a strategic voter doing approval voting learns to restrict their approval to ONLY the “electable favorite”, which de facto gives you FPTP all over gain.
Wouldn’t you restrict your approval to your favorite of the frontrunners, and every candidate you like better than that one? I don’t see how you do worse by doing that under vanilla Approval Voting.
That leaves some favorable properties compared to FPTP
If there’s a candidate perceived as unelectable, but secretly most people like him more than the frontrunners, he will win under strategic approval voting.
It is true that there are some favorable properties that many systems other than the best system has compared to FPTP.
I like methods that are cloneproof and which can’t be spoofed by irrelevant alternatives, and if there is ONLY a choice between “something mediocre” and “something mediocre with one less negative feature” then I guess I’ll be in favor of hill climbing since “some mysterious force” somehow prevents “us” from doing the best thing.
However, I think cloning and independence are “nice to haves” whereas the condorcet criterion is probably a “need to have”
((The biggest design fear I have is actually the “participation criterion”. One of the very very few virtues of FPTP is that it at least satisfies the criterion where someone showing up and “wasting their vote on a third party” doesn’t cause their least preferred candidate to jump ahead of a more preferred candidate. But something similar can happen in every method I know of that reliably selects the Condorcet Winner when one exists :-(
Mathematically, I’ve begun to worry that maybe I should try to prove that Condorcet and Participation simply cannot both be satisfied at the same time?
Pragmatically, I’m not sure what it looks like to “attack people’s will to vote” (or troll sad people into voting in ways that harm their interests and have the sad people fight back righteously by insisting that they shouldn’t vote, because voting really will net harm their interests).
One can hope that people will simply “want to vote” because it make civic sense, but it actually looks like a huge number of humans are biased to feel like a peasant, and to have a desire to be ruled? Or something? And maybe you can just make it “against the law to not vote” (like in Australia) but maybe that won’t solve the problems that could hypothetically “sociologically arise” from losing the participation criterion in ways that might be hard to foresee.))
In general, I think people should advocate for the BEST thing. The BEST thing I currently know of for picking an elected civilian commander in chief is “Ranked Pairs tabulation over Preference Ballots (with a law that requires everyone to vote during the two day Voting Holiday)”.
Wouldn’t you restrict your approval to your favorite of the frontrunners, and every candidate you like better than that one? I don’t see how you do worse by doing that under vanilla Approval Voting.
That leaves some favorable properties compared to FPTP
If there’s a candidate perceived as unelectable, but secretly most people like him more than the frontrunners, he will win under strategic approval voting.
Clone candidates don’t split the vote.
It is true that there are some favorable properties that many systems other than the best system has compared to FPTP.
I like methods that are cloneproof and which can’t be spoofed by irrelevant alternatives, and if there is ONLY a choice between “something mediocre” and “something mediocre with one less negative feature” then I guess I’ll be in favor of hill climbing since “some mysterious force” somehow prevents “us” from doing the best thing.
However, I think cloning and independence are “nice to haves” whereas the condorcet criterion is probably a “need to have”
((The biggest design fear I have is actually the “participation criterion”. One of the very very few virtues of FPTP is that it at least satisfies the criterion where someone showing up and “wasting their vote on a third party” doesn’t cause their least preferred candidate to jump ahead of a more preferred candidate. But something similar can happen in every method I know of that reliably selects the Condorcet Winner when one exists :-(
Mathematically, I’ve begun to worry that maybe I should try to prove that Condorcet and Participation simply cannot both be satisfied at the same time?
Pragmatically, I’m not sure what it looks like to “attack people’s will to vote” (or troll sad people into voting in ways that harm their interests and have the sad people fight back righteously by insisting that they shouldn’t vote, because voting really will net harm their interests).
One can hope that people will simply “want to vote” because it make civic sense, but it actually looks like a huge number of humans are biased to feel like a peasant, and to have a desire to be ruled? Or something? And maybe you can just make it “against the law to not vote” (like in Australia) but maybe that won’t solve the problems that could hypothetically “sociologically arise” from losing the participation criterion in ways that might be hard to foresee.))
In general, I think people should advocate for the BEST thing. The BEST thing I currently know of for picking an elected civilian commander in chief is “Ranked Pairs tabulation over Preference Ballots (with a law that requires everyone to vote during the two day Voting Holiday)”.