imagine trying to “relax” the “problem” of free will!
I have:-
Naturalism helps in the construction of a viable model of libertarian free will, because it becomes clear that choice cannot be an irreducible, atomic process. A common objection to libertarian free will has it that a random event cannot be sufficiently rational or connected to an individuals character, whereas a determined decision cannot be free, so that a choice is un-free or it is capricious, objectionably random (irrational or unrelated to the agents character and desires). This argument, the “dilemma of determinism” makes the tacit assumption that a decision-making is either wholly determined or wholly random. However, if decision-making is complex, it can consist of a mixture of more deterministic and more random elements. A naturalistic theory of free will can therefore recommend itself as being able refute the Dilemma of Determinism through mere compromise: a complex and heterogenous decsion making process can be deterministic enough to be related to an individual’s character, yet indeterministic enough to count as free, for realistic levels of freedom.
Note that such a compromise inevitably involves a modest or deflated view of both ingredients. Freedom of choice is not seen as an omnipotent ability to perform any action, but as an agent’s the ability to perform an action chosen from a subset of possible actions that it is capable of conceiving and performing. Decision making is seen as rational enough to avoid mere caprice: following naturalistic assumptions we do not see agents as ideal reasoners.
That’s an interesting approach, though I don’t currently see how it solves the dilemma. If the premises are that...
1) A random event cannot be sufficiently rational or connected to an individuals character
2) Determined decision cannot be free
...and if both of these effectively reduce (as I think they do) to...
1) We cannot control (choose between) random action selections
2) We cannot control (choose between) deterministic action selections
...I’m not sure how two things which we cannot control can combine into something which we can.
For example, I cannot significantly influence the weather, nor can I significantly influence the orbit of Saturn. There is no admixture of these two variables results that I can influence any more than I can influence them individually. Likewise, if I cannot freely choose actions that are random or deterministic, I also cannot freely choose actions possessing some degree of both aspects.
It is often assumed that indeterminism can only come into play as part of a complex process of decision-making when the deterministic element has reached an impasse, and indeterminism has the “casting vote” (like an internalised version of tossing a coin when you cannot make up your mind). This model, which we call the Buridan model, has the advantage that you have some level of commitment to both courses of action; neither is exactly against your wishes. It is, however, not so good for rationality and self-control. The indetermistic coin-toss can reasonably be seen as “the” crucial cause of your decision, yet it is not under your control.
In our model, by contrast, the indeterministic element is moved back in the decision-making process. A functional unit we call the “Random Idea Generator” proposed multiple ideas and courses of action, which are then pruned back by a more-or-less deterministic process called the “Sensible Idea Selector”. (This arrangement is structurally modeled on random mutation and natural selection in Darwinian theory). The output of the R.I.G is “controlled” in the sense that the rest of the system does not have to act on its proposals. It can filter out anything too wild or irrational. Nonetheless, in a “rewinding history” scenario, the individual could have acted differently, as required by libertarian free will, because their R.I.G. could have come out with different proposals — and it would still be something they wanted to do, because it would not have been translated into action without the consent of the rest of the neural apparatus. (As naturalists, we take it that a “self” is the sum total of neural activity and not a ghost-in-the-machine).
I have:-
Naturalism helps in the construction of a viable model of libertarian free will, because it becomes clear that choice cannot be an irreducible, atomic process. A common objection to libertarian free will has it that a random event cannot be sufficiently rational or connected to an individuals character, whereas a determined decision cannot be free, so that a choice is un-free or it is capricious, objectionably random (irrational or unrelated to the agents character and desires). This argument, the “dilemma of determinism” makes the tacit assumption that a decision-making is either wholly determined or wholly random. However, if decision-making is complex, it can consist of a mixture of more deterministic and more random elements. A naturalistic theory of free will can therefore recommend itself as being able refute the Dilemma of Determinism through mere compromise: a complex and heterogenous decsion making process can be deterministic enough to be related to an individual’s character, yet indeterministic enough to count as free, for realistic levels of freedom.
Note that such a compromise inevitably involves a modest or deflated view of both ingredients. Freedom of choice is not seen as an omnipotent ability to perform any action, but as an agent’s the ability to perform an action chosen from a subset of possible actions that it is capable of conceiving and performing. Decision making is seen as rational enough to avoid mere caprice: following naturalistic assumptions we do not see agents as ideal reasoners.
That’s an interesting approach, though I don’t currently see how it solves the dilemma. If the premises are that...
1) A random event cannot be sufficiently rational or connected to an individuals character
2) Determined decision cannot be free
...and if both of these effectively reduce (as I think they do) to...
1) We cannot control (choose between) random action selections
2) We cannot control (choose between) deterministic action selections
...I’m not sure how two things which we cannot control can combine into something which we can.
For example, I cannot significantly influence the weather, nor can I significantly influence the orbit of Saturn. There is no admixture of these two variables results that I can influence any more than I can influence them individually. Likewise, if I cannot freely choose actions that are random or deterministic, I also cannot freely choose actions possessing some degree of both aspects.
It is often assumed that indeterminism can only come into play as part of a complex process of decision-making when the deterministic element has reached an impasse, and indeterminism has the “casting vote” (like an internalised version of tossing a coin when you cannot make up your mind). This model, which we call the Buridan model, has the advantage that you have some level of commitment to both courses of action; neither is exactly against your wishes. It is, however, not so good for rationality and self-control. The indetermistic coin-toss can reasonably be seen as “the” crucial cause of your decision, yet it is not under your control.
In our model, by contrast, the indeterministic element is moved back in the decision-making process. A functional unit we call the “Random Idea Generator” proposed multiple ideas and courses of action, which are then pruned back by a more-or-less deterministic process called the “Sensible Idea Selector”. (This arrangement is structurally modeled on random mutation and natural selection in Darwinian theory). The output of the R.I.G is “controlled” in the sense that the rest of the system does not have to act on its proposals. It can filter out anything too wild or irrational. Nonetheless, in a “rewinding history” scenario, the individual could have acted differently, as required by libertarian free will, because their R.I.G. could have come out with different proposals — and it would still be something they wanted to do, because it would not have been translated into action without the consent of the rest of the neural apparatus. (As naturalists, we take it that a “self” is the sum total of neural activity and not a ghost-in-the-machine).