“the copy of Chris Hallquist just is Chris Hallquist in every way”
I would say that by definition of a copy, it can’t be Chris in every way, because there is one clear way that it isn’t:--it’s a copy! This is a fundamental principle of identity—a thing can only be identical to itself. Things might be functionally equivalent, or very similar, but a copy by definition isn’t the same, or we wouldn’t call it a copy.
It does make a difference—the use of the word “his” is key. “Copy of Chris” might have experiences and would not notice any difference regarding the fate of Chris, but for Chris, HIS experiences would end. (sorry for the caps; not shouting, just don’t know how to do italics).
Let’s say that “Chris” and “copy of Chris” are in a room.
I come into the room and say, “I’m going to kill one of you”. Both “Chris” and “copy of Chris” are going to prefer that the other is killed, because their particular ability to experience things would end, even if a very similar consciousness would live on.
Both “Chris” and “copy of Chris” are Chris Hallquist. Both remember being Chris Hallquist, which is the only way anyone’s identity ever persists. Copy of Chris would insist that he’s Chris Hallquist for the same reason the original Chris would insist so. And as far as I’m concerned, they’d both be right—because if you weren’t in the room when the copying process happened, you’d have no way of telling the difference. I don’t deny that as time passes they gradually would become different people.
I prefer to frame things this way. Suppose you take Chris Hallquist and scan his entire body and brain such that you could rebuild it exactly the same way later. Then you wait 5 minutes and then kill him. Now you use the machine to rebuild his body and brain. Is Chris Hallquist dead? I would say no—it would basically be the same as if he had amnesia—I would prefer to experience amnesia than to be killed, and I definitely don’t anticipate having the same experiences in either case. Yet your view seems to imply that, since the original was killed, despite having a living, talking Chris Hallquist in front of you, it’s somehow not really him.
Edit: Moreover, if I was convinced the technology worked as advertised, I would happily undergo this amnesia process for even small amounts of money, say, $100. Just to show that I actually do believe what I’m saying.
with regard to “Yet your view seems to imply that, since the original was killed, despite having a living, talking Chris Hallquist in front of you, it’s somehow not really him.”
Yes, I do believe that the copy of Chris Hallquist would have an identical consciousness (until, as you stated, he had some new experiences), but the original (non-copy) Chris is still gone. So from a functional perspective I can interact with “copy of Chris” in the same way, but the original, unbroken consciousness of “original Chris” is still gone, which from the perspective of that consciousness, would be important.
with regard to “Both “Chris” and “copy of Chris” are Chris Hallquist.” I still am confused: they may have the same structure, function, and properties, but there are still two of them, so they cannot be the same thing. There are two entities; just because you made a copy doesn’t mean that when you destroy the original that the original isn’t changed as a result.
Why do you consider Chris Hallquist to be the same person when he wakes up in the morning as he is when he went to bed the night before (do you?)?
There are two entities; just because you made a copy doesn’t mean that when you destroy the original that the original isn’t changed as a result.
The original is changed. And I agree that there are two entities. But I don’t see why Chris Hallquist should care about that before the split even occurs. Would you undergo the amnesia procedure (if you were convinced the tech worked, that the people were being honest, etc.) for $1000? What’s the difference between that and a 5-minute long dreamless sleep (other than the fact that a dead body has magically appeared outside the room)?
I would consider the Chris that wakes up in the morning the same person because his consciousness was never destroyed. Death destroys consciousness, sleep doesn’t; this seems obvious to me (and I think most people); otherwise we wouldn’t be here discussing this (if this was the case it seems we’d be discussing nightly cryonics to prevent our nightly deaths). Just because most people agree doesn’t make something right, but my intuition tells me that sleep doesn’t kill me (or my consciousness) while death does.
Sorry for caps, how do you italicize in comments?
I think the crux of the issue is that you believe GENERIC “Chris H consciousness” is all that matters, no matter what platform is running it. I agree that another platform (“copy of Chris”) would run it equally well, but I still think that the PARTICULAR person experiencing the consciousness (Chris) would go away, and I don’t like it. It seems like you are treating consciousness as a means—we can run the software on a copy, so it’s exactly the same, where I see it as an end—original Chris should hold on to his particular consciousness. Isn’t this why death is a fundamental problem for people? If people could upload their consciousness to a computer, it may provide some solace but I don’t think it would eliminate completely the sting of death.
