The problem isn’t that I might see a hot babe and care about her more than other people, but that when the numbers are bigger I care about everyone the same amount. It’s that it probably dependent on things like whether i have seen them, and how much I know about them. If I was told by a perfectly reliable source that X is a hot babe by my standards, that would not make me care about her more than other people. But it would if I saw her. So what I want is not just dependent on what I believe, but on what I experience. On some figurative level, I’m a Mealy machine, not a Moore machine.
If you find yourself in a cycle of preference, you have probably failed to accurately judge two or more things which are hard to compare.
When I prefer A to B, B to C, and C to A (a cycle of preference), then I typically find that there is something moral in the general sense about A, something moral in the direct sense about B, and something which is personally advantageous about C.
For instance, I would rather my donations to charity have a larger total effect, which in the current world means donating to the best aggregator rather to individual causes. I would rather donate to individual causes than ignore them in selfish self-interest. I would rather spend my money in my own self interest than redistribute it in order to achieve maximum benefits. I believe that the reason I think my preferences lie this way is that I am unable to judge the value of diversified charity compared to selfish behavior.
In short, I am extrapolating from the single data point I have. I am assuming that there is one overwhelmingly likely reason for making that type of error, in which case it is likely that mine is for that reason and that yours is as well.
The problem isn’t that I might see a hot babe and care about her more than other people, but that when the numbers are bigger I care about everyone the same amount. It’s that it probably dependent on things like whether i have seen them, and how much I know about them. If I was told by a perfectly reliable source that X is a hot babe by my standards, that would not make me care about her more than other people. But it would if I saw her. So what I want is not just dependent on what I believe, but on what I experience. On some figurative level, I’m a Mealy machine, not a Moore machine.
Why do you think this?
When I prefer A to B, B to C, and C to A (a cycle of preference), then I typically find that there is something moral in the general sense about A, something moral in the direct sense about B, and something which is personally advantageous about C.
For instance, I would rather my donations to charity have a larger total effect, which in the current world means donating to the best aggregator rather to individual causes. I would rather donate to individual causes than ignore them in selfish self-interest. I would rather spend my money in my own self interest than redistribute it in order to achieve maximum benefits. I believe that the reason I think my preferences lie this way is that I am unable to judge the value of diversified charity compared to selfish behavior.
In short, I am extrapolating from the single data point I have. I am assuming that there is one overwhelmingly likely reason for making that type of error, in which case it is likely that mine is for that reason and that yours is as well.