But, if we applied this model, what would make it unique to suicide and not to any other preference ?
And if you apply this model to any other preference and extent it to humans, things get really dystopian really fast.
I’m not sure it is unique to suicide, and regardless I’d imagine we’d have to take it on a case by case basis because evolution is messy. I think whether it leads to dystopia or not is not a useful way to determine if it actually describes reality.
Regardless, the argument I’m trying to make is not that this model I described is the correct model, but that it’s at least a plausible model and that there are probably other plausible models and if there are such alternative plausible models then you have to seriously engage them before you can make a considered decision that the suicide rate is a good proxy for value of animal life.
This is not really analogous, in that my example is “potential to reduce suffering” vs “obviously reducing suffering”. A telescope is neither of those, it’s working towards what I’d argue is more of a transcedent goal.
Yes, I agree that along that dimension it is not analogous. I was using it as an example of the fact that addressing more than one different issue is possible when the resources available are equal to or greater than the sum of resources required to address each issue.
I am also willing to acknowledge that it is at least *possible* some humans might benefit from actions that they don’t consent to, but still I don’t engage in those actions because I think it’s preferable to treat them as agentic beings that can make their own choices about what makes them happy.
I think my point was that until you’re willing to put a semblance of confidence levels on your beliefs, then you’re making it easy to succumb to inconsistent actions.
How possible is it that we don’t understand the mental lives of animals well enough to use the suicide argument? What are the costs if we’re wrong? What are the costs if we forgo eating them?
Most of society has agreed that actually yes we should coerce some humans into actions that they don’t consent to. See laws, prisons, etc. This is because we can look at individual cases, weigh the costs and benefits, and act accordingly. A generalized principle of “prefer to treat them as agentic beings with exceptions” is how most modern societies currently work. (How effective we are at that seems to vary widely...but I think most would agree that it’s better than the alternative.)
Regardless, I’m not sure that arranging our food chain to lessen or eliminate the number of animals born to be eaten actually intersects with interfering with independent agents abilities to self-determine. If it did, it seems like we are failing in a major way by not encouraging everyone to bring as many possible humans into existence as possible until we’re all living at the subsistence level.
People mostly don’t commit suicide just because they’re living at such a level. Thus, I think by your argument, we are doing the wrong thing by not increasing the production of humans greatly. However, I think most people’s moral intuitions cut against that course of action.
I’m not sure it is unique to suicide, and regardless I’d imagine we’d have to take it on a case by case basis because evolution is messy. I think whether it leads to dystopia or not is not a useful way to determine if it actually describes reality.
Regardless, the argument I’m trying to make is not that this model I described is the correct model, but that it’s at least a plausible model and that there are probably other plausible models and if there are such alternative plausible models then you have to seriously engage them before you can make a considered decision that the suicide rate is a good proxy for value of animal life.
Yes, I agree that along that dimension it is not analogous. I was using it as an example of the fact that addressing more than one different issue is possible when the resources available are equal to or greater than the sum of resources required to address each issue.
I think my point was that until you’re willing to put a semblance of confidence levels on your beliefs, then you’re making it easy to succumb to inconsistent actions.
How possible is it that we don’t understand the mental lives of animals well enough to use the suicide argument? What are the costs if we’re wrong? What are the costs if we forgo eating them?
Most of society has agreed that actually yes we should coerce some humans into actions that they don’t consent to. See laws, prisons, etc. This is because we can look at individual cases, weigh the costs and benefits, and act accordingly. A generalized principle of “prefer to treat them as agentic beings with exceptions” is how most modern societies currently work. (How effective we are at that seems to vary widely...but I think most would agree that it’s better than the alternative.)
Regardless, I’m not sure that arranging our food chain to lessen or eliminate the number of animals born to be eaten actually intersects with interfering with independent agents abilities to self-determine. If it did, it seems like we are failing in a major way by not encouraging everyone to bring as many possible humans into existence as possible until we’re all living at the subsistence level.
People mostly don’t commit suicide just because they’re living at such a level. Thus, I think by your argument, we are doing the wrong thing by not increasing the production of humans greatly. However, I think most people’s moral intuitions cut against that course of action.