If there’s a specific argument that you think is a good argument for the A-theory view (e.g., if you endorse one of the papers), I’m happy to check it out and see if it updates me.
No, not particularly. Actually, I do not have an opinion on the matter one way or the other!
As for the rest of your comment… it is understandable, as far as it goes; but note that a philosopher could say just the same thing, but in reverse.
He might say: “The mere fact that ‘a physics theory exists’, ‘physicists think that their theory has some bearing on this philosophical argument’, and ‘physicists have some familiarity with the state of the philosophical debate on the matter’ doesn’t move me.”
Our philosopher might say, further: “I think I already know the rough base rate of ‘physical scientists with delusions of philosophy’; I have interacted with many such folks, who think that they do not need to study philosophy in order to have an opinion on philosophers’ debates.”
And he might add, in all humility: “Since I’m not a domain expert, it might turn out that I’m missing something crucial, and the theory of relativity has some important consequence that bears on the argument; but I don’t treat this as nontrivially likely merely because professional physicists who have heard of the ‘eternalism vs. presentism’ debate disagree with me.”
Now, suppose I am a curious, though reasonably well-informed, layman—neither professionally a philosopher nor yet a physicist—and I observe this back-and-forth. What should I conclude from this exchange, about which one of you is right?
… and that would be the argument that I would make, if it were the case that you dismissed the philosophers’ arguments without reading them, while the philosophers dismissed your arguments (and/or those of the physicists) without reading them. But that’s not the case! Instead, what we have is a situation where you dismiss their arguments without reading them, while they have read your arguments, and are disagreeing with them on that, informed, basis.
Now what should I (the hypothetical well-informed layman) conclude?
Of course, the matter is more complicated than even that, because philosophers hardly agree with each other on this matter. But let’s not lose sight of the point of this discussion thread, which is: should a philosopher who endorses A-theory be docked “rationality points” (on the reasoning that any such philosopher must surely be suffering from “science illiteracy”—because if they had done any “basic research” [i.e., five minutes of web-searching], they would have learned about the special relativity issue, and would—we are meant to assume—immediately and reliably conclude that they had no business having an opinion about the nature of time, at least not without gaining a thorough technical understanding of special relativity)?
I think the answer to that question is “no, definitely not”. It’s obvious from a casual literature search that philosophers who are familiar with the “eternalism vs. presentism” debate at all, are also familiar with the question of special relativity’s implications for that debate. Whatever is causing some of them to still favor A-theory, it ain’t “science illiteracy”, inability to use Google, or any other such simple foolishness.
it is understandable, as far as it goes; but note that a philosopher could say just the same thing, but in reverse.
Sure! And similarly, if you were an agnostic, and I were an atheist making all the same statements about theism, you could say ‘philosophers of religion could say just the same thing, but in reverse’.
Yet this symmetry wouldn’t be a good reason for me to doubt atheism or put more time into reading theology articles.
I think the specific symmetry you’re pointing at doesn’t quite work (special relativity doesn’t have the same standing as A-theory arguments, either in fact or in philosophers’ or physicists’ eyes), but it’s not cruxy in any case.
Instead, what we have is a situation where you dismiss their arguments without reading them, while they have read your arguments, and are disagreeing with them on that, informed, basis.
At a minimum, you should say that I’m making a bizarrely bold prediction (at least from an outside-view perspective that thinks philosophers have systematically accurate beliefs about their subject matter). If I turn out to be right, after having put so little work in, it suggests I have surprisingly ‘efficient’ heuristics—ones that can figure out truth on at least certain classes of question, without putting in a ton of legwork first. (Cf. skills like ‘being able to tell whether certain papers are shit based on the abstract’.)
You’re free to update toward the hypothesis that I’m overconfident; the point of my sharing my views is to let you consider hypotheses like that, rather than hiding any arrogant-sounding beliefs of mine from view. I’m deliberately stating my views in a bold, stick-my-neck-out way because those are my actual views—I think we do for-real live in the world where A-theory is obviously false.
