Well, it depends on how you define “the free will problem”. The problem I’m talking about is the ability to assign (moral) values to possible actions: if we can only speak of one possible action then those values don’t exist (or defined only for one action in which case they’re useless anyway).
Well, it depends on how you define “the free will problem”.
I’ll take a shot at it:
1) On the one hand, the natural world of which we are a part is governed by laws, in the sense that any causal relations within the natural world obey law-like (if probabilistic) principles. Any effect is the necessary result of some sufficiently rich set of antecedent causes plus the laws that govern the relations between them. Human beings are natural objects, subject to the same physical laws as everything else. Further, our minds are likewise the product of law like causal relationships.
2) On the other hand, human thought and action does not obey law-like principles, except normatively. Nothing we do or think is the result of necessity.
(1) and (2) seem to be inconsistent. Either one of the two is false, or they merely appear inconsistant.
That’s the problem of free will as I understand it.
As far as I understand things, 2 isn’t true. We feel ourselves making decisions, but that is how the process feels from the inside. From the outside, it’s all done by all those atoms and particles inside our skulls, bouncing off each other in strict accordance with the laws of nature like so many tiny billiard balls, and so everything we do and think is the result of necessity. All the ambivalence we feel – should I choose lemon or mango ice cream? – also consists of patterns in the bouncing of the balls, all on their paths which have been determined by the ‘laws’ of nature since the Big Bang. Even though I feel myself making a decision – lemon ice cream! –, what I will decide has been determined by all the ball-bouncing that has been going on in the universe before the moment I decide. I could not possibly choose anything else.
Determinism is the outside view; free will is what it feels like from the inside. Right now I’m typing this comment, and it certainly feels to me like I am deciding what to say, i.e., I feel I have free will. Taking the outside view, what I’m writing has been inevitable since the Big Bang, i.e., it has been determined.
Oh, sorry! I misread your question. You’re asking if I think free will is an illusion. I guess you could say that yes, I think it doesn’t really exist, because we make decisions and take actions because of our thoughts and feelings, which are ultimately ‘just’ processes within our brains, which are subject to the laws of physics. Like I said, from the moment of the Big Bang it has been inevitable that I would come to write this comment. It’s mind-boggling, really. Also mind-boggling is the amount of time I’ve already spent writing and thinking about and rewriting (and rere[...]rewriting this comment, that’s why it is so late.
To me, (2) seems obviously false. You cannot predict what you’re going to do before you decide what you’re going to do. Therefore from an inside view, it seems to be unpredictable. But from an outside view, it is perfectly predictable.
Well, it depends on how you define “the free will problem”. The problem I’m talking about is the ability to assign (moral) values to possible actions: if we can only speak of one possible action then those values don’t exist (or defined only for one action in which case they’re useless anyway).
I’ll take a shot at it:
1) On the one hand, the natural world of which we are a part is governed by laws, in the sense that any causal relations within the natural world obey law-like (if probabilistic) principles. Any effect is the necessary result of some sufficiently rich set of antecedent causes plus the laws that govern the relations between them. Human beings are natural objects, subject to the same physical laws as everything else. Further, our minds are likewise the product of law like causal relationships.
2) On the other hand, human thought and action does not obey law-like principles, except normatively. Nothing we do or think is the result of necessity.
(1) and (2) seem to be inconsistent. Either one of the two is false, or they merely appear inconsistant.
That’s the problem of free will as I understand it.
As far as I understand things, 2 isn’t true. We feel ourselves making decisions, but that is how the process feels from the inside. From the outside, it’s all done by all those atoms and particles inside our skulls, bouncing off each other in strict accordance with the laws of nature like so many tiny billiard balls, and so everything we do and think is the result of necessity. All the ambivalence we feel – should I choose lemon or mango ice cream? – also consists of patterns in the bouncing of the balls, all on their paths which have been determined by the ‘laws’ of nature since the Big Bang. Even though I feel myself making a decision – lemon ice cream! –, what I will decide has been determined by all the ball-bouncing that has been going on in the universe before the moment I decide. I could not possibly choose anything else.
How would you characterize your thoughts about free will then? Is it a mere illusion, or is there something genuine in it?
Determinism is the outside view; free will is what it feels like from the inside. Right now I’m typing this comment, and it certainly feels to me like I am deciding what to say, i.e., I feel I have free will. Taking the outside view, what I’m writing has been inevitable since the Big Bang, i.e., it has been determined.
That’s not quite an answer to my question.
Oh, sorry! I misread your question. You’re asking if I think free will is an illusion. I guess you could say that yes, I think it doesn’t really exist, because we make decisions and take actions because of our thoughts and feelings, which are ultimately ‘just’ processes within our brains, which are subject to the laws of physics. Like I said, from the moment of the Big Bang it has been inevitable that I would come to write this comment. It’s mind-boggling, really. Also mind-boggling is the amount of time I’ve already spent writing and thinking about and rewriting (and rere[...]rewriting this comment, that’s why it is so late.
To me, (2) seems obviously false. You cannot predict what you’re going to do before you decide what you’re going to do. Therefore from an inside view, it seems to be unpredictable. But from an outside view, it is perfectly predictable.
I didn’t say anything about predictability though. To my mind, prediction is not relevant to free will either way.