Panpsychism doesn’t regard the mental as being reducible to the physical.. indeed, hostility to emergence is not ne of its main motivations.
Panpsychism asserts that everything has consciousness/mental properties. Non functionalist reductionism doesn’t, and is in fact less liberal about which entities are conscious than functionalism/computationalism.
So NFR restricts what structures are conscious but doesn’t require the corresponding rules to live on the algorithmic level only. Ok, I can see how that’s a coherent theory. Thanks.
It’s not necessarily a question of additional rules. If you take the view that no kind of functionality could explain or predict qualia, then having the right substrate in addition to the right algorithm could cause something additional to for functionality, IE qualia.
I didn’t mean additional rules, just rules in general, i.e., under NFR, the set of things you need to look at to determine whether something is conscious aren’t entirely contained on the algorithmic level of abstraction.
Of course, we are supposed to regard biological processes as reducible and not dependent on an Elan Vital… and that’s a form of reduction that’s exquisitely dependent on precise chemical.properties...you can’t make chlorophyl or haemoglobin out of any collection of atoms.
Functionalism about algorithms is called computationalism.
Non functionalist reductionism (substrate dependence) needs to be mentioned separately, because it’s one of the major physicalist theories.
What’s the difference between that and panpsychism?
It being non functionalist reductionism ?
Panpsychism doesn’t regard the mental as being reducible to the physical.. indeed, hostility to emergence is not ne of its main motivations.
Panpsychism asserts that everything has consciousness/mental properties. Non functionalist reductionism doesn’t, and is in fact less liberal about which entities are conscious than functionalism/computationalism.
So NFR restricts what structures are conscious but doesn’t require the corresponding rules to live on the algorithmic level only. Ok, I can see how that’s a coherent theory. Thanks.
Does it specify state vs. process?
It’s not necessarily a question of additional rules. If you take the view that no kind of functionality could explain or predict qualia, then having the right substrate in addition to the right algorithm could cause something additional to for functionality, IE qualia.
I didn’t mean additional rules, just rules in general, i.e., under NFR, the set of things you need to look at to determine whether something is conscious aren’t entirely contained on the algorithmic level of abstraction.
The set of things that are relevant isn’t entirely contained by “rules”, either.
Of course, we are supposed to regard biological processes as reducible and not dependent on an Elan Vital… and that’s a form of reduction that’s exquisitely dependent on precise chemical.properties...you can’t make chlorophyl or haemoglobin out of any collection of atoms.