I’m not saying any of this to shut down discussion, or say I’m unwilling to hear arguments for A-theory. But I do think there’s value in combating underconfidence just as much as overconfidence, and in trying to reach conclusions efficiently rather than going through ritualistic doubts.
If you think I’m going too fast, then that’s a testable claim, since we can look at the best A-theory arguments and see if they change my mind, the minds of people we both agree are very sane, etc. But I’d probably want to delegate that search for ‘best arguments’ to someone who’s more optimistic that it will change anything.
Whatever is causing some of them to still favor A-theory, it ain’t “science illiteracy”, inability to use Google, or any other such simple foolishness.
Depending on how much we’re talking about ‘philosophers who don’t work on the metaphysics of time professionally, but have a view on this debate’ (the main group I discussed in the OP) vs. ‘A-theorists who write on the topic professionally’, I’d say it’s mostly a mix of (a) not using google / not having basic familiarity with the special relativity argument; (b) misunderstanding the force of the special relativity argument; and (c) misunderstanding/rejecting the basic Bayesian idea of how evidence, burdens of proof, updating, priors, and thermodynamic-work-that-makes-a-map-reflect-a-territory work, in favor of epistemologies that put more weight on ‘metaphysical intuitions that don’t make Bayesian sense but feel really compelling when I think them’.
I’d say much the same thing about professional theologians who argue that God must be real (in order for us to know stuff at all) because there’s no reason for evolution to give humans accurate cognition; or, for that matter, about theologians who argue that God must be real because speciation isn’t real. There are huge industries of theist scholars who have spent their whole lives arguing such things. Can they really be so wrong, when the counter-argument is so obvious, so strong, and so googlable?
To put it in simpler terms: is a physicist who believes an invisible, undetectable dragon lives in their garage ‘science-illiterate’?
I’d say that they’re at best science-illiterate, if not outright unhinged. If you want to say that it’s impossible to be science-illiterate while knowing a bunch of physics facts or while being able to do certain forms of physics lab work, then I assume we’re defining the word ‘science-illiterate’ differently. But hopefully this example clarifies in what basic sense I’m using the term.
If the arguments I have against theism don’t count as ‘knock-down arguments’… so much the worse for knock-down arguments, I suppose? The practical implication (‘this deserves the same level of intellectual respect and attention as leprechauns’) holds regardless.
No, not particularly. Actually, I do not have an opinion on the matter one way or the other!
As for the rest of your comment… it is understandable, as far as it goes; but note that a philosopher could say just the same thing, but in reverse.
He might say: “The mere fact that ‘a physics theory exists’, ‘physicists think that their theory has some bearing on this philosophical argument’, and ‘physicists have some familiarity with the state of the philosophical debate on the matter’ doesn’t move me.”
Our philosopher might say, further: “I think I already know the rough base rate of ‘physical scientists with delusions of philosophy’; I have interacted with many such folks, who think that they do not need to study philosophy in order to have an opinion on philosophers’ debates.”
And he might add, in all humility: “Since I’m not a domain expert, it might turn out that I’m missing something crucial, and the theory of relativity has some important consequence that bears on the argument; but I don’t treat this as nontrivially likely merely because professional physicists who have heard of the ‘eternalism vs. presentism’ debate disagree with me.”
Now, suppose I am a curious, though reasonably well-informed, layman—neither professionally a philosopher nor yet a physicist—and I observe this back-and-forth. What should I conclude from this exchange, about which one of you is right?
… and that would be the argument that I would make, if it were the case that you dismissed the philosophers’ arguments without reading them, while the philosophers dismissed your arguments (and/or those of the physicists) without reading them. But that’s not the case! Instead, what we have is a situation where you dismiss their arguments without reading them, while they have read your arguments, and are disagreeing with them on that, informed, basis.
Now what should I (the hypothetical well-informed layman) conclude?
Of course, the matter is more complicated than even that, because philosophers hardly agree with each other on this matter. But let’s not lose sight of the point of this discussion thread, which is: should a philosopher who endorses A-theory be docked “rationality points” (on the reasoning that any such philosopher must surely be suffering from “science illiteracy”—because if they had done any “basic research” [i.e., five minutes of web-searching], they would have learned about the special relativity issue, and would—we are meant to assume—immediately and reliably conclude that they had no business having an opinion about the nature of time, at least not without gaining a thorough technical understanding of special relativity)?
