So you glanced at the posts, noticed (I guess) the fact that I didn’t go into the details of the prosecution case
Yes, that is the main flaw that I noticed. I think you can’t make a case for .99 probability of innocence without going through the prosecution case in detail, unless you assume that the reader is already familiar with the prosecution case and knows the counterarguments for all of the prosecution’s evidence and arguments, and you didn’t make that assumption clear. Someone reading it without knowing much about the case (like me) would have just thought it unconvincing.
The reason I didn’t point it out at the time was that I just didn’t think about it. I read the post, wasn’t very interested, and moved on.
Now, however, that Rolf Nelson’s response to my post has been voted down to the lower depths of karma hell, now you suddenly seem to care (more) about the quality of my post.
Well, I was curious why Rolf’s post was voted down so much, since I knew him from before. That seems reasonable to me.
I interpreted that as, “The only thing wrong with Rolf’s post was the tone.” Maybe that’s uncharitable, but what did you mean by “careful”?
I meant he needed to spend more effort to look for and eliminate the flaws in his post. I think when you write a post that contradicts some people’s beliefs, those who are being contradicted will tend to search the post more carefully for flaws. So he should have known that his post would be scrutinized more and acted accordingly.
But even putting that aside, it’s not like there was any dearth of rationality issues and meta-issues at play here.
The problem with using it as a rationality learning tool is that the amount of time I’d have to put in to learn the details of the case, compared to what I might get out of it, just seem too high for me to make the effort. Your post is already quite long, and to make it more convincing would have required a lot more text.
You feel strongly for Knox and Sollecito, which is fine, but it’s hard for me to understand why, given that there are billions of people on this planet, and a significant fraction of them suffer worse fates than they. Why these two, and not all the others? (I assume you don’t feel equally strongly about all the others, but I guess I could be wrong. Let me know if I am.)
I think you can’t make a case for .99 probability of innocence without going through the prosecution case in detail, unless you assume that the reader is already familiar with the prosecution case and knows the counterarguments for all of the prosecution’s evidence and arguments, and you didn’t make that assumption clear
The post was prominently labeled as a followup to its predecessor; and as the latter consisted of instructions for a survey and thus amounted to little more than a prompt for discussion, it should have been obvious (or so I would have thought) that its substantive content lay in the comments.
In other words, I thought it was perfectly clear from context that if you weren’t interested enough in the exercise to read at least the comments on the first post, if not the actual links provided, then you simply weren’t in the target audience for the second post.
What sort of additional wording do you think would have helped make this clearer?
The problem with using it as a rationality learning tool is that the amount of time I’d have to put in to learn the details of the case, compared to what I might get out of it, just seem too high for me to make the effort. Your post is already quite long, and to make it more convincing would have required a lot more text.
You may have missed a key point here; see comments by mattnewport and Eliezer. This is not, it turns out, a difficult case that hinges on the details; instead it’s decided overwhelmingly just by the priors. The thesis of my post was that a skilled rationalist shouldn’t need more than a few minutes of study in order to arrive at a high probability of innocence. Now, whether you could actually get to a probability of 0.99 or 0.999 that way, as opposed to merely 0.9, is an interesting, but separate, question.
You feel strongly for Knox and Sollecito, which is fine, but it’s hard for me to understand why, given that there are billions of people on this planet, and a significant fraction of them suffer worse fates than they. Why these two, and not all the others? (I assume you don’t feel equally strongly about all the others, but I guess I could be wrong. Let me know if I am.)
I’m not sure why you would make such an assumption. It’s not as if my total level of global outrage is fixed, and hearing about Knox and Sollecito unfairly moved some sympathy in their direction at the expense of others. It just so happened that this case came to my attention, and provoked an emotional response appropriate to my state of knowledge. The result was a net increase in my concern about the madness of this world and in my desire to alleviate suffering; you may be interested to know that additional resources were allocated to the general goal of improving humanity’s future as a direct result of my feelings about this case.
What sort of additional wording do you think would have helped make this clearer?
Perhaps something along the lines of “This post assumes that the reader has read the comments section of the previous post.”
You may have missed a key point here; see comments by mattnewport and Eliezer. This is not, it turns out, a difficult case that hinges on the details; instead it’s decided overwhelmingly just by the priors. The thesis of my post was that a skilled rationalist shouldn’t need more than a few minutes of study in order to arrive at a high probability of innocence. Now, whether you could actually get to a probability of 0.99 or 0.999 that way, as opposed to merely 0.9, is an interesting, but separate, question.
The above might be true if I didn’t know that Knox and Sollecito were convicted by an Italian court, but once I take that into account, it seems impossible to get to 0.9 probability of innocence that quickly. Unless I’ve seen nearly all of the evidence and arguments that the court has seen, I think there’s a probability higher than 0.1 that the court knows something significant that I don’t.
