It is to note that evolutionary genetical optimization → genotype → phenotype, I am saying this as you extrapolate based on the bug study and metazoa are usually rather complex system, your argument is, as far as I know, sound, but a such a broad loss function might result in a variety of other behaviours, different from the intended purpose as well, what I am trying to do is expand on your point as it allows for a variety of interesting scenarios.
The post you linked contains a reference to the mathematical long-term fitness advantage of certain altruism types, I will add a later date edit this post to add some experimental studies that show, that it is “relatively easy” to breed altruism into certain metazoa ( same as above holds of course it was easy in these given the chosen environment ). If I remember correctly the chicken one is even linked on lesswrong.
I would like to ask whether it is not more engaging if to say, the caring drive would need to be specifically towards humans, such that there is no surrogate?
In regards to ducks is that an intelligence or perception problem? I think tose two would need to be differentiated as they add another layer of complexity, both apart and together, or am I missing something?
I would like to ask whether it is not more engaging if to say, the caring drive would need to be specifically towards humans, such that there is no surrogate?
Definitely need some targeting criteria that points towards humans or in their vague general direction. Clippy does in some sense care about paperclips so targeting criteria that favors humans over paperclips is important.
The duck example is about (lack of) intelligence. Ducks will place themselves in harms way and confront big scary humans they think are a threat to their ducklings. They definitely care. They’re just too stupid to prevent “fall into a sewer and die” type problems. Nature is full of things that care about their offspring. Human “caring for offspring” behavior is similarly strong but involves a lot more intelligence like everything else we do.
It is to note that evolutionary genetical optimization → genotype → phenotype, I am saying this as you extrapolate based on the bug study and metazoa are usually rather complex system, your argument is, as far as I know, sound, but a such a broad loss function might result in a variety of other behaviours, different from the intended purpose as well, what I am trying to do is expand on your point as it allows for a variety of interesting scenarios.
The post you linked contains a reference to the mathematical long-term fitness advantage of certain altruism types, I will add a later date edit this post to add some experimental studies that show, that it is “relatively easy” to breed altruism into certain metazoa ( same as above holds of course it was easy in these given the chosen environment ). If I remember correctly the chicken one is even linked on lesswrong.
I would like to ask whether it is not more engaging if to say, the caring drive would need to be specifically towards humans, such that there is no surrogate?
In regards to ducks is that an intelligence or perception problem? I think tose two would need to be differentiated as they add another layer of complexity, both apart and together, or am I missing something?
Definitely need some targeting criteria that points towards humans or in their vague general direction. Clippy does in some sense care about paperclips so targeting criteria that favors humans over paperclips is important.
The duck example is about (lack of) intelligence. Ducks will place themselves in harms way and confront big scary humans they think are a threat to their ducklings. They definitely care. They’re just too stupid to prevent “fall into a sewer and die” type problems. Nature is full of things that care about their offspring. Human “caring for offspring” behavior is similarly strong but involves a lot more intelligence like everything else we do.