2 was supposed to point out how there shouldn’t be any components to consciousness that we can miss by preserving all the observations, since if there are any such epiphenomenal components of consciousness, there by definition isn’t any evidence of them.
That the reasoning also goes the other way is irrelevant.
That depends on what you mean by observations and evidence. If we preserved the subjective, introspective access to consciousness, then consciousness would be preserved… logically. But we can not do that practically. Practically, we can preserve externally observable functions and behaviour, but we can’t be sure that doing that preserves consciousness.
2 was supposed to point out how there shouldn’t be any components to consciousness that we can miss by preserving all the observations, since if there are any such epiphenomenal components of consciousness, there by definition isn’t any evidence of them.
That the reasoning also goes the other way is irrelevant.
That depends on what you mean by observations and evidence. If we preserved the subjective, introspective access to consciousness, then consciousness would be preserved… logically. But we can not do that practically. Practically, we can preserve externally observable functions and behaviour, but we can’t be sure that doing that preserves consciousness.