made responsible for the victim’s exact medical costs or some fraction thereof, in addition to any punitive or approximated damages. This would provide adequate incentive to seek out ways to reduce those costs, including but not limited to a voluntary donation on the part of the driver or someone who owes the driver a favor.
In the abortion example, the fetus 1) is created already attached and ending ongoing life support may not be the same as requiring that someone who is not providing it provide it, 2) needs life support for an extended period, and 3) can only use the life support of one person.
The complication here is that a responsible, consenting adult tacitly accepts giving up her bodily autonomy (or accepts a risk of doing so) when she has sex.
The complication there is that on the standard view, one cannot give up one’s bodily autonomy permanently. You cannot sell yourself into slavery. The pregnant person always has the right to opt-out of the contract.
Though the fetus would presumably be able to get damages. I guess those get paid to the next-of-kin.
We don’t generally require that people give up their bodily autonomy to support the life of others.
We don’t?
In what situation, exactly, do we fail to do this? I can’t think of any other real-world situation. I can imagine counterfactual ones, sure, but I’m fairly certain most people see those as analogies for abortion and respond appropriately.
We don’t, for instance, require people to donate redundant organs, nor even blood. Nor is organ donation mandatory even after death (prehaps it should be).
What are some cases where we do require people to give up their bodily autonomy?
That’s the big one I can think of, and this usually arises in a very different context where it’s easy to dehumanize those forced to take such tests: alleged criminals and children.
(Even in these contexts, peeing in a cup or taking a breathalyzer is quite a bit less severe than enduring a forced pregnancy. Mandatory blood draws for DUIs do upset a signifianct number of people. How you feel about employment tests and sports doping might depend on how you feel about economic coercion and whether it’s truly “mandatory”.)
The standard answer is that at that point there is no longer a conflict with the rights of the women whose body the infant was hooked into. We don’t generally require that people give up their bodily autonomy to support the life of others.
The complication here is that a responsible, consenting adult tacitly accepts giving up her bodily autonomy (or accepts a risk of doing so) when she has sex. That’s precisely the same reason men are required to pay child support even if they didn’t wish for a pregnancy. (Yes, I see the asymmetry; yes, it sucks).
Case-by-case reasoning is probably a good thing in these circs, but unless the mother was not informed (minor/mental illness) or did not consent, then the only really tenable reason for a late-term abortion I can think of is health. In which case the relative weighing of rights is a tricky business, a buck I will pass to doctors, patients & hospital ethics boards.
This is already a significant retreat from your previously stated position. (“not unless it’s going to kill you” after 24 weeks)
That’s a hell of an assertion. I don’t really see any reason to accept it as other than a normative statement of what you wish would happen.
As you say, there is an asymmetry. Garnishing a wage is a bit different, and seems appropriate to me.
Yes, it is, so long as it is reasoning rather than assertions that this case is different. We have to specify how it is different, and how those differences make a difference. The easiest way for me to do this is to use analogies. This is dangerous of course, as one must keep in mind that they can ignore relevant differences while emphasizing surface similarities.
So, in this case the relevant specialness you’re calling out is that a risky activity was knowingly engaged in that created a person who needs life support for some time, as well as care and feeding far after that. So I’m going to try to set up an analogous situation, but without sex being the act (which I think is irrelevant) coming into the mix. This will also mean another difference: the person will not be “created” except metaphorically from a preëxisting person. I personally don’t see how that would be relevant, but I suppose it is possible for others to disagree.
Suppose a person is driving, and crashes into a pedestrian. This ruptures the liver of the pedestrian. A partial transplant of the driver’s liver will save the pedestrian’s life. Is the driver expected to donate their liver? Should it be required by law?
Note that the donor’s death rate for this operation is under 1%. When we compare this to the statistics for maternal death, we see it is similar to WHO’s 2005 estimate of world average of 900 per 100,000, though developed regions have it far lower at 9 per 100000.
Is it? I suppose it is. I contain multitudes. No, honestly, I just didn’t name all my caveats in the previous post (my bad). Clearly there are two people’s interests to take into consideration here. Also, as I noted, that was an ethical rather than legal argument. I don’t have any strong opinions about what the law should do wrt this question.
I don’t think it’s unreasonable, although you’re right it’s not a fact statement. But I think it’s a fairly well-established principle of ethics & jurisprudence that informed consent implies responsibility. Nobody has to have unprotected sex, so if you (a consenting adult) do so, any reasonably foreseeable consequences are on your shoulders.
It’s a reasonably good analogy I guess. There are two separate questions here: what should the law do, and what should the driver do. I don’t think anybody wants the law to require organ donations from people who behave irresponsibly. However, put in the driver’s shoes, and assuming the collision was my fault, I would feel obligated to donate (if, in this worst-case scenario, I am the only one who can).
There is a slight disanalogy here though, which is that an abortion is an act, whereas a failure to donate is an omission. It’s like the difference between throwing the fat guy on the tracks and just letting the train hit the fat guy.
I’m curious to the reasoning on what the difference is, except maybe that, no better options being available (it seems) we use omission as the default strategy when consequences are not within our grasp (as watching and gathering more information will at least not worsen your later ability to come to a conclusion, with the only caveat that then it may be too late to act).
