Sample scenario 1: I go to an upload clinic. They give me a coma inducing drug and tell me that it will wear off in approximately 8 hours, after the scan is complete. As I drift off, I expect a 50% chance that I will awake to find myself an upload, and a 50% chance that I will awake to find myself still stuck in a meat body.
Sample scenario 2: I go to an upload clinic. They tell me the machine is instantaneous and I will be conscious for the scan, and that the uploaded copy will be fully tested and operational in virtual form in about an hour. I step into the machine. I expect with 50% probability that I will step out of the machine after the scan, not feeling particularly different, and that an hour later I’ll be able to talk to my virtual upload in the machine. I also expect with 50% probability that I will find myself spontaneously in virtual form the instant after the scan completes, and that when I check the block, an hour or more of real time will have passed even though it felt instantaneous to me.
(Waking up as an upload in scenario 2 doesn’t seem much different from being put under for surgery to me, at least based on my experiences. You’re talking, then suddenly everything is in a different place and the anaestheseologist is asking ‘can you tell me your name’, interrupting your train of thought and half an hour has passed and the doctor has totally lost track of the conversation right when it was getting interesting.)
Ok, I understand your position. It is not impossible that what you describe is reality. However I believe that it depends on a model of consciousness / subjective experience / personal identity as I have been using those terms which has not definitely been shown to be true. There are other plausible models which would predict with certainty that you would walk out of the machine and not wake up in the simulator. Since (I believe) we do not yet know enough to say with certainty which theory is correct, the conservative, dare I say rational way to proceed is to make choices which come out favorably under both models.
However in the case of destructive uploading vs. revival in cryonics we can go further. Under no model is it better to upload than to revive. This is analogous to scenario #2 - where the patient has (in your model) only a 50% chance of ending up in the simulation vs. the morgue. If I’m right he or she has a 0% chance of success. If you are right then that same person has a 50% chance of success. Personally I’d take revival with a 100% chance of success in both models (modulo chance of losing identity anyway during the vitrification process).
Nothing I said implied a ’50% chance of ending up in the simulation vs. the morgue’. In the scenario where destructive uploading is used, I would expect to walk into the uploading booth, and wake up as an upload with ~100% probability, not 50%. Are you sure you understand my position? Signs point to no.
Sample scenario 1: I go to an upload clinic. They give me a coma inducing drug and tell me that it will wear off in approximately 8 hours, after the scan is complete. As I drift off, I expect a 50% chance that I will awake to find myself an upload, and a 50% chance that I will awake to find myself still stuck in a meat body.
Sample scenario 2: I go to an upload clinic. They tell me the machine is instantaneous and I will be conscious for the scan, and that the uploaded copy will be fully tested and operational in virtual form in about an hour. I step into the machine. I expect with 50% probability that I will step out of the machine after the scan, not feeling particularly different, and that an hour later I’ll be able to talk to my virtual upload in the machine. I also expect with 50% probability that I will find myself spontaneously in virtual form the instant after the scan completes, and that when I check the block, an hour or more of real time will have passed even though it felt instantaneous to me.
(Waking up as an upload in scenario 2 doesn’t seem much different from being put under for surgery to me, at least based on my experiences. You’re talking, then suddenly everything is in a different place and the anaestheseologist is asking ‘can you tell me your name’, interrupting your train of thought and half an hour has passed and the doctor has totally lost track of the conversation right when it was getting interesting.)
Ok, I understand your position. It is not impossible that what you describe is reality. However I believe that it depends on a model of consciousness / subjective experience / personal identity as I have been using those terms which has not definitely been shown to be true. There are other plausible models which would predict with certainty that you would walk out of the machine and not wake up in the simulator. Since (I believe) we do not yet know enough to say with certainty which theory is correct, the conservative, dare I say rational way to proceed is to make choices which come out favorably under both models.
However in the case of destructive uploading vs. revival in cryonics we can go further. Under no model is it better to upload than to revive. This is analogous to scenario #2 - where the patient has (in your model) only a 50% chance of ending up in the simulation vs. the morgue. If I’m right he or she has a 0% chance of success. If you are right then that same person has a 50% chance of success. Personally I’d take revival with a 100% chance of success in both models (modulo chance of losing identity anyway during the vitrification process).
Nothing I said implied a ’50% chance of ending up in the simulation vs. the morgue’. In the scenario where destructive uploading is used, I would expect to walk into the uploading booth, and wake up as an upload with ~100% probability, not 50%. Are you sure you understand my position? Signs point to no.