I’m not sure why you would make such an assumption. It’s not as if my total level of global outrage is fixed, and hearing about Knox and Sollecito unfairly moved some sympathy in their direction at the expense of others. It just so happened that this case came to my attention, and provoked an emotional response appropriate to my state of knowledge. The result was a net increase in my concern about the madness of this world and in my desire to alleviate suffering; you may be interested to know that additional resources were allocated to the general goal of improving humanity’s future as a direct result of my feelings about this case.
I assume that a human being has a finite capacity for outrage. To feel that strongly about Knox and Sollecito implies that you cannot feel equally strongly about all other individuals who have suffered equally terrible fates. You say that the case increased your net concern about the madness of the world, but surely you must have already known that injustice like this (assuming you’re right Knox and Sollecito) happens every day to many people all over the world? Is it just that the abstract knowledge didn’t engage your emotions, like seeing these two specific individuals did?
The above might be true if I didn’t know that Knox and Sollecito were convicted by an Italian court, but once I take that into account, it seems impossible to get to 0.9 probability of innocence that quickly. Unless I’ve seen nearly all of the evidence and arguments that the court has seen, I think there’s a probability higher than 0.1 that the court knows something significant that I don’t.
There was little to no change in the information content of True Justice and Friends of Amanda between Thursday, December 3, 2009 and Friday, December 4, 2009 (when the verdict was announced). If you believe that you would have arrived at a high probability of innocence on Thursday, then by conservation of expected evidence, you should have been very surprised to observe significant evidence of guilt on Friday. Since you appear to regard the conviction as significant evidence of guilt, this would imply that you have a low prior on a jury delivering a guilty verdict on the basis of the information available on those two sites.
To which I can only ask: Whence cometh this unwavering faith in the rationality of one’s fellow humans?
I assume that a human being has a finite capacity for outrage. To feel that strongly about Knox and Sollecito implies that you cannot feel equally strongly about all other individuals who have suffered equally terrible fates. You say that the case increased your net concern about the madness of the world, but surely you must have already known that injustice like this (assuming you’re right Knox and Sollecito) happens every day to many people all over the world? Is it just that the abstract knowledge didn’t engage your emotions, like seeing these two specific individuals did?
If I understand you correctly, you appear to be arguing (or at least suggesting I consider an argument) for the following disjunction:
Either:
(1) I should devote more psychological energy to other victims of injustice to match my concern for Knox and Sollecito.
Or:
(2) I should devote less psychological energy to Knox and Sollecito in order not to unfairly privilege them more than other victims of injustice.
Now neither of these strikes me as plausible. (1) is simply impractical: LW readers would get tired if I did a post on every miscarriage of justice that has ever occurred, even if I were capable of doing so. But (2) can’t be right either, because what happened to Knox and Sollecito is a legitimate outrage, and simply going about my business with indifference strikes me as highly unsatisfactory.
I see this as nothing more than a variant of the old argument against “ordinary” altruism: we really ought not to hold doors for little old ladies, since doing so consumes resources that could be put to better use fighting existential risk. But, as we know, human brains simply don’t work that way. It’s far more efficient to harness our natural feeling-circuitry to accomplish our goals than it is to (vainly) struggle to reprogram it.
So yes, there is a psychological difference between abstractly knowing that injustice exists and humans are irrational on the one hand, and actually seeing consequences of this happen to victims one finds particularly sympathetic on the other. But that emotional stimulation can be put to good use. That’s why it’s not quite right to say:
To feel that strongly about Knox and Sollecito implies that you cannot feel equally strongly about all other individuals who have suffered equally terrible fates.
I don’t feel less strongly about the other individuals than I used to; rather, I feel more strongly than I did before. In my mind, Knox and Sollecito represent others in their situation; thinking specifically of them makes it easier to care about the problem of injustice in general. It’s a mind-hack that happens to cater to the way my brain works. I suspect I’m not the only one on whom this kind of trick is effective.
(And it also helps Amanda and Raffaele themselves—who deserve to be helped, just like the old ladies for whom we open doors.)
It’s perfectly okay for a human rationalist to have natural human reactions; when those reactions are put to good use, it’s an outright good thing.
Yes, that is the main flaw that I noticed. I think you can’t make a case for .99 probability of innocence without going through the prosecution case in detail, unless you assume that the reader is already familiar with the prosecution case and knows the counterarguments for all of the prosecution’s evidence and arguments, and you didn’t make that assumption clear. Someone reading it without knowing much about the case (like me) would have just thought it unconvincing.
The reason I didn’t point it out at the time was that I just didn’t think about it. I read the post, wasn’t very interested, and moved on.
Well, I was curious why Rolf’s post was voted down so much, since I knew him from before. That seems reasonable to me.
I meant he needed to spend more effort to look for and eliminate the flaws in his post. I think when you write a post that contradicts some people’s beliefs, those who are being contradicted will tend to search the post more carefully for flaws. So he should have known that his post would be scrutinized more and acted accordingly.
The problem with using it as a rationality learning tool is that the amount of time I’d have to put in to learn the details of the case, compared to what I might get out of it, just seem too high for me to make the effort. Your post is already quite long, and to make it more convincing would have required a lot more text.
