because most random women I’ve tested choose the certain $500, but every single woman in our community that I’ve asked, regardless of math level or wealth level or economic literacy or their performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test, takes the 15% chance of $1M.
Well, that doesn’t surprise me but I don’t think it’s got that much to do with personality: I’d think that a person struggling to make ends meet would be a lot more likely to choose the sure $500 than a reasonably wealthy person, and I don’t think there are many of the former kind among people who have enough spare time to read LessWrong, whereas there are lots of them among random people in the streets (at least in 2011 -- there probably were fewer in the 1980s, and more in the 1930s).
As a substantial portion of the population doesn’t play the game of thought experiments very well, it would be worthwhile to ask a second, unrelated thought-experiment question. Anyone who says something like “But a fat man wouldn’t weigh enough to stop a trolley!” or “You can’t keep a violinist alive by connecting them to a person!” and also doesn’t ask something like “Can I have investors bet on whether or not I will receive the $1M?” is just stupid.
Well, it just didn’t occur to me that I could make such a bet.
(Or even, I might sell the lottery ticket with an auction: someone richer than me (who would assign roughly the same utility as me to $1M but much less utility than me to smaller amounts such as $500) might buy it for a lot more money.)
If it wouldn’t have seemed to you like a decisive refutation that a fat man might not be able stop a trolley, then you’re not stupid, and didn’t immediately think of auctioning off the ticket because you understand how these things are supposed to work.
Well, I sometimes do think about non-LPCW answers to hypothetical dilemmas (though I don’t say them aloud), but in this case I didn’t even think of it. (I feel like my inclination to come up with non-LPCW answers is a function of the scenario’s plausibility, but not a monotonic one.)
Well, that doesn’t surprise me but I don’t think it’s got that much to do with personality: I’d think that a person struggling to make ends meet would be a lot more likely to choose the sure $500 than a reasonably wealthy person, and I don’t think there are many of the former kind among people who have enough spare time to read LessWrong, whereas there are lots of them among random people in the streets (at least in 2011 -- there probably were fewer in the 1980s, and more in the 1930s).
As a substantial portion of the population doesn’t play the game of thought experiments very well, it would be worthwhile to ask a second, unrelated thought-experiment question. Anyone who says something like “But a fat man wouldn’t weigh enough to stop a trolley!” or “You can’t keep a violinist alive by connecting them to a person!” and also doesn’t ask something like “Can I have investors bet on whether or not I will receive the $1M?” is just stupid.
Well, it just didn’t occur to me that I could make such a bet.
(Or even, I might sell the lottery ticket with an auction: someone richer than me (who would assign roughly the same utility as me to $1M but much less utility than me to smaller amounts such as $500) might buy it for a lot more money.)
If it wouldn’t have seemed to you like a decisive refutation that a fat man might not be able stop a trolley, then you’re not stupid, and didn’t immediately think of auctioning off the ticket because you understand how these things are supposed to work.
Well, I sometimes do think about non-LPCW answers to hypothetical dilemmas (though I don’t say them aloud), but in this case I didn’t even think of it. (I feel like my inclination to come up with non-LPCW answers is a function of the scenario’s plausibility, but not a monotonic one.)