I think the answer to that question is “no, definitely not”. It’s obvious from a casual literature search that philosophers who are familiar with the “eternalism vs. presentism” debate at all, are also familiar with the question of special relativity’s implications for that debate. Whatever is causing some of them to still favor A-theory, it ain’t “science illiteracy”, inability to use Google, or any other such simple foolishness.
Sure! And similarly, if you were an agnostic, and I were an atheist making all the same statements about theism, you could say ‘philosophers of religion could say just the same thing, but in reverse’.
Yet this symmetry wouldn’t be a good reason for me to doubt atheism or put more time into reading theology articles.
I think the specific symmetry you’re pointing at doesn’t quite work (special relativity doesn’t have the same standing as A-theory arguments, either in fact or in philosophers’ or physicists’ eyes), but it’s not cruxy in any case.
At a minimum, you should say that I’m making a bizarrely bold prediction (at least from an outside-view perspective that thinks philosophers have systematically accurate beliefs about their subject matter). If I turn out to be right, after having put so little work in, it suggests I have surprisingly ‘efficient’ heuristics—ones that can figure out truth on at least certain classes of question, without putting in a ton of legwork first. (Cf. skills like ‘being able to tell whether certain papers are shit based on the abstract’.)
You’re free to update toward the hypothesis that I’m overconfident; the point of my sharing my views is to let you consider hypotheses like that, rather than hiding any arrogant-sounding beliefs of mine from view. I’m deliberately stating my views in a bold, stick-my-neck-out way because those are my actual views—I think we do for-real live in the world where A-theory is obviously false.
I’m not saying any of this to shut down discussion, or say I’m unwilling to hear arguments for A-theory. But I do think there’s value in combating underconfidence just as much as overconfidence, and in trying to reach conclusions efficiently rather than going through ritualistic doubts.
If you think I’m going too fast, then that’s a testable claim, since we can look at the best A-theory arguments and see if they change my mind, the minds of people we both agree are very sane, etc. But I’d probably want to delegate that search for ‘best arguments’ to someone who’s more optimistic that it will change anything.
Depending on how much we’re talking about ‘philosophers who don’t work on the metaphysics of time professionally, but have a view on this debate’ (the main group I discussed in the OP) vs. ‘A-theorists who write on the topic professionally’, I’d say it’s mostly a mix of (a) not using google / not having basic familiarity with the special relativity argument; (b) misunderstanding the force of the special relativity argument; and (c) misunderstanding/rejecting the basic Bayesian idea of how evidence, burdens of proof, updating, priors, and thermodynamic-work-that-makes-a-map-reflect-a-territory work, in favor of epistemologies that put more weight on ‘metaphysical intuitions that don’t make Bayesian sense but feel really compelling when I think them’.
I’d say much the same thing about professional theologians who argue that God must be real (in order for us to know stuff at all) because there’s no reason for evolution to give humans accurate cognition; or, for that matter, about theologians who argue that God must be real because speciation isn’t real. There are huge industries of theist scholars who have spent their whole lives arguing such things. Can they really be so wrong, when the counter-argument is so obvious, so strong, and so googlable?
Apparently, they can.
To put it in simpler terms: is a physicist who believes an invisible, undetectable dragon lives in their garage ‘science-illiterate’?
I’d say that they’re at best science-illiterate, if not outright unhinged. If you want to say that it’s impossible to be science-illiterate while knowing a bunch of physics facts or while being able to do certain forms of physics lab work, then I assume we’re defining the word ‘science-illiterate’ differently. But hopefully this example clarifies in what basic sense I’m using the term.
You don’t have the kind of knock down arguments against theism that you can think you have either .
If the arguments I have against theism don’t count as ‘knock-down arguments’… so much the worse for knock-down arguments, I suppose? The practical implication (‘this deserves the same level of intellectual respect and attention as leprechauns’) holds regardless.
Or maybe you could show some curiosity about the flaws instead of digging your heels in.