There is nothing in what I wrote that implies people value their lives infinitely. People just need to value their lives highly enough such that flying on an airplane (with its probability of crashing) has a negative expected value.
Again, from Nick Bostrom’s article:
“Pascal: I must confess: I’ve been having doubts about the mathematics of
infinity. Infinite values lead to many strange conclusions and paradoxes. You
know the reasoning that has come to be known as ‘Pascal’s Wager’? Between
you and me, some of the critiques I’ve seen have made me wonder whether I
might not be somehow confused about infinities or about the existence of
infinite values . . .
Mugger: I assure you, my powers are strictly finite. The offer before you does
not involve infinite values in any way. But now I really must be off; I have an
assignation in the Seventh Dimension that I’d rather not miss. Your wallet,
please!”
There is nothing in what I wrote that implies people value their lives infinitely. People just need to value their lives highly enough such that flying on an airplane (with its probability of crashing) has a negative expected value.
Yes, that is the point.
Your claim that people flying on planes are engaging in an activity that has negative expected value flatly contradicts standard economic analysis and yet provides no supporting evidence to justify such a wildly controversial position. The only way your claim could be true in general would be if humans placed infinite value on their own lives. Otherwise it depends on details of why they are flying and what value they expect to gain if they arrive safely and on the actual probability of a fatal incident.
Since you didn’t mention in your original post under what circumstances your claim holds true you did imply that you were making a general claim and thus further imply that people value their lives infinitely.
You can’t have your cake and eat it too. If the probability is low enough, or the penalty mild enough, that the rational action is to take the gamble, then necessarily the expected utility will be positive.
Taking your driving example, if I evaluate a day of work as 100 utilons, my life as 10MU, and estimate the probability to die while driving to work as 1/M, then driving to work has an expected gain of 90U.
Is the problem that 0.01 or 0.05 too high?
Take a smaller value then.
In fact, people take such gambles (with negative expectation but with high probability of winning) everyday.
They fly on airplanes and drive to work.
In our world people do not place infinite value on their own lives.
There is nothing in what I wrote that implies people value their lives infinitely. People just need to value their lives highly enough such that flying on an airplane (with its probability of crashing) has a negative expected value.
Again, from Nick Bostrom’s article:
“Pascal: I must confess: I’ve been having doubts about the mathematics of infinity. Infinite values lead to many strange conclusions and paradoxes. You know the reasoning that has come to be known as ‘Pascal’s Wager’? Between you and me, some of the critiques I’ve seen have made me wonder whether I might not be somehow confused about infinities or about the existence of infinite values . . .
Mugger: I assure you, my powers are strictly finite. The offer before you does not involve infinite values in any way. But now I really must be off; I have an assignation in the Seventh Dimension that I’d rather not miss. Your wallet, please!”
Yes, that is the point.
Your claim that people flying on planes are engaging in an activity that has negative expected value flatly contradicts standard economic analysis and yet provides no supporting evidence to justify such a wildly controversial position. The only way your claim could be true in general would be if humans placed infinite value on their own lives. Otherwise it depends on details of why they are flying and what value they expect to gain if they arrive safely and on the actual probability of a fatal incident.
Since you didn’t mention in your original post under what circumstances your claim holds true you did imply that you were making a general claim and thus further imply that people value their lives infinitely.
You can’t have your cake and eat it too. If the probability is low enough, or the penalty mild enough, that the rational action is to take the gamble, then necessarily the expected utility will be positive.
Taking your driving example, if I evaluate a day of work as 100 utilons, my life as 10MU, and estimate the probability to die while driving to work as 1/M, then driving to work has an expected gain of 90U.