I would raise a hypothesis to consideration because someone was arguing for it, but I don’t think anecdotes are good evidence in that I would have similar confidence in a hypothesis supported by an anecdote, and a hypothesis that is flatly stated with no justification. The evidence to raise it to consideration comes from the fact that someone took the time to advocate it.
This is more of a heuristic than a rule, because there are anecdotes that are strong evidence (“I ran experiments on this last year and they didn’t fit”), but when dealing with murkier issues, they don’t count for much.
The evidence to raise it to consideration comes from the fact that someone took the time to advocate it, not the anecdote.
Yes, it may be that the mere fact that a hypothesis is advocated screens off whether that hypothesis is also supported by an anecdote. But I suspect that the existence of anecdotes still moves a little probability mass around, even among just those hypotheses that are being advocated.
I mean, if someone advocated for a hypothesis, and they couldn’t even offer an anecdote in support of it, that would be pretty deadly to their credibility. So, unless I am certain that every advocated hypothesis has supporting anecdotes (which I am not), I must concede that anecdotes are evidence, howsoever weak, over and above mere advocacy.
Here’s a situation where an anecdote should reduce our confidence in a belief:
A person’s beliefs are usually well-supported.
When he offers supporting evidence, he usually offers the strongest evidence he knows about.
If this person were to offer an anecdote, it should reduce our confidence in his proposition, because it makes it unlikely he knows of stronger supporting evidence.
I don’t know how applicable this is to actual people.
I don’t think this is necessarily valid, because people also know that anecdotes can be highly persuasive. So for many people, if you have an anecdote it will make sense to say so, since most people argue not to reach the truth but to persuade.
… For example, if you told me that you once met a powerful demon who works to stop anyone from ever telling anecdotes about him (regardless of whether the anecdotes are true or false), then I would decrease my credence in the existence of such a demon.
I would raise a hypothesis to consideration because someone was arguing for it, but I don’t think anecdotes are good evidence in that I would have similar confidence in a hypothesis supported by an anecdote, and a hypothesis that is flatly stated with no justification. The evidence to raise it to consideration comes from the fact that someone took the time to advocate it.
This is more of a heuristic than a rule, because there are anecdotes that are strong evidence (“I ran experiments on this last year and they didn’t fit”), but when dealing with murkier issues, they don’t count for much.
Yes, it may be that the mere fact that a hypothesis is advocated screens off whether that hypothesis is also supported by an anecdote. But I suspect that the existence of anecdotes still moves a little probability mass around, even among just those hypotheses that are being advocated.
I mean, if someone advocated for a hypothesis, and they couldn’t even offer an anecdote in support of it, that would be pretty deadly to their credibility. So, unless I am certain that every advocated hypothesis has supporting anecdotes (which I am not), I must concede that anecdotes are evidence, howsoever weak, over and above mere advocacy.
Here’s a situation where an anecdote should reduce our confidence in a belief:
A person’s beliefs are usually well-supported.
When he offers supporting evidence, he usually offers the strongest evidence he knows about.
If this person were to offer an anecdote, it should reduce our confidence in his proposition, because it makes it unlikely he knows of stronger supporting evidence.
I don’t know how applicable this is to actual people.
I don’t think this is necessarily valid, because people also know that anecdotes can be highly persuasive. So for many people, if you have an anecdote it will make sense to say so, since most people argue not to reach the truth but to persuade.
I agree that it is at least hypothetically possible that the offering of an anecdote should reduce our credence in what the anecdote claims.
… For example, if you told me that you once met a powerful demon who works to stop anyone from ever telling anecdotes about him (regardless of whether the anecdotes are true or false), then I would decrease my credence in the existence of such a demon.