With regard to whether I would do it for $1,000--no. Earlier you equated the amnesia procedure with death (I agree). So no, I wouldn’t agree to have a copy of me who happens to be running my consciousness $1,000 for the privilege of committing suicide!
Asterisks around your *italic text* like that. There should be a “Show help” button below the comment field which will pop up a table that explains this stuff.
Isn’t this why death is a fundamental problem for people?
I actually think so. I mean, I used to think of death as this horrible thing, but I realized that I will never experience being dead, so it doesn’t bother me so much anymore. Not being alive bothers me, because I like being alive, but that’s another story. However, I’m dying all the time, in a sense. For example, most of the daily thoughts of 10-year old me are thoughts I will never have again; particularly, because I live somewhere else now, I won’t even have the same patterns being burned into my visual cortex.
I think the crux of the issue is that you believe generic “Chris H consciousness” is all that matters, no matter what platform is running it.
That’s a good way of putting it. The main thing that bothers me about focusing on a “particular” person is that I (in your sense of the word) have no way of knowing whether I’m a copy (in your sense of the word) or not. But I do know that my experiences are real. So I would prefer to say not that there is a copy but that there are two originals. There is, as a matter of fact, a copy in your sense of the word, but I don’t think that attribute should factor into a person’s decision-making (or moral weighting of individuals). The copy has the same thoughts as the original for the same reason the original has his own thoughts! So I don’t see why you consider one as being privileged, because I don’t see location as being that which truly confers consciousness on someone.
I (in your sense of the word) have no way of knowing whether I’m a copy (in your sense of the word) or not. But I do >know that my experiences are real.
I see what you mean about not knowing whether you are a copy. I think this is almost part of the intuition I’m having—you in particular know that your experiences are real, and that you value them. So even if the copy doesn’t know it’s a copy, I feel that the original will still lose out. I don’t think people experience death, as you noted above, but not being alive sucks, and that’s what I think would happen to “original Chris”
By the way, thanks for having this conversation—it made me think about the consequences of my intuitions about this matter more than I have previously—even counting the time I spent as an undergrad writing a paper about the “copy machine dilemma” we’ve been toying with.
Thanks for the italics! Don’t know how I missed the huge show help button for so long.
“the copy of Chris Hallquist just is Chris Hallquist in every way”
I would say that by definition of a copy, it can’t be Chris in every way, because there is one clear way that it isn’t:--it’s a copy! This is a fundamental principle of identity—a thing can only be identical to itself. Things might be functionally equivalent, or very similar, but a copy by definition isn’t the same, or we wouldn’t call it a copy.
But why would Chris Hallquist care about this “fundamental principle of identity”, if it makes no difference to his experiences?
It does make a difference—the use of the word “his” is key. “Copy of Chris” might have experiences and would not notice any difference regarding the fate of Chris, but for Chris, HIS experiences would end. (sorry for the caps; not shouting, just don’t know how to do italics).
Let’s say that “Chris” and “copy of Chris” are in a room.
I come into the room and say, “I’m going to kill one of you”. Both “Chris” and “copy of Chris” are going to prefer that the other is killed, because their particular ability to experience things would end, even if a very similar consciousness would live on.
Both “Chris” and “copy of Chris” are Chris Hallquist. Both remember being Chris Hallquist, which is the only way anyone’s identity ever persists. Copy of Chris would insist that he’s Chris Hallquist for the same reason the original Chris would insist so. And as far as I’m concerned, they’d both be right—because if you weren’t in the room when the copying process happened, you’d have no way of telling the difference. I don’t deny that as time passes they gradually would become different people.
I prefer to frame things this way. Suppose you take Chris Hallquist and scan his entire body and brain such that you could rebuild it exactly the same way later. Then you wait 5 minutes and then kill him. Now you use the machine to rebuild his body and brain. Is Chris Hallquist dead? I would say no—it would basically be the same as if he had amnesia—I would prefer to experience amnesia than to be killed, and I definitely don’t anticipate having the same experiences in either case. Yet your view seems to imply that, since the original was killed, despite having a living, talking Chris Hallquist in front of you, it’s somehow not really him.
