Rephrasing the original question: if we can anticipate the guiding principles underlying the morality of the future, ought we apply those principles to our current circumstances to make decisions, supposing they are different?
Though you seem to be implicitly assuming that the guiding principles don’t change, merely the decisions, and those changed decisions are due to the closest implementable approximation of our guiding principles varying over time based on economic change. (Did I understand that right?)
Pretty much. Though it feels totally different from the inside. Athens could not have thrived without slave labor, and so you find folks arguing that slavery is moral, not just necessary. Since you can’t say “Action A is immoral but economically necessary, so we shall A” you instead say “Action A is moral, here are some great arguments to that effect!”
And when we have enough money, we can even invent new things to be upset about, like vegetable rights.
On your view, is there any attempt at internal coherence?
For example, given an X such that X is equally practical (economically) in an Athenian and post-Athenian economy, and where both Athenians and moderns would agree that X is more “consistent with” slavery than non-slavery, would you expect Athenians to endorse X and moderns to reject it, or would you expect other (non-economic) factors, perhaps random noise, to predominate? (Or some third option?)
I can’t think of a concrete example that doesn’t introduce derailing specifics. Let me try a different question that gets at something similar: do you think that all choices a society makes that it describes as “moral” are economic choices in the sense you describe here, or just that some of them are?
Edit: whoops! got TimS and thomblake confused.
Um.
Unfortunately, that changes nothing of consequence: I still can’t think of a concrete example that doesn’t derail. But my followup question is not actually directed to Tim. Or, rather, ought not have been.
Probably a good counterexample would be the right for certain groups to work any job they’re qualified for, for example women or people with disabilities. Generally, those changes were profitable and would have been at any time society accepted it.
I don’t understand the position you are arguing and I really want to. Either illusion of transparency or I’m an idiot. And TheOtherDave appears to understand you. :(
I’m not really arguing for a position—the grandparent was a counterexample to the general principle I had proposed upthread, since the change was both good and an immediate economic benefit, and it took a very long time to be adopted.
(nods) Yup, that’s one example I was considering, but discarded as too potentially noisy.
But, OK, now that we’re here… if we can agree for the sake of comity that giving women the civil right to work any job would have been economically practical for Athenians, and that they nevertheless didn’t do so, presumably due to some other non-economic factors… I guess my question is, would you find it inconsistent, in that case, to find Athenians arguing that doing so would be immoral?
Rephrasing the original question: if we can anticipate the guiding principles underlying the morality of the future, ought we apply those principles to our current circumstances to make decisions, supposing they are different?
Though you seem to be implicitly assuming that the guiding principles don’t change, merely the decisions, and those changed decisions are due to the closest implementable approximation of our guiding principles varying over time based on economic change. (Did I understand that right?)
Pretty much. Though it feels totally different from the inside. Athens could not have thrived without slave labor, and so you find folks arguing that slavery is moral, not just necessary. Since you can’t say “Action A is immoral but economically necessary, so we shall A” you instead say “Action A is moral, here are some great arguments to that effect!”
And when we have enough money, we can even invent new things to be upset about, like vegetable rights.
(nods) Got it.
On your view, is there any attempt at internal coherence?
For example, given an X such that X is equally practical (economically) in an Athenian and post-Athenian economy, and where both Athenians and moderns would agree that X is more “consistent with” slavery than non-slavery, would you expect Athenians to endorse X and moderns to reject it, or would you expect other (non-economic) factors, perhaps random noise, to predominate? (Or some third option?)
Or is such an X incoherent in the first place?
Can you give a more concrete example? I don’t understand your question.
I can’t think of a concrete example that doesn’t introduce derailing specifics.
Let me try a different question that gets at something similar: do you think that all choices a society makes that it describes as “moral” are economic choices in the sense you describe here, or just that some of them are?
Edit: whoops! got TimS and thomblake confused. Um. Unfortunately, that changes nothing of consequence: I still can’t think of a concrete example that doesn’t derail. But my followup question is not actually directed to Tim. Or, rather, ought not have been.
Probably a good counterexample would be the right for certain groups to work any job they’re qualified for, for example women or people with disabilities. Generally, those changes were profitable and would have been at any time society accepted it.
I don’t understand the position you are arguing and I really want to. Either illusion of transparency or I’m an idiot. And TheOtherDave appears to understand you. :(
I’m not really arguing for a position—the grandparent was a counterexample to the general principle I had proposed upthread, since the change was both good and an immediate economic benefit, and it took a very long time to be adopted.
(nods) Yup, that’s one example I was considering, but discarded as too potentially noisy.
But, OK, now that we’re here… if we can agree for the sake of comity that giving women the civil right to work any job would have been economically practical for Athenians, and that they nevertheless didn’t do so, presumably due to some other non-economic factors… I guess my question is, would you find it inconsistent, in that case, to find Athenians arguing that doing so would be immoral?
I don’t think so. I’m pretty sure lots of things can stand in the way of moral progress.