It seems to me that someone being accused publicly has a right to name their accuser publicly, if they are aware of said accuser’s identity. Third parties may or may not (and usually, I would say, do not) have this right—but the accused person does.
Why do you think that third parties shouldn’t name an accuser? If an accusation is being handled in the court of public opinion, presumably it is because the public has an interest in the truth of the matter, and therefor I would think that any member of the public who has relevant evidence ought to be able to present it. If the accusation depends on the credibility of the accuser, then the identity of the accuser seems like relevant evidence. If anything, I’d think the accused should be particularly hesitant to name the accuser, at least as a strategic matter, for fear of appearing retaliatory. Third parties, not being under that constraint, might be in a better position to name the accuser.
First, the matter of retaliation against an accuser. Making an accusation anonymously/pseudonymously is typically done because one fears retaliation from the accused party and/or their allies. It is generally much less of a concern that some unrelated third parties, not allied with the accused, will retaliate against the accuser for the accusation—they rarely have an interest in doing so. (This is especially true in community situations like this, as opposed to “whistleblower” situations in industry, where consequences like “nobody will hire you if you’re known as a whistleblower” are quite plausible; such dynamics are simply less applicable in cases like the one we’re discussing here.)
But this being the case, the danger to the accuser obviously comes primarily from the accused and allies knowing the accuser’s identity. Even if the accuser doesn’t publicly reveal the accuser’s identity, they can still engage in basically all the same sorts of retaliation! Indeed, it seems entirely plausible that the danger to the accuser decreases if their identity is made public, because many or even most plausible sorts of retaliatory tactics benefit from being done “in the shadows”, so to speak—through whisper networks and so on—and being commonly known to have been the accuser in such a case, can easily protect someone from many such retaliations, relative to the case where the accuser’s identity is known to the accused (and, by extension, to the accused’s allies), but not to the public.
Thus means that the scenario where a third party plausibly has an obligation not to publicize the accuser’s identity is one where their identity is known to said third party (who is not an ally of the accused, and has no incentive to directly inform the accused, but acts only in accordance with their ethical views), but not known to the accused & allies.
Note that the question thus becomes not whether the accused has a right to publicly reveal the identity of their accuser, but whether the accused has a right to know the identity of their accuser. The answer to this question may very well be “yes”, but such things ought not be decided unilaterally by arbitrary third parties merely because they happen to be in possession of the relevant information.
(As a side note, the above logic dispenses with the worry that “the accused should be particularly hesitant to name the accuser, at least as a strategic matter, for fear of appearing retaliatory”.)
Second and relatedly, there is the question of public interest in the truth of the matter. Now, public interest is a perfect legitimate concept and an important concern, but it is nonetheless very easy for anyone to claim that basically any kind of thing is supposedly in the public interest. And this stuff about “the court of public opinion” is all very well as a sort of metaphor, but taking it too literally leads to absurdity. In particular, there’s no real way to evaluate positions like “any member of the public who has relevant evidence ought to be able to present it”, because—well, in an actual court you’d consult the actual law, you’d weigh the public benefit of relevant evidence coming to light against various other legal and ethical concerns (privacy, contractual obligations, etc.)… in the court of public opinion, how do you do any of that, and who would be doing it?
And an argument can easily be made that it’s also in the public interest to have norms against doxxing, which would be unacceptably subverted if third parties publicly revealed the identities of anonymous/pseudonymous accusers. (See what I mean about the ease of making such claims?) Who is weighing this public interest against the other? Of course we can argue for our preferred community norms, on ethical grounds and so on, but bringing “public interest” into it is unlikely to be productive.
Third, the question of the accuser’s credibility. Well, this seems to me like a red herring. In most of these sorts of cases that have taken place in the “rationalist” community and thereabouts, the accused have been people whose names I just barely recognize, and the accusers (when their names have come out) have been people I’ve never heard of. I suspect that it’s like that for most third parties to these disputes. So if I learn that “Alice” in this particular dispute is really one Jane Doe, age 25, currently residing in Springfield, NY, but I have never so much as heard of this person, much less have the slightest opinion of her credibility or lack thereof, then what does it do for me, to know her identity? Well, you might say, but who cares about my (Said’s) opinion anyway? Alice’s credibility matters to various community leaders, though, doesn’t it? But I’m sure that they already know her identity. They don’t need any third party to reveal it.
Quite frankly, in most of these sorts of cases, the update and inference that I’ve made has gone in the other direction. I started out knowing nothing about the accusers, and ended up judging them to be… less than impeccably credible, shall we say. (The accused even more so, often enough! But the accusers, too.) So for that reason, sure, I’d like to know the accuser’s identity. But this is precisely the sort of scenario where it’s the accused who not not only may, but should, reveal the accuser’s identity to the public.
