But it’s still a compromise. Is it part of humanity’s utility function to value another species’ utility function to such an extent that they would accept the tradeoff of changing humanity’s utility function to preserve as much of the other species’ utility function?
I don’t recall any mention of humanity being total utilitarians in the story. Neither did the compromise made by the superhappies strike me as being better for all parties than their original values were, for each of them.
The only reason the compromise was supposed to be beneficial is because the three species made contact and couldn’t easily coexist together from that point on. Also, because the superhappies were the stronger force and could therefore easily enforce their own solution. Cutting off the link removes those assumptions, and allows each species to preserve its utility function, which I assume they have a preference for, at least humans and baby-eaters.
Cutting off the link (...) allows each species to preserve its utility function, which I assume they have a preference for, at least humans and baby-eaters.
There was an asymetry in the story, if I remember correctly.
Babyeaters had a preference for other species eating their babies. Humans and superhappies had a preference for other species not eating their babies. This part was symetrical. Superhappies also had a preference for other species never feeling any pain. But humans didn’t have a preference for other species feeling pain; they just wanted to more or less preserve their own biological status quo. They didn’t mind if superhappies remain… superhappy.
This is why cutting the link harms the superhappy utility function more than the human utility function. -- Humans will feel the relief that babyeater children are still saved by superhappies, more quickly and reliably than humans could do. On the other hand, superhappies will know that somewhere in the universe human babies are feeling pain and frustration, and there is nothing the superhappies can do about it.
The asymetry was that superhappies didn’t seem ethically repulsive to humans. Well, apart from what they wanted to do with humans; which was successfully avoided.
In the story the superhappies propose to self-modify to appreciate complex art, not just simple porn, and they say that humans and babyeaters will both think that is an improvement. So to some degree the superhappies (with their very ugly spaceships) are repulsive to humans, although not as strongly repulsive as the babyeaters.
But it’s still a compromise. Is it part of humanity’s utility function to value another species’ utility function to such an extent that they would accept the tradeoff of changing humanity’s utility function to preserve as much of the other species’ utility function?
I don’t recall any mention of humanity being total utilitarians in the story. Neither did the compromise made by the superhappies strike me as being better for all parties than their original values were, for each of them.
The only reason the compromise was supposed to be beneficial is because the three species made contact and couldn’t easily coexist together from that point on. Also, because the superhappies were the stronger force and could therefore easily enforce their own solution. Cutting off the link removes those assumptions, and allows each species to preserve its utility function, which I assume they have a preference for, at least humans and baby-eaters.
There was an asymetry in the story, if I remember correctly.
Babyeaters had a preference for other species eating their babies. Humans and superhappies had a preference for other species not eating their babies. This part was symetrical. Superhappies also had a preference for other species never feeling any pain. But humans didn’t have a preference for other species feeling pain; they just wanted to more or less preserve their own biological status quo. They didn’t mind if superhappies remain… superhappy.
This is why cutting the link harms the superhappy utility function more than the human utility function. -- Humans will feel the relief that babyeater children are still saved by superhappies, more quickly and reliably than humans could do. On the other hand, superhappies will know that somewhere in the universe human babies are feeling pain and frustration, and there is nothing the superhappies can do about it.
The asymetry was that superhappies didn’t seem ethically repulsive to humans. Well, apart from what they wanted to do with humans; which was successfully avoided.
In the story the superhappies propose to self-modify to appreciate complex art, not just simple porn, and they say that humans and babyeaters will both think that is an improvement. So to some degree the superhappies (with their very ugly spaceships) are repulsive to humans, although not as strongly repulsive as the babyeaters.