I’d say it falls naturally out of the construction of consent, actually. Looks pretty different from a consequential perspective, but from a deontological one the only relevant problems show up around the consent-capable/consent-incapable border, or relate to what to do when both partners are considered incapable—none of which is much of a surprise if you’re using a consent criterion. I’m pretty sure there’s similar strangeness in contract law.
There’s some more or less analogous stuff going on in the earlier property-crime construction, too.
I’d say it falls naturally out of the construction of consent, actually. Looks pretty different from a consequential perspective, but from a deontological one the only relevant problems show up around the consent-capable/consent-incapable border, or relate to what to do when both partners are considered incapable—none of which is much of a surprise if you’re using a consent criterion. I’m pretty sure there’s similar strangeness in contract law.
There’s some more or less analogous stuff going on in the earlier property-crime construction, too.