“Suppose a person is driving, and crashes into a pedestrian. This ruptures the liver of the pedestrian. A partial transplant of the driver’s liver will save the pedestrian’s life. Is the driver expected to donate their liver? Should it be required by law?”
For organ transplantations, the body biochemistries of the organ donor and acceptor must be somewhat compatible, otherwise the transplanted organ gets rejected by the immune system of the acceptor. The best transplantation results are between the identical twins. For unrelated people, there are tests to estimate the compatibility of organs, and databases. A conclusion: The driver is not generally expected to donate their liver, because in the majority of the cases, it would not help the victim.
Imagine an alternate universe, where all the human bodies are highly compatible for transplantation purposes.
Yes, I believe it might become a social norm in this alternate universe, or even a law, that the driver must donate their liver to the victim.
This depends mostly upon whether you think that law should enforce doing actions which save lives with insignificant risk to the actor.
If yes, then this (quite special) case is clear-cut, given a few assumptions (liver matches and is healthy, is not already scheduled for another similarly important surgery, etc. etc.). However, at least as far as I know, this is not the case.
And I doubt it will be soon (simply did not think about whether it should yet). Just an example: In Austria by default all deceased people are potential donors—you have to file an explicit opt-out. This is quite different than for instance in Germany. Therefore we have a relatively good “source” of organs. However, though sometimes under discussion, Germany has not changed its legislation, even with the possibility to compare the numbers. Maybe for religious reasons, or freedom of whomever. I didn’t follow it that close...
If such simple matters (we are talking about already medically dead persons) do not change within years, what can be expected for such, really fundamental, decisions?
I am very much in favour of this sort of policy; it would do no end of good.
The effect of pretending to have opt-out organ donation is small. Austria is unique in really having opt-out organ donation (everywhere else, next of kin decide in practice), so it’s hard to judge the effect, but it’s not an outlier. In the 90s, Spain became the high outlier and Italy ceased being the low outlier, so rapid change is possible without doing anything ethically sensitive. graph. More Kieran Healy links here.
An interesting article.
“Reform of the rules governing consent is often accompanied by an overhaul and improvement of the logistical system, and it is this—not the letter of the law—that makes a difference. Cadaveric organ procurement is an intense, time-sensitive and very fluid process that requires a great deal of co-ordination and management. Countries that invest in that layer of the system do better than others, regardless of the rules about presumed and informed consent.”
In our country, we have an opt-out donation, but I guess the relatives can have a veto. I have seen a physician on TV, who said some scary things openly. Our doctors are standardly overworked and underpayed. Imagine a doctor, who, towards the end of the long shift, sees a patient dying with some of the organs intact. If he decides to report the availability of the organs, he creates an extra, several hours work for himself and others, paperwork included. There is either none or very little financial reward for reporting the organs, I do not remember exactly. They might feel heroic for the first couple of times, but, eventually, they resign and stop making these reports, after they work long enough. I have seen this on TV cca 3 years ago, do not know the current situation.
The driver could instead be made responsible for the victim’s exact medical costs or some fraction thereof, in addition to any punitive or approximated damages. This would provide adequate incentive to seek out ways to reduce those costs, including but not limited to a voluntary donation on the part of the driver or someone who owes the driver a favor.
In the abortion example, the fetus 1) is created already attached and ending ongoing life support may not be the same as requiring that someone who is not providing it provide it, 2) needs life support for an extended period, and 3) can only use the life support of one person.
The complication there is that on the standard view, one cannot give up one’s bodily autonomy permanently. You cannot sell yourself into slavery. The pregnant person always has the right to opt-out of the contract.
Though the fetus would presumably be able to get damages. I guess those get paid to the next-of-kin.
Upvoted entirely for this line, which made me spit coffee when it finally registered.
In the first month of pregnancy, right, but in the seventh month you can Caesarean the baby out of the mother and put it into an incubator, can’t you?
Not without some risk to both, the exact amounts depending on the situation..
(I’m assuming that by “some” you mean ‘larger than that of either abortion or natural childbirth’, otherwise it wouldn’t be relevant. Right?)
Smaller would be relevant too, for the opposite reason.
We don’t?
In what situation, exactly, do we fail to do this? I can’t think of any other real-world situation. I can imagine counterfactual ones, sure, but I’m fairly certain most people see those as analogies for abortion and respond appropriately.
We don’t, for instance, require people to donate redundant organs, nor even blood. Nor is organ donation mandatory even after death (prehaps it should be).
What are some cases where we do require people to give up their bodily autonomy?
Mandatory drug testing?
That’s the big one I can think of, and this usually arises in a very different context where it’s easy to dehumanize those forced to take such tests: alleged criminals and children.
(Even in these contexts, peeing in a cup or taking a breathalyzer is quite a bit less severe than enduring a forced pregnancy. Mandatory blood draws for DUIs do upset a signifianct number of people. How you feel about employment tests and sports doping might depend on how you feel about economic coercion and whether it’s truly “mandatory”.)