It seems to me that what we are ‘actually in’ is indeed better described as a narrative. Sure you have chosen what you describe as unsuccessful narratives in your life but in order to exist you have to choose a narrative. You say “As I’ve gotten older I’ve learned to become alarmed and cautious when I detect myself reasoning by proximity to Protagonist Feelings”. Why have you become alarmed and cautious? Cautious towards what? What danger are you trying to avoid? It seems to me that you have changed your narrative structure to take into account whatever you have chosen to define as that which you do not want to identify with. But you are still in what can be seen as a narrative structure.
A narrative is not _any possible chain of explanations_ -- I’m concerned that you can just always describe someone’s description of a chain of events as a narrative, making it meaningless. To me, a narrative in the context of Val’s post means a description which is specifically optimised for social/psychological incentives (especially emotional appeal, which is to say, engagness) rather than for accuracy.
The claim is deeper than that. Your mind is structured in a way that mirrors narrative structure. You are always in a state (A) and in order to do anything you need to decide on a goal state(B). That is a simplified narrative structure and is not just a way to explain the actions of someone else. It is the way you decide how to act. Check Jordan Peterson’s Maps of Meaning lectures where he goes in depth on the full pattern and then shows how it is found in stories, myth, religion etc. and also, quite astonishingly, in the biological structure of the brain.
There are many different definitions of “narrative” which you can give, and there are many different patterns which the brain is biased toward. The particular element which you point at (out of Peterson’s more elaborate definition) can also be called intentional stance, and it makes sense to suppose that the brain is evolved to deal with it, along with a number of other structures.
But, if we just define “narrative structure” as the sort of pattern which the brain is adapted to understand, then you can always say that you are turning your reality into a narrative structure, because you are understanding it with your brain.
While this may be a perfectly useful definition in some contexts, it is useless for the kind of debiasing move which moridinamael was talking about. In the context of that conversation, it seems better to interpret “narrative” as a description which is specifically warped by optimizing it to fit the biases of the brain particularly well, as a kind of superstimulus. Then, “narrative” is a matter of degree (we can still say that everything is warped by the fact that we have to use our brains to understand it), but we can distinguish between narrative and non-narrative.
This also seems more likely to me to be a useful definition in general, and in the context of Val’s post, but I could be wrong. To me, it seems to better fit the central cases of what I want to call narrative, such as political speeches, or fiction.
I have to admit that your comment makes a lot of sense from within the rationalist perspective. I just think that the rationalist perspective is quite myopic when it comes to the value of stories. You say:
While this may be a perfectly useful definition in some contexts, it is useless for the kind of debiasing move which moridinamael was talking about. In the context of that conversation, it seems better to interpret “narrative” as a description which is specifically warped by optimizing it to fit the biases of the brain particularly well, as a kind of superstimulus.
You seem to see narrative structures as being useful only as a stimulus [1]. Epistemologically you are using the word ‘warped’ and ‘bias’ that, in my view, betrays your own belief system. A hypothesis that you might want to entertain is that stories contain truths (wisdom) that can not always be rationally articulated, at least for now. That does not mean that all stories contain wisdom, just like statements that presume to be rational do not necessarily achieve their goal. By studying stories you will develop the capacity to understand/obtain wisdom. In other words the stories themselves contain the elements needed to understand them and distinguish wisdom from superstition.
Here is a story through which you can reflect on some aspects of your situation:
There is more Light here
Someone saw Nasrudin searching for something on the ground.
‘What have you lost, Mulla?’ he asked. ‘My key,’ said the Mulla. So they both went down on their knees and looked for it.
After a time the other man asked: ‘Where exactly did you drop it?’
‘In my own house.’
‘Then why are you looking here?’
‘There is more light here than inside my own house.’
[ from Idries Shah—The Exploits of the Incomparable Mulla Nasrudin ]
I do recommend Idries Shah’s books of stories. The Nasrudin books are a good start for most people.
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[1] I have to acknowledge here that Valentine seems to treat stories in a similar manner so your comment is definitely justified. I am here expanding on why I believe this to be a restrictive way of thinking.
It seems to me that what we are ‘actually in’ is indeed better described as a narrative. Sure you have chosen what you describe as unsuccessful narratives in your life but in order to exist you have to choose a narrative. You say “As I’ve gotten older I’ve learned to become alarmed and cautious when I detect myself reasoning by proximity to Protagonist Feelings”. Why have you become alarmed and cautious? Cautious towards what? What danger are you trying to avoid? It seems to me that you have changed your narrative structure to take into account whatever you have chosen to define as that which you do not want to identify with. But you are still in what can be seen as a narrative structure.
A narrative is not _any possible chain of explanations_ -- I’m concerned that you can just always describe someone’s description of a chain of events as a narrative, making it meaningless. To me, a narrative in the context of Val’s post means a description which is specifically optimised for social/psychological incentives (especially emotional appeal, which is to say, engagness) rather than for accuracy.
The claim is deeper than that. Your mind is structured in a way that mirrors narrative structure. You are always in a state (A) and in order to do anything you need to decide on a goal state(B). That is a simplified narrative structure and is not just a way to explain the actions of someone else. It is the way you decide how to act. Check Jordan Peterson’s Maps of Meaning lectures where he goes in depth on the full pattern and then shows how it is found in stories, myth, religion etc. and also, quite astonishingly, in the biological structure of the brain.
There are many different definitions of “narrative” which you can give, and there are many different patterns which the brain is biased toward. The particular element which you point at (out of Peterson’s more elaborate definition) can also be called intentional stance, and it makes sense to suppose that the brain is evolved to deal with it, along with a number of other structures.
But, if we just define “narrative structure” as the sort of pattern which the brain is adapted to understand, then you can always say that you are turning your reality into a narrative structure, because you are understanding it with your brain.
While this may be a perfectly useful definition in some contexts, it is useless for the kind of debiasing move which moridinamael was talking about. In the context of that conversation, it seems better to interpret “narrative” as a description which is specifically warped by optimizing it to fit the biases of the brain particularly well, as a kind of superstimulus. Then, “narrative” is a matter of degree (we can still say that everything is warped by the fact that we have to use our brains to understand it), but we can distinguish between narrative and non-narrative.
This also seems more likely to me to be a useful definition in general, and in the context of Val’s post, but I could be wrong. To me, it seems to better fit the central cases of what I want to call narrative, such as political speeches, or fiction.
I have to admit that your comment makes a lot of sense from within the rationalist perspective. I just think that the rationalist perspective is quite myopic when it comes to the value of stories. You say:
You seem to see narrative structures as being useful only as a stimulus [1]. Epistemologically you are using the word ‘warped’ and ‘bias’ that, in my view, betrays your own belief system. A hypothesis that you might want to entertain is that stories contain truths (wisdom) that can not always be rationally articulated, at least for now. That does not mean that all stories contain wisdom, just like statements that presume to be rational do not necessarily achieve their goal. By studying stories you will develop the capacity to understand/obtain wisdom. In other words the stories themselves contain the elements needed to understand them and distinguish wisdom from superstition.
Here is a story through which you can reflect on some aspects of your situation:
I do recommend Idries Shah’s books of stories. The Nasrudin books are a good start for most people.
------------------------------------------
[1] I have to acknowledge here that Valentine seems to treat stories in a similar manner so your comment is definitely justified. I am here expanding on why I believe this to be a restrictive way of thinking.