The “selfhood” relation doesn’t necessarily have to be symmetric or transitive, but the term is used as if it is, and I think this causes a lot of problems in discussion.
Eva1 and Eva2 likely both consider Eva0 (who walked into the machine) to be their past self, but that doesn’t mean that they must automatically consider themselves to be the same person as each other. It also doesn’t mean that Eva0 would agree with one or both of them.
I also think there is not any objective, external way to determine this relation: it’s purely psychological.
However, if I think further into a future where people could copy themselves, and later psychologically integrate both sets of memories, behaviour, and so on, then Eva1 and Eva2 in such a world may well consider themselves to be the same person as each other, and also some future Eva3,4, and so on. The thought of this few minutes branch of herself not contributing to her future self’s memories might not be so horrible, but I don’t think she’d merely take the word of a technician that Eva2 actually exists to carry on her survival.
Excellent points. I hadn’t given much thought to the psychological vs external sameness of selfhood.
One is naturally lead to wonder about how such dilemma would be dealt with in legal proceedings. Your assertion about the lack of an external objective criteria for the sameness of selfhood implies that if Eva1 committed a crime then we cannot reasonably convict Eva2 for it.
As Seth justly states, immediately after the cloning, all the Eva’s become different persons because they acquire different experiences. They do share a common history but they will soon start telling different stories about this history just as different people do.
Yes, legal identity is an even bigger can of worms. Even in some cases in the real world, you can already lose your continuity of “legal identity” in some corner cases. Being able to duplicate people would just make it even messier.
Do duplicates “inherit” into some sort of joint ownership of property? Is the property divided like inheritance? Are they new people entirely with no claims on property at all? What about citizenship? If Eva0 committed a crime, should we hold both Eva1 and Eva2 responsible for it? If after duplication Eva2 committed a crime that strongly benefits Eva1, but killed herself before conviction, can the prosecution go after Eva1? Do they need to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the intent was in the mind of Eva0 before duplication?
Being able to “merge” mind states would make it very much messier still.
Do they need to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the intent was in the mind of Eva0 before duplication?
That’s gnarly.
Another aspect that I’m led to contemplate is the ease of collusion with your clone. It’s reasonable to believe that Eva1 would collude with Eva2 more easily than with an entirely different person.
The “selfhood” relation doesn’t necessarily have to be symmetric or transitive, but the term is used as if it is, and I think this causes a lot of problems in discussion.
Eva1 and Eva2 likely both consider Eva0 (who walked into the machine) to be their past self, but that doesn’t mean that they must automatically consider themselves to be the same person as each other. It also doesn’t mean that Eva0 would agree with one or both of them.
I also think there is not any objective, external way to determine this relation: it’s purely psychological.
However, if I think further into a future where people could copy themselves, and later psychologically integrate both sets of memories, behaviour, and so on, then Eva1 and Eva2 in such a world may well consider themselves to be the same person as each other, and also some future Eva3,4, and so on. The thought of this few minutes branch of herself not contributing to her future self’s memories might not be so horrible, but I don’t think she’d merely take the word of a technician that Eva2 actually exists to carry on her survival.
Excellent points. I hadn’t given much thought to the psychological vs external sameness of selfhood.
One is naturally lead to wonder about how such dilemma would be dealt with in legal proceedings. Your assertion about the lack of an external objective criteria for the sameness of selfhood implies that if Eva1 committed a crime then we cannot reasonably convict Eva2 for it.
As Seth justly states, immediately after the cloning, all the Eva’s become different persons because they acquire different experiences. They do share a common history but they will soon start telling different stories about this history just as different people do.
Yes, legal identity is an even bigger can of worms. Even in some cases in the real world, you can already lose your continuity of “legal identity” in some corner cases. Being able to duplicate people would just make it even messier.
Do duplicates “inherit” into some sort of joint ownership of property? Is the property divided like inheritance? Are they new people entirely with no claims on property at all? What about citizenship? If Eva0 committed a crime, should we hold both Eva1 and Eva2 responsible for it? If after duplication Eva2 committed a crime that strongly benefits Eva1, but killed herself before conviction, can the prosecution go after Eva1? Do they need to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the intent was in the mind of Eva0 before duplication?
Being able to “merge” mind states would make it very much messier still.
That’s gnarly.
Another aspect that I’m led to contemplate is the ease of collusion with your clone. It’s reasonable to believe that Eva1 would collude with Eva2 more easily than with an entirely different person.