Utility functions might already be the true name—after all, they do directly measure optimisation, while probability doesn’t directly measure information.
The true name might have nothing to do with utility functions—Alex Altair has made the case that it should be defined in terms of preference orderings instead.
My vote here is for something between “Utility functions might already be the true name” and “The true name might have nothing to do with utility functions”.
It sounds to me like you’re chasing an intuition that is validly reflecting one of nature’s joints, and that that joint is more or less already named by the concept of “utility function” (but where further research is useful).
And separately, I think there’s another natural joint that I (and Yudkowsky and others) call “optimization”, and this joint has nothing to do with utility functions. Or more accurately, maximizing a utility function is an instance of optimization, but has additional structure.
My vote here is for something between “Utility functions might already be the true name” and “The true name might have nothing to do with utility functions”.
It sounds to me like you’re chasing an intuition that is validly reflecting one of nature’s joints, and that that joint is more or less already named by the concept of “utility function” (but where further research is useful).
And separately, I think there’s another natural joint that I (and Yudkowsky and others) call “optimization”, and this joint has nothing to do with utility functions. Or more accurately, maximizing a utility function is an instance of optimization, but has additional structure.