That’s certainly possible, it’s also possible that you do not understand the argument.
The combination:
Uncontraversial understanding by academic orthodoxy
General position by those on lesswrong
My parsing of your post
Observation of your attempts to back up your argument when it was not found to be persuasive by myself or others
… is sufficient to give rather high confidence levels. It really is a huge claim you are making, to dismiss the understanding of basically the rest of the world regarding how CDT and EDT apply to the trivial toy problems that were designed to test them.
There is altogether too much deduction of causal mechanisms involved in your “EDT” reasoning. And the deductions involved rely on a premise (the second dot point) that just isn’t a part of either the problem or ‘genes’.
I’m making a simple, logical argument. If it’s wrong, it should be trivial to debunk. You’re relying on an outside view to judge; it is pretty weak.
As I’ve clearly said, I’m entirely aware that I’m making a rather controversial claim. I never bother to post on lesswrong, so I’m clearly not whoring for attention or anything like that. Look at it this way, in order to present my point despite it being so unorthodox, I have to be pretty damn sure it’s solid.
The second dot point is part of the problem description. You’re saying it’s irrelevant, but you can’t just parachute a payoff matrix where causality goes backward in time.
Find any example you like, as long as they’re physically possible, you’ll either have the payoff tied to your decision algorithm (Newcomb’s) or to your preference set (Solomon’s).
The combination:
Uncontraversial understanding by academic orthodoxy
General position by those on lesswrong
My parsing of your post
Observation of your attempts to back up your argument when it was not found to be persuasive by myself or others
… is sufficient to give rather high confidence levels. It really is a huge claim you are making, to dismiss the understanding of basically the rest of the world regarding how CDT and EDT apply to the trivial toy problems that were designed to test them.
There is altogether too much deduction of causal mechanisms involved in your “EDT” reasoning. And the deductions involved rely on a premise (the second dot point) that just isn’t a part of either the problem or ‘genes’.
I’m making a simple, logical argument. If it’s wrong, it should be trivial to debunk. You’re relying on an outside view to judge; it is pretty weak.
As I’ve clearly said, I’m entirely aware that I’m making a rather controversial claim. I never bother to post on lesswrong, so I’m clearly not whoring for attention or anything like that. Look at it this way, in order to present my point despite it being so unorthodox, I have to be pretty damn sure it’s solid.
The second dot point is part of the problem description. You’re saying it’s irrelevant, but you can’t just parachute a payoff matrix where causality goes backward in time.
Find any example you like, as long as they’re physically possible, you’ll either have the payoff tied to your decision algorithm (Newcomb’s) or to your preference set (Solomon’s).