Assume that we know everything there is to know about the world, but nothing about the future. Everything we’ve observed (and we’ve observed everything so far) tells us that in cases like this one, the apple always falls to the ground. Do we have any reason at all to believe that it will fall to the ground this time? In other words, do we have any reason at all to think that the future will resemble the past? If so, what?
Assume that we know everything there is to know about the world, but nothing about the future.
This might not be possible. And it’s a tall order anyways.
Yes we know the character of the world and so know that the apple will fall.
Knowing who you are and what (and why) you do doesn’t affect what you could have done. The idea that free will is somehow against determinism often seems to boil down as if only things that we don’t know how they work are “free”. That is as if knowing a thing would affect it directly. The thing that makes things tick and our desciption on how things tick are two separate things. The Force doesn’t have the constitution of a formula. In order to exercise will you would need to have some action be correlated with your will state. If there is no such correlation your will is powerless. A natural law doesn’t come (atleast directly (you could get killed for holding a solar-centric worldview)) to interfere with those correlations. Thus there is nothing will limiting about knowing how things work.
Yes we know the character of the world and so know that the apple will fall.
Okay, so the world has a character. Lets take all the facts about the character of the world together; this is what I’m calling ‘natural laws’. The world obeys natural law in the sense that the world obeys its own character: the character of the world determines how things go. Does that sound right to you?
Yes, it sound right. Tried to reread the thread on whether there is more than terminology confusion going on. To me it’s not obvious that there is a contraposition between will and determinism. And I am guessing what kind of silliness is employed to get to that end result. It seems like a “one and only one can win” situation is constructed but I can describe the same situation so that both win.
I was saying that you being told your character (correctly) is not dangerous or limiting. It means that you have a character and it’s harder to pretend as if you could do everything. However the option would be to not have any character. And that isn’t omnipotence that would be nilpotence. For some purposes you can forget what the black box contains but to claim that fundamentally the black box doesn’t work in any way? A common situation is that you don’t know how it works or that it must work somehow exoticly.
You could also say that it isn’t the case of character of not-you making the character of you nilpotent or unnecceary. It’s a question of character of all overlapping with the character of you (which it kinda obviously needs to do).
Assume that we know everything there is to know about the world, but nothing about the future. Everything we’ve observed (and we’ve observed everything so far) tells us that in cases like this one, the apple always falls to the ground. Do we have any reason at all to believe that it will fall to the ground this time? In other words, do we have any reason at all to think that the future will resemble the past? If so, what?
Yes we know the character of the world and so know that the apple will fall.
Knowing who you are and what (and why) you do doesn’t affect what you could have done. The idea that free will is somehow against determinism often seems to boil down as if only things that we don’t know how they work are “free”. That is as if knowing a thing would affect it directly. The thing that makes things tick and our desciption on how things tick are two separate things. The Force doesn’t have the constitution of a formula. In order to exercise will you would need to have some action be correlated with your will state. If there is no such correlation your will is powerless. A natural law doesn’t come (atleast directly (you could get killed for holding a solar-centric worldview)) to interfere with those correlations. Thus there is nothing will limiting about knowing how things work.
Okay, so the world has a character. Lets take all the facts about the character of the world together; this is what I’m calling ‘natural laws’. The world obeys natural law in the sense that the world obeys its own character: the character of the world determines how things go. Does that sound right to you?
Yes, it sound right. Tried to reread the thread on whether there is more than terminology confusion going on. To me it’s not obvious that there is a contraposition between will and determinism. And I am guessing what kind of silliness is employed to get to that end result. It seems like a “one and only one can win” situation is constructed but I can describe the same situation so that both win.
I was saying that you being told your character (correctly) is not dangerous or limiting. It means that you have a character and it’s harder to pretend as if you could do everything. However the option would be to not have any character. And that isn’t omnipotence that would be nilpotence. For some purposes you can forget what the black box contains but to claim that fundamentally the black box doesn’t work in any way? A common situation is that you don’t know how it works or that it must work somehow exoticly.
You could also say that it isn’t the case of character of not-you making the character of you nilpotent or unnecceary. It’s a question of character of all overlapping with the character of you (which it kinda obviously needs to do).