Part of the confusion between us is that you seem to want the word ‘morality’ to encompass all preferences—whether a preference for chocolate over vanilla, or a preference for telling the truth over lying, or a preference for altruism over selfishness.
No, I don’t want that. In fact I do not currently have a metaethical position beyond finding all existing metaethical theories (that I’m aware of) to be inadequate. In my earlier comment I offered two possible lines of defense for altruism, because I didn’t know which metaethics you prefer:
Altruists certainly claim to have support for their stated preferences. Or one could argue that preferences don’t need to have support.
In your reply to that comment you chose to respond to only the second sentence, hence the “confusion”.
Anyway, why don’t you make a post detailing your metaethics, as well as your arguments against “universal unreciprocated altruism”? It’s not clear to me what you’re trying to accomplish by calling people who believe such things (many of whom are very smart and have already seriously reflected on these issues) “crazy” without backing up your claims.
It’s not clear to me what you’re trying to accomplish by calling people who believe such things (many of whom are very smart and have already seriously reflected on these issues) “crazy” without backing up your claims.
I’m not sure why you think I have called anyone crazy. What I said above is that a particular moral notion is crazy.
Perhaps you instead meant to complain that (in the grandparent) I had referred to the persons in question as “moral idiots”. I’m afraid I must plead guilty to that bit of hyperbole.
Anyway, why don’t you make a post detailing your metaethics, as well as your arguments against “universal unreciprocated altruism”?
I am gradually coming to think that there is little agreement here as to what the word metaethics even means. My current understanding is that metaethics is what you do to prepare the linguistic ground so that people operating under different ethical theories and doctrines can talk to each other. Meta-ethics strives to be neutral and non-normative. There are no meta-ethical facts about the world—only definitions that permit discourse and disputation about the facts.
Given this interpretation of “meta-ethics”, it would seem that what you mean to suggest is that I make a post detailing my normative ethics, which would include an argument against “universal unreciprocated altruism” (which I take to be a competing theory of normative ethics).
Luke and/or Eliezer and/or any trained philosopher here: I would appreciate feedback as to whether I finally have the correct understanding of the scope and purpose of meta-ethics.
Given this interpretation of “meta-ethics”, it would seem that what you mean to suggest is that I make a post detailing my normative ethics, which would include an argument against “universal unreciprocated altruism” (which I take to be a competing theory of normative ethics).
I thought you might have certain metaethical views, which might be important for understanding your normative ethics. But yes, I’m mainly interested in hearing about your normative ethics.
No, I don’t want that. In fact I do not currently have a metaethical position beyond finding all existing metaethical theories (that I’m aware of) to be inadequate. In my earlier comment I offered two possible lines of defense for altruism, because I didn’t know which metaethics you prefer:
In your reply to that comment you chose to respond to only the second sentence, hence the “confusion”.
Anyway, why don’t you make a post detailing your metaethics, as well as your arguments against “universal unreciprocated altruism”? It’s not clear to me what you’re trying to accomplish by calling people who believe such things (many of whom are very smart and have already seriously reflected on these issues) “crazy” without backing up your claims.
I’m not sure why you think I have called anyone crazy. What I said above is that a particular moral notion is crazy.
Perhaps you instead meant to complain that (in the grandparent) I had referred to the persons in question as “moral idiots”. I’m afraid I must plead guilty to that bit of hyperbole.
I am gradually coming to think that there is little agreement here as to what the word metaethics even means. My current understanding is that metaethics is what you do to prepare the linguistic ground so that people operating under different ethical theories and doctrines can talk to each other. Meta-ethics strives to be neutral and non-normative. There are no meta-ethical facts about the world—only definitions that permit discourse and disputation about the facts.
Given this interpretation of “meta-ethics”, it would seem that what you mean to suggest is that I make a post detailing my normative ethics, which would include an argument against “universal unreciprocated altruism” (which I take to be a competing theory of normative ethics).
Luke and/or Eliezer and/or any trained philosopher here: I would appreciate feedback as to whether I finally have the correct understanding of the scope and purpose of meta-ethics.
I thought you might have certain metaethical views, which might be important for understanding your normative ethics. But yes, I’m mainly interested in hearing about your normative ethics.