The bottom line is this: the scenario where there is a real case to be made for hiding the accuser’s identity from the public is the one where the accused is not aware of it. If the accused knows who the accuser is, they may reveal it, and probably should do so. If the accused does not know who the accuser is, it is generally improper for a third party to unilaterally reveal this information. (Of course, in such a case, it may be proper to largely discount the accusations.)
A real court would apply complex rules of evidence, which sometimes involve balancing but often are more categorical. But yes, it’s a different notion of public interest than whatever one rando thinks is public interest.
I agree that there is a significant difference between cases where the accused knows the identity of the accuser and cases where they do not, and we should split our analysis.
In cases where the accused does not know the identity of the accuser, I think the accusations would necessarily be so vague that I wouldn’t update much on them, and I would hope other rationalists and EAs wouldn’t either, but clearly there is a significant contingent of people in these communities who do not share my epistemic scruples. Given that, I don’t know, seems a mess. But your rule that only the accused should share the identity of the accuser seems too absolute—surely accusers are sometimes in the wrong, and sometimes malicious, and in that case having their identities publicly known seems good. Yes that will result in some amount of social punishment, and if the accusations were false and malicious, then I think that is good.
The case where the accused does know the identity of the accuser is where my above logic about the accused appearing retaliatory would suggest it is better for a third party to name the accuser.
In cases where the accused does not know the identity of the accuser, I think the accusations would necessarily be so vague that I wouldn’t update much on them, and I would hope other rationalists and EAs wouldn’t either, but clearly there is a significant contingent of people in these communities who do not share my epistemic scruples. Given that, I don’t know, seems a mess.
Agreed.
But your rule that only the accused should share the identity of the accuser seems too absolute—surely accusers are sometimes in the wrong, and sometimes malicious, and in that case having their identities publicly known seems good.
To clarify, this is what I said in my top-level comment (bolding added):
It seems to me that someone being accused publicly has a right to name their accuser publicly, if they are aware of said accuser’s identity. Third parties may or may not (and usually, I would say, do not) have this right—but the accused person does.
I stand by this view. Exceptions are possible, although I take no position at this time on what sorts of cases might be exceptional in this sense (or, to put it another way, I am not prepared to say what the real rule is); that would require considerably more thought. Pending such, the rule of “only accusers should reveal this” seems like a prudent default.
The case where the accused does know the identity of the accuser is where my above logic about the accused appearing retaliatory would suggest it is better for a third party to name the accuser.
I think that I have sufficiently addressed this in the grandparent; I don’t have much to add beyond that.
If Brent had done this in response to the MittensCautious allegations would you have seen that as “just exercising his basic right to name his accusers publicly” or more like “unwarranted retaliation intended to increase the costs of sharing true and important information about him”?
It seems to me that someone being accused publicly has a right to name their accuser publicly, if they are aware of said accuser’s identity. Third parties may or may not (and usually, I would say, do not) have this right—but the accused person does.
Why do you think that third parties shouldn’t name an accuser? If an accusation is being handled in the court of public opinion, presumably it is because the public has an interest in the truth of the matter, and therefor I would think that any member of the public who has relevant evidence ought to be able to present it. If the accusation depends on the credibility of the accuser, then the identity of the accuser seems like relevant evidence. If anything, I’d think the accused should be particularly hesitant to name the accuser, at least as a strategic matter, for fear of appearing retaliatory. Third parties, not being under that constraint, might be in a better position to name the accuser.
This is a good question, thank you for asking it.
There are several considerations here.
First, the matter of retaliation against an accuser. Making an accusation anonymously/pseudonymously is typically done because one fears retaliation from the accused party and/or their allies. It is generally much less of a concern that some unrelated third parties, not allied with the accused, will retaliate against the accuser for the accusation—they rarely have an interest in doing so. (This is especially true in community situations like this, as opposed to “whistleblower” situations in industry, where consequences like “nobody will hire you if you’re known as a whistleblower” are quite plausible; such dynamics are simply less applicable in cases like the one we’re discussing here.)
But this being the case, the danger to the accuser obviously comes primarily from the accused and allies knowing the accuser’s identity. Even if the accuser doesn’t publicly reveal the accuser’s identity, they can still engage in basically all the same sorts of retaliation! Indeed, it seems entirely plausible that the danger to the accuser decreases if their identity is made public, because many or even most plausible sorts of retaliatory tactics benefit from being done “in the shadows”, so to speak—through whisper networks and so on—and being commonly known to have been the accuser in such a case, can easily protect someone from many such retaliations, relative to the case where the accuser’s identity is known to the accused (and, by extension, to the accused’s allies), but not to the public.
Thus means that the scenario where a third party plausibly has an obligation not to publicize the accuser’s identity is one where their identity is known to said third party (who is not an ally of the accused, and has no incentive to directly inform the accused, but acts only in accordance with their ethical views), but not known to the accused & allies.