You feel strongly for Knox and Sollecito, which is fine, but it’s hard for me to understand why, given that there are billions of people on this planet, and a significant fraction of them suffer worse fates than they. Why these two, and not all the others? (I assume you don’t feel equally strongly about all the others, but I guess I could be wrong. Let me know if I am.)
The post was prominently labeled as a followup to its predecessor; and as the latter consisted of instructions for a survey and thus amounted to little more than a prompt for discussion, it should have been obvious (or so I would have thought) that its substantive content lay in the comments.
In other words, I thought it was perfectly clear from context that if you weren’t interested enough in the exercise to read at least the comments on the first post, if not the actual links provided, then you simply weren’t in the target audience for the second post.
What sort of additional wording do you think would have helped make this clearer?
You may have missed a key point here; see comments by mattnewport and Eliezer. This is not, it turns out, a difficult case that hinges on the details; instead it’s decided overwhelmingly just by the priors. The thesis of my post was that a skilled rationalist shouldn’t need more than a few minutes of study in order to arrive at a high probability of innocence. Now, whether you could actually get to a probability of 0.99 or 0.999 that way, as opposed to merely 0.9, is an interesting, but separate, question.
I’m not sure why you would make such an assumption. It’s not as if my total level of global outrage is fixed, and hearing about Knox and Sollecito unfairly moved some sympathy in their direction at the expense of others. It just so happened that this case came to my attention, and provoked an emotional response appropriate to my state of knowledge. The result was a net increase in my concern about the madness of this world and in my desire to alleviate suffering; you may be interested to know that additional resources were allocated to the general goal of improving humanity’s future as a direct result of my feelings about this case.
Perhaps something along the lines of “This post assumes that the reader has read the comments section of the previous post.”
The above might be true if I didn’t know that Knox and Sollecito were convicted by an Italian court, but once I take that into account, it seems impossible to get to 0.9 probability of innocence that quickly. Unless I’ve seen nearly all of the evidence and arguments that the court has seen, I think there’s a probability higher than 0.1 that the court knows something significant that I don’t.
I assume that a human being has a finite capacity for outrage. To feel that strongly about Knox and Sollecito implies that you cannot feel equally strongly about all other individuals who have suffered equally terrible fates. You say that the case increased your net concern about the madness of the world, but surely you must have already known that injustice like this (assuming you’re right Knox and Sollecito) happens every day to many people all over the world? Is it just that the abstract knowledge didn’t engage your emotions, like seeing these two specific individuals did?
There was little to no change in the information content of True Justice and Friends of Amanda between Thursday, December 3, 2009 and Friday, December 4, 2009 (when the verdict was announced). If you believe that you would have arrived at a high probability of innocence on Thursday, then by conservation of expected evidence, you should have been very surprised to observe significant evidence of guilt on Friday. Since you appear to regard the conviction as significant evidence of guilt, this would imply that you have a low prior on a jury delivering a guilty verdict on the basis of the information available on those two sites.
To which I can only ask: Whence cometh this unwavering faith in the rationality of one’s fellow humans?
If I understand you correctly, you appear to be arguing (or at least suggesting I consider an argument) for the following disjunction:
Either:
(1) I should devote more psychological energy to other victims of injustice to match my concern for Knox and Sollecito.
Or:
(2) I should devote less psychological energy to Knox and Sollecito in order not to unfairly privilege them more than other victims of injustice.
Now neither of these strikes me as plausible. (1) is simply impractical: LW readers would get tired if I did a post on every miscarriage of justice that has ever occurred, even if I were capable of doing so. But (2) can’t be right either, because what happened to Knox and Sollecito is a legitimate outrage, and simply going about my business with indifference strikes me as highly unsatisfactory.
I see this as nothing more than a variant of the old argument against “ordinary” altruism: we really ought not to hold doors for little old ladies, since doing so consumes resources that could be put to better use fighting existential risk. But, as we know, human brains simply don’t work that way. It’s far more efficient to harness our natural feeling-circuitry to accomplish our goals than it is to (vainly) struggle to reprogram it.
So yes, there is a psychological difference between abstractly knowing that injustice exists and humans are irrational on the one hand, and actually seeing consequences of this happen to victims one finds particularly sympathetic on the other. But that emotional stimulation can be put to good use. That’s why it’s not quite right to say:
I don’t feel less strongly about the other individuals than I used to; rather, I feel more strongly than I did before. In my mind, Knox and Sollecito represent others in their situation; thinking specifically of them makes it easier to care about the problem of injustice in general. It’s a mind-hack that happens to cater to the way my brain works. I suspect I’m not the only one on whom this kind of trick is effective.
(And it also helps Amanda and Raffaele themselves—who deserve to be helped, just like the old ladies for whom we open doors.)
It’s perfectly okay for a human rationalist to have natural human reactions; when those reactions are put to good use, it’s an outright good thing.