This is a very interesting statement (with which I agree). I would also like to see your explanation for when it’s inappropriate to apply reason, I’ll post mine afterwords.
(And it’s not equivalent to arguing.)
I don’t quite see the distinction you’re trying to make. Especially in this context since the posters arguing about morality were certainly trying to reason about it and not just arguing for the sake of arguing.
I (and probably the 2 who upvoted me) misunderstood your use of ‘ironic’. I now see that you probably meant it in the sense of ‘superficially paradoxical or false, but on closer inspection, interesing’. (I thought you meant it more in the sense of ‘incongruous, and consequently suspect’. I.e., I thought you were arguing that it is probably bad pedagogy to advise an aspiring rationalist not to reason about something.)
would also like to see your explanation for when it’s inappropriate to apply reason
It is inappropriate—well, let us say it is a mistake in reasoning—to apply reason to something whenever it is obvious that the time and mental energy are better applied to something else. My point is that I do not see the irony in Eliezer’s advising his readers that some particular issue is not worth applying reason to.
(And it’s not equivalent to arguing.)
I don’t quite see the distinction you’re trying to make.
Can I just declare my statement in parens above to be withdrawn? :)
would also like to see your explanation for when it’s inappropriate to apply reason
It is inappropriate—well, let us say it is a mistake in reasoning—to apply reason to something whenever it is obvious that the time and mental energy are better applied to something else.
Interesting, I had in mind something much stronger. For example, if you attempt to apply too much reasoning to a Schelling point, you’ll discover that the Schelling point’s location was ultimately arbitrary and greatly weaken it in the process.
Another related example, is that you shouldn’t attempt to (re)create hermeneutic truths/traditions from first principals. You won’t be able to create a system that will work in practice, but might falsely convince yourself that you have.
...you shouldn’t attempt to (re)create hermeneutic truths/traditions from first principals. You won’t be able to create a system that will work in practice, but might falsely convince yourself that you have.
I didn’t see any mentions of examples in Szabo’s paper of traditions that have a high instrumental value but can’t be derived from first principles, although he does seem to be saying that they exist. The best example that comes to mind is Jews and Moslems not eating pork, but I eat pork and my family has on both sides for multiple generations, and we haven’t curled up and died yet, so the present instrumental value of that tradition is unclear to me. Do you have any examples in mind?
I can see that the wellbeing of the population that obeys the tradition would contribute to it doing well in cultural evolution, but it’s not at all clear to me that it’s a large enough factor that we’re unlikely to come out ahead by discarding the tradition and designing a new one.
I suppose the claim that a tradition is one of these truths that one cannot usefully rederive from first principles is testable. Go form an intentional community that, say, has an 8 day week, and if they’re still doing well physically and financially in a generation or two, then the 7 day week apparently wasn’t such a tradition.
Well Szabo’s main examples, which he briefly alludes to in this essay, are legal, economic and political systems. He discusses them at length in his otherwritings.
You’ve articulated a couple of ideas that have been lurking in the collective concern of ideas here on Less Wrong, but which, as far as I know, haven’t been made definite. About why some topics shouldn’t have too much light directed at them—ironically, as you originally claim, in the interest of reason. It’s been a very vague concern and precisely because it hasn’t been articulated it persists stronger than it might otherwise. I would encourage development of these points (not specifically by you, or specifically in this thread, but by anyone, wherever) .
This is a very interesting statement (with which I agree). I would also like to see your explanation for when it’s inappropriate to apply reason, I’ll post mine afterwords.
I don’t quite see the distinction you’re trying to make. Especially in this context since the posters arguing about morality were certainly trying to reason about it and not just arguing for the sake of arguing.
I (and probably the 2 who upvoted me) misunderstood your use of ‘ironic’. I now see that you probably meant it in the sense of ‘superficially paradoxical or false, but on closer inspection, interesing’. (I thought you meant it more in the sense of ‘incongruous, and consequently suspect’. I.e., I thought you were arguing that it is probably bad pedagogy to advise an aspiring rationalist not to reason about something.)
It is inappropriate—well, let us say it is a mistake in reasoning—to apply reason to something whenever it is obvious that the time and mental energy are better applied to something else. My point is that I do not see the irony in Eliezer’s advising his readers that some particular issue is not worth applying reason to.
Can I just declare my statement in parens above to be withdrawn? :)
Interesting, I had in mind something much stronger. For example, if you attempt to apply too much reasoning to a Schelling point, you’ll discover that the Schelling point’s location was ultimately arbitrary and greatly weaken it in the process.
Another related example, is that you shouldn’t attempt to (re)create hermeneutic truths/traditions from first principals. You won’t be able to create a system that will work in practice, but might falsely convince yourself that you have.
I didn’t see any mentions of examples in Szabo’s paper of traditions that have a high instrumental value but can’t be derived from first principles, although he does seem to be saying that they exist. The best example that comes to mind is Jews and Moslems not eating pork, but I eat pork and my family has on both sides for multiple generations, and we haven’t curled up and died yet, so the present instrumental value of that tradition is unclear to me. Do you have any examples in mind?
I can see that the wellbeing of the population that obeys the tradition would contribute to it doing well in cultural evolution, but it’s not at all clear to me that it’s a large enough factor that we’re unlikely to come out ahead by discarding the tradition and designing a new one.
I suppose the claim that a tradition is one of these truths that one cannot usefully rederive from first principles is testable. Go form an intentional community that, say, has an 8 day week, and if they’re still doing well physically and financially in a generation or two, then the 7 day week apparently wasn’t such a tradition.
ETA: I suppose the organizational structure of a church is such a tradition.
Well Szabo’s main examples, which he briefly alludes to in this essay, are legal, economic and political systems. He discusses them at length in his other writings.
I agree with your 2 examples.
You’ve articulated a couple of ideas that have been lurking in the collective concern of ideas here on Less Wrong, but which, as far as I know, haven’t been made definite. About why some topics shouldn’t have too much light directed at them—ironically, as you originally claim, in the interest of reason. It’s been a very vague concern and precisely because it hasn’t been articulated it persists stronger than it might otherwise. I would encourage development of these points (not specifically by you, or specifically in this thread, but by anyone, wherever) .