Nope, I still think that’s wrong. It can’t be helped until they develop better technology maybe, but it’s wrong. The species in Greg Egan’s Orthogonal series was like that. They eventually figured out how to reproduce without dying.
There are things about ourselves that evolution did to us that we ought to change. Like dying of old age, for example. Evolution is not moral. It is indifferent. The Sequences illustrate this very clearly.
It can’t be helped until they develop better technology maybe, but it’s wrong.
That’s not how morality works. If you say that something is wrong, it necessarily follows that the opposite is right. So if it’s still wrong in that situation, they should go extinct, rather than waiting for better technology. If something “can’t be helped,” then that thing cannot be morally wrong, since you cannot blame someone for doing something that cannot be helped, while moral wrongness is something blameworthy.
The correct way to describe this situation is that it is right to kill for the sake of reproduction, but this is not an ideal situation, and it is true that they should hope they will be able to change it later.
In the same way, I already said that other things being equal, I prefer that other animals suffer less. So when we have technology that enables us to get equal or superior utility without eating other animals, we will stop eating them. Meanwhile, it is right to eat them, just as it is right for those people to kill.
There are things about ourselves that evolution did to us that we ought to change.
I agree, but the point is not relevant, since it means that unfortunate situations evolve, not wicked situations. I have a post on that here.
Evolution is not moral. It is indifferent. The Sequences illustrate this very clearly.
Eliezer was very strongly opposed to the idea that morality is an abstract truth that has nothing to do with what humans have actually evolved to do.
That’s not how morality works.
moral wrongness is something blameworthy.
We might be arguing word definitions at this point, but if your definition is “blameworthiness”, then I think I see what you mean.
If you say that something is wrong, it necessarily follows that the opposite is right.
What? No it doesn’t! Reversed stupidity is not intelligence. Neither is reversed immorality morality. The foolhardy action in battle is wrong, therefore, the cowardly action is right? The right answer is not the opposite. The courageous action is somewhere in between, but probably closer to foolhardy than cowardly.
The opposite of doing wrong is NOT doing wrong, and is also doing right. If it is wrong to kill to reproduce in the situation under discussion, it is right not to kill—that is, it is right not to reproduce at all. But this is false, so it is right to kill in that situation.
We might be arguing word definitions at this point,
Indeed. If you say “such and such is morally wrong, but not blameworthy,” then you are definitely not speaking of morally wrong as I or any normal person means it.
The opposite of doing wrong is NOT doing wrong, and is also doing right
You deny the existence of morally neutral acts? There’s a difference between “not blameworthy” and “praiseworthy”.
If you say “such and such is morally wrong, but not blameworthy
That’s not exactly what I said. But I’m not so confident that normal persons entirely agree with each other on such definitions. If an insane person kills another person, we may not call that blameworthy (because the insane person is not a competent moral agent), but we still call the act itself “wrong”, because it is unlawful, has predictably bad consequences, and would be blameworthy had a (counterfactually) competent person done it. I hear “normal person”s use this kind of definition all the time.
There are acts which are neutral in the abstract, which can sometimes be good and sometimes bad. But particular acts are always one or the other. This is obvious, since if an act contributes to a good purpose, and there is nothing bad about it, it will be good. On the other hand, if it contributes to no good purpose at all, it will be bad, because it will be a waste of time and energy.
I think a normal person would be more likely to say that an act by an incompetent person “would” be wrong, if it were done by a competent person, rather than saying that it “is” wrong. But I don’t think there is much disagreement there. I agree that in order to be blameworthy, a person has to be responsible for their actions. This makes no difference to the scenario under discussion, because people would be purposely reproducing. They could just not reproduce, if they wanted to; so if the act were wrong, they would be morally obliged not to reproduce, and this is false.
But particular acts are always one or the other. This is obvious, since if an act contributes to a good purpose, and there is nothing bad about it, it will be good. On the other hand, if it contributes to no good purpose at all, it will be bad, because it will be a waste of time and energy.
You can’t have this both ways. You define the morality of an act not by its consequence, but by whether the agent should be blamed for the consequence. But then you also deny the existence of morally neutral acts based on consequence alone. Contradiction.
Moral agents in the real world are not omniscient, not even logically omniscient. Particular acts may always have perfect or suboptimal consequences, but real agents can’t always predict this, and thus cannot be blamed for acting in a way that turns out to be suboptimal in hindsight (in the case the prediction was mistaken).
It sounds like you’re defining anything suboptimal as “bad”, rather than a lesser good. If you do accept the existence of lesser goods and lesser evils, then replace “suboptimal” with “bad” and “perfect” with “good” in the above paragraph, and the argument still works.
