The distinction between epistemic and instrumental rationality is standard.
Postmodernists/relativists have emphasized use of the word ‘true’ as a mere emphasis, which I admit is a common use.
I haven’t particularly seen anyone pioneering a rationalist technique of trying to eliminate the word ‘true’ to avoid use as a mere emphasis. The deflationary theory of truth says that all uses of “truth” are deflatable—which this sequence denies; but the idea of deflating “true” out of sentences is clearly precedented, as is the Tarski-inspired algorithm for doing so.
I haven’t particularly seen anything which emphasizes that the residue of trying to eliminate the word “truth” is abstraction and generalization over the behavior of map-territory correspondences.
Similarly, I haven’t previously seen anyone advocate, as a rationality technique, trying to eliminate the word ‘rational’; or emphasizing that the non-eliminable residue will be about cognitive algorithms. I wouldn’t particularly expect to see that; this is me trying to narrow the definition a particular way that I think is useful.
Postmodernists/relativists have emphasized use of the word ‘true’ as a mere emphasis, which I admit is a common use.
More boo lights.
Postmodernists assert that object-level morality abuses the concept of truth in order to reinforce the acceptance of normative claims. You noted that some thinkers call that “the halo effect.”
Kuhn and Feyerabend assert that the interpretations of evidence and what evidence is available to interpret are affected by social factors than a naive philosophy of science wouldn’t suspect.
Common use is not better evidence of postmodern thought than folk psychology is evidence of what Kahneman thinks.
What postmodern position are you actually attacking here?
What postmodern position are you actually attacking here?
You seem to have misread. Eliezer’s comment was intended to point out connections between what he’s talking about and “mainstream” ideas / writing. He noted in the article that “true” is sometimes used as mere emphasis, and noted here that postmodernists have made the same observation. I don’t see why that would be characterized as an “attack”.
Eliezer is attacking a particular usage of the word “true.” That point is well taken. Further, I appreciate his explicit linking of his thoughts into the larger philosophical debate.
But I am unaware of any philosophical movement that uses “true” the way Eliezer attacks. The sentence I quote could have made the same point (and been more accurate) if postmodernist/relativism was omitted entirely. What purpose do you think including the label had? In particular, why was the label (inaccurately) applied to a position that Eliezer just demonstrated was false?
In essence, postmodernism is based on the position that reality is not mirrored in human understanding of it, but is rather constructed as the mind tries to understand its own personal reality. Postmodernism is therefore skeptical of explanations that claim to be valid for all groups, cultures, traditions, or races, and instead focuses on the relative truths of each person. In the postmodern understanding, interpretation is everything; reality only comes into being through our interpretations of what the world means to us individually.
If “postmodernists” have this opinion as stated, I suspect that when they aren’t using the word “true” to attack or criticize other philosophical ideas, they would be using it as a form of emphasis on a particular interpretation, or to assert the dominance of a particular interpretation, as this interpretation then literally becomes more “true” (in their model, according to my model of their model).
I think the next paragraph is a bit more accurate:
Postmodernism postulates that many, if not all, apparent realities are only social constructs and are therefore subject to change. It claims that there is no absolute truth and that the way people perceive the world is subjective and emphasises the role of language, power relations, and motivations in the formation of ideas and beliefs. In particular it attacks the use of sharp binary classifications such as male versus female, straight versus gay, white versus black, and imperial versus colonial; it holds realities to be plural and relative, and to be dependent on who the interested parties are and the nature of these interests. Postmodernist approaches therefore often consider the ways in which social dynamics, such as power and hierarchy, affect human conceptualizations of the world to have important effects on the way knowledge is constructed and used. Postmodernist thought often emphasizes constructivism, idealism, pluralism, relativism, and scepticism in its approaches to knowledge and understanding.
The key point of political theory post-modernist is that certain social norms are claimed to be true or universal when that is not the case. Further, binary distinctions (black/white, capitalist/proletariat) are inherently misleading, organizing the world in particular ways in order to advance particular moral agendas.
Thanks, I shall update towards most postmodernists being less of the extreme philosophical kind and more about practical matters like those.
Most self-titled “postmodernists” I’ve encountered and discussed with were more of the extreme philosophical kind—the kind that would claim ontologically basic mental entities or some other really weird postulate if asked “But where did the first ‘reality’ come from if there never was any objective reality for us to base our own ones on?”
As a discipline, postmodernism seems unusually terrible at producing competent practitioners. The average academic chemist is a better scientist than the average postmodernist is as a philosopher.
Not all moral distinctions are on-off buttons. Some (most?) are sliding scales.
I don’t expect king-of-postmodernism-is-nonsense and mister-I-think-postmodernism-makes-good-points to come to agreement, but I’m interested in where exactly we disagree.
Do you think some agents could gain advantage by treating a sliding-scale moral quality as discrete?
Do you think some agents could gain advantage by treating a discrete moral quality as sliding-scale?
What sort of evidence is useful in deciding whether a particular moral quality is discrete or sliding scale?
the sentence I quote could have made the same point (and been more accurate) if postmodernist/relativism was omitted entirely.
The point of that sentence was that postmodernists/relativists have emphasized something. Removing “postmodernists/relativists” from that sentence removes the entire point of the sentence. The comment was about what mainstream folks have talked about.
In particular, why was the label (inaccurately) applied to a position that Eliezer just demonstrated was false?
It was not. The label was applied to people who noticed something that Eliezer also noticed. He did not even say that postmodernists/relativists think that is the correct use of the word “true”. If anything, it was praise for postmodernists/relativists for having already covered something that Eliezer wanted to talk about.