Note that the question thus becomes not whether the accused has a right to publicly reveal the identity of their accuser, but whether the accused has a right to know the identity of their accuser. The answer to this question may very well be “yes”, but such things ought not be decided unilaterally by arbitrary third parties merely because they happen to be in possession of the relevant information.
(As a side note, the above logic dispenses with the worry that “the accused should be particularly hesitant to name the accuser, at least as a strategic matter, for fear of appearing retaliatory”.)
Second and relatedly, there is the question of public interest in the truth of the matter. Now, public interest is a perfect legitimate concept and an important concern, but it is nonetheless very easy for anyone to claim that basically any kind of thing is supposedly in the public interest. And this stuff about “the court of public opinion” is all very well as a sort of metaphor, but taking it too literally leads to absurdity. In particular, there’s no real way to evaluate positions like “any member of the public who has relevant evidence ought to be able to present it”, because—well, in an actual court you’d consult the actual law, you’d weigh the public benefit of relevant evidence coming to light against various other legal and ethical concerns (privacy, contractual obligations, etc.)… in the court of public opinion, how do you do any of that, and who would be doing it?
And an argument can easily be made that it’s also in the public interest to have norms against doxxing, which would be unacceptably subverted if third parties publicly revealed the identities of anonymous/pseudonymous accusers. (See what I mean about the ease of making such claims?) Who is weighing this public interest against the other? Of course we can argue for our preferred community norms, on ethical grounds and so on, but bringing “public interest” into it is unlikely to be productive.
Third, the question of the accuser’s credibility. Well, this seems to me like a red herring. In most of these sorts of cases that have taken place in the “rationalist” community and thereabouts, the accused have been people whose names I just barely recognize, and the accusers (when their names have come out) have been people I’ve never heard of. I suspect that it’s like that for most third parties to these disputes. So if I learn that “Alice” in this particular dispute is really one Jane Doe, age 25, currently residing in Springfield, NY, but I have never so much as heard of this person, much less have the slightest opinion of her credibility or lack thereof, then what does it do for me, to know her identity? Well, you might say, but who cares about my (Said’s) opinion anyway? Alice’s credibility matters to various community leaders, though, doesn’t it? But I’m sure that they already know her identity. They don’t need any third party to reveal it.
Quite frankly, in most of these sorts of cases, the update and inference that I’ve made has gone in the other direction. I started out knowing nothing about the accusers, and ended up judging them to be… less than impeccably credible, shall we say. (The accused even more so, often enough! But the accusers, too.) So for that reason, sure, I’d like to know the accuser’s identity. But this is precisely the sort of scenario where it’s the accused who not not only may, but should, reveal the accuser’s identity to the public.
The bottom line is this: the scenario where there is a real case to be made for hiding the accuser’s identity from the public is the one where the accused is not aware of it. If the accused knows who the accuser is, they may reveal it, and probably should do so. If the accused does not know who the accuser is, it is generally improper for a third party to unilaterally reveal this information. (Of course, in such a case, it may be proper to largely discount the accusations.)
A real court would apply complex rules of evidence, which sometimes involve balancing but often are more categorical. But yes, it’s a different notion of public interest than whatever one rando thinks is public interest.
I agree that there is a significant difference between cases where the accused knows the identity of the accuser and cases where they do not, and we should split our analysis.
In cases where the accused does not know the identity of the accuser, I think the accusations would necessarily be so vague that I wouldn’t update much on them, and I would hope other rationalists and EAs wouldn’t either, but clearly there is a significant contingent of people in these communities who do not share my epistemic scruples. Given that, I don’t know, seems a mess. But your rule that only the accused should share the identity of the accuser seems too absolute—surely accusers are sometimes in the wrong, and sometimes malicious, and in that case having their identities publicly known seems good. Yes that will result in some amount of social punishment, and if the accusations were false and malicious, then I think that is good.
The case where the accused does know the identity of the accuser is where my above logic about the accused appearing retaliatory would suggest it is better for a third party to name the accuser.
Agreed.
To clarify, this is what I said in my top-level comment (bolding added):
I stand by this view. Exceptions are possible, although I take no position at this time on what sorts of cases might be exceptional in this sense (or, to put it another way, I am not prepared to say what the real rule is); that would require considerably more thought. Pending such, the rule of “only accusers should reveal this” seems like a prudent default.
I think that I have sufficiently addressed this in the grandparent; I don’t have much to add beyond that.
If Brent had done this in response to the MittensCautious allegations would you have seen that as “just exercising his basic right to name his accusers publicly” or more like “unwarranted retaliation intended to increase the costs of sharing true and important information about him”?
Definitely “just exercising his basic right to name his accusers publicly”.