You can’t have this both ways. You define the morality of an act not by its consequence, but by whether the agent should be blamed for the consequence. But then you also deny the existence of morally neutral acts based on consequence alone. Contradiction.
There is no contradiction. If you reasonably believe that no good will come of your act, you are blameworthy for performing it, and it is a bad act. If you reasonably believe good will come of your act, and that it is not a bad act, you are praiseworthy.
Nope, I still think that’s wrong. It can’t be helped until they develop better technology maybe, but it’s wrong. The species in Greg Egan’s Orthogonal series was like that. They eventually figured out how to reproduce without dying.
There are things about ourselves that evolution did to us that we ought to change. Like dying of old age, for example. Evolution is not moral. It is indifferent. The Sequences illustrate this very clearly.
That’s not how morality works. If you say that something is wrong, it necessarily follows that the opposite is right. So if it’s still wrong in that situation, they should go extinct, rather than waiting for better technology. If something “can’t be helped,” then that thing cannot be morally wrong, since you cannot blame someone for doing something that cannot be helped, while moral wrongness is something blameworthy.
The correct way to describe this situation is that it is right to kill for the sake of reproduction, but this is not an ideal situation, and it is true that they should hope they will be able to change it later.
In the same way, I already said that other things being equal, I prefer that other animals suffer less. So when we have technology that enables us to get equal or superior utility without eating other animals, we will stop eating them. Meanwhile, it is right to eat them, just as it is right for those people to kill.
I agree, but the point is not relevant, since it means that unfortunate situations evolve, not wicked situations. I have a post on that here.
Eliezer was very strongly opposed to the idea that morality is an abstract truth that has nothing to do with what humans have actually evolved to do.
We might be arguing word definitions at this point, but if your definition is “blameworthiness”, then I think I see what you mean.
What? No it doesn’t! Reversed stupidity is not intelligence. Neither is reversed immorality morality. The foolhardy action in battle is wrong, therefore, the cowardly action is right? The right answer is not the opposite. The courageous action is somewhere in between, but probably closer to foolhardy than cowardly.
The opposite of doing wrong is NOT doing wrong, and is also doing right. If it is wrong to kill to reproduce in the situation under discussion, it is right not to kill—that is, it is right not to reproduce at all. But this is false, so it is right to kill in that situation.
Indeed. If you say “such and such is morally wrong, but not blameworthy,” then you are definitely not speaking of morally wrong as I or any normal person means it.
You deny the existence of morally neutral acts? There’s a difference between “not blameworthy” and “praiseworthy”.
That’s not exactly what I said. But I’m not so confident that normal persons entirely agree with each other on such definitions. If an insane person kills another person, we may not call that blameworthy (because the insane person is not a competent moral agent), but we still call the act itself “wrong”, because it is unlawful, has predictably bad consequences, and would be blameworthy had a (counterfactually) competent person done it. I hear “normal person”s use this kind of definition all the time.
There are acts which are neutral in the abstract, which can sometimes be good and sometimes bad. But particular acts are always one or the other. This is obvious, since if an act contributes to a good purpose, and there is nothing bad about it, it will be good. On the other hand, if it contributes to no good purpose at all, it will be bad, because it will be a waste of time and energy.
I think a normal person would be more likely to say that an act by an incompetent person “would” be wrong, if it were done by a competent person, rather than saying that it “is” wrong. But I don’t think there is much disagreement there. I agree that in order to be blameworthy, a person has to be responsible for their actions. This makes no difference to the scenario under discussion, because people would be purposely reproducing. They could just not reproduce, if they wanted to; so if the act were wrong, they would be morally obliged not to reproduce, and this is false.
You can’t have this both ways. You define the morality of an act not by its consequence, but by whether the agent should be blamed for the consequence. But then you also deny the existence of morally neutral acts based on consequence alone. Contradiction.
Moral agents in the real world are not omniscient, not even logically omniscient. Particular acts may always have perfect or suboptimal consequences, but real agents can’t always predict this, and thus cannot be blamed for acting in a way that turns out to be suboptimal in hindsight (in the case the prediction was mistaken).
It sounds like you’re defining anything suboptimal as “bad”, rather than a lesser good. If you do accept the existence of lesser goods and lesser evils, then replace “suboptimal” with “bad” and “perfect” with “good” in the above paragraph, and the argument still works.
There is no contradiction. If you reasonably believe that no good will come of your act, you are blameworthy for performing it, and it is a bad act. If you reasonably believe good will come of your act, and that it is not a bad act, you are praiseworthy.