My mental model of Eliezer Yudkowsky is that he thinks all postmodernism is nonsense—as others have noted. If he intended to say something equivalent to “Postmodernist got this point right” then what he wrote is not how I expect he would say it. Further, the attack that I am reading into his words is a standard understanding of postmodernism in this community.
But the community seems to agree with you more than I—so I’m adjusting slightly in favor of me misreading Eliezer’s intent.
Mainstream status:
The distinction between epistemic and instrumental rationality is standard.
Postmodernists/relativists have emphasized use of the word ‘true’ as a mere emphasis, which I admit is a common use.
I haven’t particularly seen anyone pioneering a rationalist technique of trying to eliminate the word ‘true’ to avoid use as a mere emphasis. The deflationary theory of truth says that all uses of “truth” are deflatable—which this sequence denies; but the idea of deflating “true” out of sentences is clearly precedented, as is the Tarski-inspired algorithm for doing so.
I haven’t particularly seen anything which emphasizes that the residue of trying to eliminate the word “truth” is abstraction and generalization over the behavior of map-territory correspondences.
Similarly, I haven’t previously seen anyone advocate, as a rationality technique, trying to eliminate the word ‘rational’; or emphasizing that the non-eliminable residue will be about cognitive algorithms. I wouldn’t particularly expect to see that; this is me trying to narrow the definition a particular way that I think is useful.
A “mainstream status” on LW philosophy posts is an excellent idea. Nice one.
More boo lights.
Postmodernists assert that object-level morality abuses the concept of truth in order to reinforce the acceptance of normative claims. You noted that some thinkers call that “the halo effect.”
Kuhn and Feyerabend assert that the interpretations of evidence and what evidence is available to interpret are affected by social factors than a naive philosophy of science wouldn’t suspect.
Common use is not better evidence of postmodern thought than folk psychology is evidence of what Kahneman thinks.
What postmodern position are you actually attacking here?
You seem to have misread. Eliezer’s comment was intended to point out connections between what he’s talking about and “mainstream” ideas / writing. He noted in the article that “true” is sometimes used as mere emphasis, and noted here that postmodernists have made the same observation. I don’t see why that would be characterized as an “attack”.
Eliezer is attacking a particular usage of the word “true.” That point is well taken. Further, I appreciate his explicit linking of his thoughts into the larger philosophical debate.
But I am unaware of any philosophical movement that uses “true” the way Eliezer attacks. The sentence I quote could have made the same point (and been more accurate) if postmodernist/relativism was omitted entirely. What purpose do you think including the label had? In particular, why was the label (inaccurately) applied to a position that Eliezer just demonstrated was false?
From Wikipedia:
If “postmodernists” have this opinion as stated, I suspect that when they aren’t using the word “true” to attack or criticize other philosophical ideas, they would be using it as a form of emphasis on a particular interpretation, or to assert the dominance of a particular interpretation, as this interpretation then literally becomes more “true” (in their model, according to my model of their model).
I think the next paragraph is a bit more accurate:
The key point of political theory post-modernist is that certain social norms are claimed to be true or universal when that is not the case. Further, binary distinctions (black/white, capitalist/proletariat) are inherently misleading, organizing the world in particular ways in order to advance particular moral agendas.
Thanks, I shall update towards most postmodernists being less of the extreme philosophical kind and more about practical matters like those.
Most self-titled “postmodernists” I’ve encountered and discussed with were more of the extreme philosophical kind—the kind that would claim ontologically basic mental entities or some other really weird postulate if asked “But where did the first ‘reality’ come from if there never was any objective reality for us to base our own ones on?”
As a discipline, postmodernism seems unusually terrible at producing competent practitioners. The average academic chemist is a better scientist than the average postmodernist is as a philosopher.
That said, a lot of conventional wisdom in fields like sociology or Legal Realism have very strong postmodern flavors. Honestly, a lot of the meta-type analysis of norms is using scientific data to show what various humanities thinkers had been saying all along.
Some are some aren’t. Furthermore, it’s impossible to say anything without using distinctions.
Not all moral distinctions are on-off buttons. Some (most?) are sliding scales.
I don’t expect king-of-postmodernism-is-nonsense and mister-I-think-postmodernism-makes-good-points to come to agreement, but I’m interested in where exactly we disagree.
Do you think some agents could gain advantage by treating a sliding-scale moral quality as discrete?
Do you think some agents could gain advantage by treating a discrete moral quality as sliding-scale?
What sort of evidence is useful in deciding whether a particular moral quality is discrete or sliding scale?
First binary distinctions aren’t just for moral systems.
If we restrict to moral distinctions, most moral distinctions are Schelling points.
The point of that sentence was that postmodernists/relativists have emphasized something. Removing “postmodernists/relativists” from that sentence removes the entire point of the sentence. The comment was about what mainstream folks have talked about.
It was not. The label was applied to people who noticed something that Eliezer also noticed. He did not even say that postmodernists/relativists think that is the correct use of the word “true”. If anything, it was praise for postmodernists/relativists for having already covered something that Eliezer wanted to talk about.
My mental model of Eliezer Yudkowsky is that he thinks all postmodernism is nonsense—as others have noted. If he intended to say something equivalent to “Postmodernist got this point right” then what he wrote is not how I expect he would say it. Further, the attack that I am reading into his words is a standard understanding of postmodernism in this community.
But the community seems to agree with you more than I—so I’m adjusting slightly in favor of me misreading Eliezer’s intent.
I certainly read it as “postmodernists notice that the word true is used as mere emphasis ”.
Your interpretation doesn’t exactly align with the essence of postmodernism (as I see it, I’m no expert).