When it comes to describing moral discourse in general, I endorse semantic pluralism / ‘different groups are talking about wildly different things, and in some cases talking about nothing at all, when they use moral language’.
I agree, but this is orthogonal to whether moral realism is true. Questions about moral realism generally concern whether there are stance-independent moral facts. Whether or not there are such facts does not directly depend on the descriptive status of folk moral thought and discourse. Even if it did, it’s unclear to me how such an approach would vindicate any substantive account of realism.
You could call these views “anti-realist” in some senses. In other senses, you could call them realist (as I believe Frank Jackson does).
I’d have to know more about what Jackson’s specific position is to address it.
But ultimately the labels are unimportant; what matters is the actual content of the view, and we should only use the labels if they help with understanding that content, rather than concealing it under a pile of ambiguities and asides.
I agree with all that. I just don’t agree that this is diagnostic of debates in metaethics about realism versus antirealism. I don’t consider the realist label to be unhelpful, I do think it has a sufficiently well-understood meaning that its use isn’t wildly confused or unhelpful in contemporary debates, and I suspect most people who say that they’re moral realists endorse a sufficiently similar enough cluster of views that there’s nothing too troubling about using the term as a central distinction in the field. There is certainly wiggle room and quibbling, but there isn’t nearly enough actual variation in how philosophers understand realism for it to be plausible that a substantial proportion of realists don’t endorse the kinds of views I’m objecting to and claiming are indicative of problems in the field.
I don’t know enough about Jackson’s position in particular, but I’d be willing to bet I’d include it among those views I consider objectionable.
I agree, but this is orthogonal to whether moral realism is true. Questions about moral realism generally concern whether there are stance-independent moral facts. Whether or not there are such facts does not directly depend on the descriptive status of folk moral thought and discourse. Even if it did, it’s unclear to me how such an approach would vindicate any substantive account of realism.
I’d have to know more about what Jackson’s specific position is to address it.
I agree with all that. I just don’t agree that this is diagnostic of debates in metaethics about realism versus antirealism. I don’t consider the realist label to be unhelpful, I do think it has a sufficiently well-understood meaning that its use isn’t wildly confused or unhelpful in contemporary debates, and I suspect most people who say that they’re moral realists endorse a sufficiently similar enough cluster of views that there’s nothing too troubling about using the term as a central distinction in the field. There is certainly wiggle room and quibbling, but there isn’t nearly enough actual variation in how philosophers understand realism for it to be plausible that a substantial proportion of realists don’t endorse the kinds of views I’m objecting to and claiming are indicative of problems in the field.
I don’t know enough about Jackson’s position in particular, but I’d be willing to bet I’d include it among those views I consider objectionable.