If I look at my shoe and (voluntarily) pay attention to it, my subsequent thoughts are constrained to be somehow “about” my shoe. This constraint isn’t fully constraining—I might be putting my shoe into different contexts, or thinking about my shoe while humming a song to myself, etc.
By analogy, if I’m anxious, then my subsequent thoughts are (involuntarily) constrained to be somehow “about” the interoceptive feeling of anxiety. Again, this constraint isn’t fully constraining—I might be putting the feeling of anxiety into the context of how everyone hates me, or into the context of how my health is going downhill, or whatever else, and I could be doing both those things while simultaneously zipping up my coat and humming a song, etc.
Anxiety is just one example; I think there’s likewise involuntary attention associated with feeling itchy, feeling in pain, angry, etc.
You can still use the same positively-oriented brainstorming process for figuring out how to avoid bad outcomes. As soon as there’s even a vague idea of avoiding a very bad outcome, that becomes a very good reward prediction after taking the differential. The dopamine system does calculate such differentials, and it seems like the valance system, while probably different from direct reward prediction and more conceptual, should and could also take differentials in useful ways. Valance needs to at least somewhat dependent on context. I don’t think this requires unique mechanisms (although it might have them); it’s sufficient to learn variants of the concepts like “avoiding a really bad event” and then attaching valance to that concept variant.
Thanks!
FWIW my answer is “involuntary attention” as discussed in Valence §3.3.5 (it also came up in §6.5.2.1 of this series).
If I look at my shoe and (voluntarily) pay attention to it, my subsequent thoughts are constrained to be somehow “about” my shoe. This constraint isn’t fully constraining—I might be putting my shoe into different contexts, or thinking about my shoe while humming a song to myself, etc.
By analogy, if I’m anxious, then my subsequent thoughts are (involuntarily) constrained to be somehow “about” the interoceptive feeling of anxiety. Again, this constraint isn’t fully constraining—I might be putting the feeling of anxiety into the context of how everyone hates me, or into the context of how my health is going downhill, or whatever else, and I could be doing both those things while simultaneously zipping up my coat and humming a song, etc.
Anxiety is just one example; I think there’s likewise involuntary attention associated with feeling itchy, feeling in pain, angry, etc.
Interesting! I think that works.
You can still use the same positively-oriented brainstorming process for figuring out how to avoid bad outcomes. As soon as there’s even a vague idea of avoiding a very bad outcome, that becomes a very good reward prediction after taking the differential. The dopamine system does calculate such differentials, and it seems like the valance system, while probably different from direct reward prediction and more conceptual, should and could also take differentials in useful ways. Valance needs to at least somewhat dependent on context. I don’t think this requires unique mechanisms (although it might have them); it’s sufficient to learn variants of the concepts like “avoiding a really bad event” and then attaching valance to that concept variant.