Edit: Moreover, if I was convinced the technology worked as advertised, I would happily undergo this amnesia process for even small amounts of money, say, $100. Just to show that I actually do believe what I’m saying.
with regard to “Yet your view seems to imply that, since the original was killed, despite having a living, talking Chris Hallquist in front of you, it’s somehow not really him.”
Yes, I do believe that the copy of Chris Hallquist would have an identical consciousness (until, as you stated, he had some new experiences), but the original (non-copy) Chris is still gone. So from a functional perspective I can interact with “copy of Chris” in the same way, but the original, unbroken consciousness of “original Chris” is still gone, which from the perspective of that consciousness, would be important.
with regard to “Both “Chris” and “copy of Chris” are Chris Hallquist.” I still am confused: they may have the same structure, function, and properties, but there are still two of them, so they cannot be the same thing. There are two entities; just because you made a copy doesn’t mean that when you destroy the original that the original isn’t changed as a result.
Why do you consider Chris Hallquist to be the same person when he wakes up in the morning as he is when he went to bed the night before (do you?)?
The original is changed. And I agree that there are two entities. But I don’t see why Chris Hallquist should care about that before the split even occurs. Would you undergo the amnesia procedure (if you were convinced the tech worked, that the people were being honest, etc.) for $1000? What’s the difference between that and a 5-minute long dreamless sleep (other than the fact that a dead body has magically appeared outside the room)?
I would consider the Chris that wakes up in the morning the same person because his consciousness was never destroyed. Death destroys consciousness, sleep doesn’t; this seems obvious to me (and I think most people); otherwise we wouldn’t be here discussing this (if this was the case it seems we’d be discussing nightly cryonics to prevent our nightly deaths). Just because most people agree doesn’t make something right, but my intuition tells me that sleep doesn’t kill me (or my consciousness) while death does.
Sorry for caps, how do you italicize in comments? I think the crux of the issue is that you believe GENERIC “Chris H consciousness” is all that matters, no matter what platform is running it. I agree that another platform (“copy of Chris”) would run it equally well, but I still think that the PARTICULAR person experiencing the consciousness (Chris) would go away, and I don’t like it. It seems like you are treating consciousness as a means—we can run the software on a copy, so it’s exactly the same, where I see it as an end—original Chris should hold on to his particular consciousness. Isn’t this why death is a fundamental problem for people? If people could upload their consciousness to a computer, it may provide some solace but I don’t think it would eliminate completely the sting of death.
With regard to whether I would do it for $1,000--no. Earlier you equated the amnesia procedure with death (I agree). So no, I wouldn’t agree to have a copy of me who happens to be running my consciousness $1,000 for the privilege of committing suicide!
Asterisks around your *italic text* like that. There should be a “Show help” button below the comment field which will pop up a table that explains this stuff.
I actually think so. I mean, I used to think of death as this horrible thing, but I realized that I will never experience being dead, so it doesn’t bother me so much anymore. Not being alive bothers me, because I like being alive, but that’s another story. However, I’m dying all the time, in a sense. For example, most of the daily thoughts of 10-year old me are thoughts I will never have again; particularly, because I live somewhere else now, I won’t even have the same patterns being burned into my visual cortex.
That’s a good way of putting it. The main thing that bothers me about focusing on a “particular” person is that I (in your sense of the word) have no way of knowing whether I’m a copy (in your sense of the word) or not. But I do know that my experiences are real. So I would prefer to say not that there is a copy but that there are two originals. There is, as a matter of fact, a copy in your sense of the word, but I don’t think that attribute should factor into a person’s decision-making (or moral weighting of individuals). The copy has the same thoughts as the original for the same reason the original has his own thoughts! So I don’t see why you consider one as being privileged, because I don’t see location as being that which truly confers consciousness on someone.
I see what you mean about not knowing whether you are a copy. I think this is almost part of the intuition I’m having—you in particular know that your experiences are real, and that you value them. So even if the copy doesn’t know it’s a copy, I feel that the original will still lose out. I don’t think people experience death, as you noted above, but not being alive sucks, and that’s what I think would happen to “original Chris”
By the way, thanks for having this conversation—it made me think about the consequences of my intuitions about this matter more than I have previously—even counting the time I spent as an undergrad writing a paper about the “copy machine dilemma” we’ve been toying with.
Thanks for the italics! Don’t know how I missed the huge show help button for so long.