Beats me, I don’t care. But people here seriously discuss various incarnations of the many-worlds ideas as if their actuality made any difference in this world.
“Anything is possible” is one of the conclusions of the pseudo-scientific Tegmarkery.
Again… really? I’m even less of a Tegmark expert than I am an MWI expert, which is saying something, but my understanding of Tegmark is more “even impossible things are actual.”
What’s the difference between “anything is possible (and therefore actual)” and “even impossible things are actual.”?
From wiki: Tegmark elaborates the mathematical universe hypothesis (MUH, a.k.a. “Ultimate Ensemble”) into the Computable Universe Hypothesis (CUH), which posits that all computable mathematical structures exist.
We can conclude that “anything that isn’t disallowed, using our current model of physics” is only a subset of “anything that can be described using any arbitrary computable mathematical structure”.
people here seriously discuss various incarnations of the many-worlds ideas as if their actuality made any difference in this world.
Yeah, I’ve noticed that.
It seems harmless enough, and I share a narrative preference for “observers behave just like everything else” over “observers somehow collapse wavefunctions” just because I prefer explanations where the observer isn’t special, but I’ve never understood what difference it’s supposed to make.
I mean, if it were theoretically possible under MWI to mine other Worlds for energy, as you seem to suggest above, then I could understand caring… but as I understand it, MWI doesn’t allow for that, any more than non-MWI allows for mining hypothetical worlds for energy.
That said, if someone argues X and I think X doesn’t matter, it’s silly to argue NOT X rather than ask “OK, what follows? Why should I care?”
What’s the difference between “anything is possible (and therefore actual)” and “even impossible things are actual.”?
Well, the former asserts a dependency between actuality and possibility, the latter denies any such dependency. Why should I care, you ask? No reason I can think of. I understand why I’m supposed to care about Tegmark even less than I understand why I’m supposed to care about MWI.
I mean, if it were theoretically possible under MWI to mine other Worlds for energy, as you seem to suggest above
Uh, I most emphatically don’t suggest anything like that, I was simply mentioning that among possible worlds there are some convenient ones where what you need is always available for you.
That said, if someone argues X and I think X doesn’t matter, it’s silly to argue NOT X rather than ask “OK, what follows? Why should I care?”
I agree, but it’s not silly to point out that it’s silly to argue X if it makes no instrumental difference whether X is true.
among possible worlds there are some convenient ones where what you need is always available for you.
If “you” means me, or anyone else able to read your post, (which is what I thought you meant, hence the “mining” reference) then this simply isn’t true under MWI. If not, can you clarify what “you” means here?
Huh. Well, I certainly agree that under MWI someone in the most convenient world has access to the resources of the world they live in. (And, again, I don’t really care.)
I see no reason to call that person “me,” though, except in the broad sense in which I can identify with people similar to me. Though I doubt there’s anyone in that most-convenient-world who resembles me as much as, for example, you (by which I mean, y’know, you) do.
Though I doubt there’s anyone in that most-convenient-world who resembles me as much as, for example, you (by which I mean, y’know, you) do
Eh, it looks like we largely agree, so there is no point in further discussing this particular untestable. And given the downvotes I get in this thread, apparently others don’t want it to continue, either. Tapping out.
Beats me, I don’t care. But people here seriously discuss various incarnations of the many-worlds ideas as if their actuality made any difference in this world.
What’s the difference between “anything is possible (and therefore actual)” and “even impossible things are actual.”?
From wiki: Tegmark elaborates the mathematical universe hypothesis (MUH, a.k.a. “Ultimate Ensemble”) into the Computable Universe Hypothesis (CUH), which posits that all computable mathematical structures exist.
We can conclude that “anything that isn’t disallowed, using our current model of physics” is only a subset of “anything that can be described using any arbitrary computable mathematical structure”.
Yeah, I’ve noticed that.
It seems harmless enough, and I share a narrative preference for “observers behave just like everything else” over “observers somehow collapse wavefunctions” just because I prefer explanations where the observer isn’t special, but I’ve never understood what difference it’s supposed to make.
I mean, if it were theoretically possible under MWI to mine other Worlds for energy, as you seem to suggest above, then I could understand caring… but as I understand it, MWI doesn’t allow for that, any more than non-MWI allows for mining hypothetical worlds for energy.
That said, if someone argues X and I think X doesn’t matter, it’s silly to argue NOT X rather than ask “OK, what follows? Why should I care?”
Well, the former asserts a dependency between actuality and possibility, the latter denies any such dependency. Why should I care, you ask? No reason I can think of. I understand why I’m supposed to care about Tegmark even less than I understand why I’m supposed to care about MWI.
Uh, I most emphatically don’t suggest anything like that, I was simply mentioning that among possible worlds there are some convenient ones where what you need is always available for you.
I agree, but it’s not silly to point out that it’s silly to argue X if it makes no instrumental difference whether X is true.
If “you” means me, or anyone else able to read your post, (which is what I thought you meant, hence the “mining” reference) then this simply isn’t true under MWI.
If not, can you clarify what “you” means here?
Someone in this most convenient world.
Huh. Well, I certainly agree that under MWI someone in the most convenient world has access to the resources of the world they live in. (And, again, I don’t really care.)
I see no reason to call that person “me,” though, except in the broad sense in which I can identify with people similar to me. Though I doubt there’s anyone in that most-convenient-world who resembles me as much as, for example, you (by which I mean, y’know, you) do.
Eh, it looks like we largely agree, so there is no point in further discussing this particular untestable. And given the downvotes I get in this thread, apparently others don’t want it to continue, either. Tapping out.