Before and during the event, there was a high probability P of humanity going extinct. That is equivalent to the loss then of P proportion of all future expected value. Expected value is always about the future; that’s why it’s not actual value.
(Also, I think on some many-worlds theories utility was actually lost due to humanity surviving in less measure.)
Did the event “cause the loss of most expected value”? Looking around, I’m not so sure.
It’s a good example of extinction risk, but doesn’t seem to fit the (iii) definition well.
Before and during the event, there was a high probability P of humanity going extinct. That is equivalent to the loss then of P proportion of all future expected value. Expected value is always about the future; that’s why it’s not actual value.
(Also, I think on some many-worlds theories utility was actually lost due to humanity surviving in less measure.)
Looking from before the event, true. Fair point.