It means that if you are in one, probability does not come down to only preferences. I suppose that since you can never be absolutely sure you’re in one, you still have to find out your weightings between worlds where there might be nothing but preferences.
The other point is that I seriously doubt there’s anything built into you that makes you not care about possible worlds where QM is true, so even if it does come down to ‘mere preferences’, you can still make mistakes.
The existence of an objective weighting scheme within one set of possible worlds gives me some hope of an objective weighting between all possible worlds, but note all that much, and it’s not clear to me what that would be. Maybe the set of all possible worlds is countable, and each world is weighted equally?
Maybe the set of all possible worlds is countable, and each world is weighted equally?
I am not really sure what to make of weightings on possible worlds. Overall, on this issue, I think I am going to have to admit that I am thoroughly confused.
By the way, do you mean “finite” here, rather than countable?
Yeah, but the confusion gets better as the worlds become more similar. How to weight between QM worlds and nonQM worlds is something I haven’t even seen an attempt to explain, but how to weight within QM worlds has been explained, and how to weight in the sleeping beauty problem is quite straight forward.
I meant countable, but now that you mention it I think I should have said finite- I’ll have to think about this some more.
There are plenty of possible worlds (infinitely many of them) where quantum mechanics is false; so I don’t see how this helps.
It means that if you are in one, probability does not come down to only preferences. I suppose that since you can never be absolutely sure you’re in one, you still have to find out your weightings between worlds where there might be nothing but preferences.
The other point is that I seriously doubt there’s anything built into you that makes you not care about possible worlds where QM is true, so even if it does come down to ‘mere preferences’, you can still make mistakes.
The existence of an objective weighting scheme within one set of possible worlds gives me some hope of an objective weighting between all possible worlds, but note all that much, and it’s not clear to me what that would be. Maybe the set of all possible worlds is countable, and each world is weighted equally?
I am not really sure what to make of weightings on possible worlds. Overall, on this issue, I think I am going to have to admit that I am thoroughly confused.
By the way, do you mean “finite” here, rather than countable?
Yeah, but the confusion gets better as the worlds become more similar. How to weight between QM worlds and nonQM worlds is something I haven’t even seen an attempt to explain, but how to weight within QM worlds has been explained, and how to weight in the sleeping beauty problem is quite straight forward.
I meant countable, but now that you mention it I think I should have said finite- I’ll have to think about this some more.