In short, if you have a decision process (aka moral system) that can’t resolve a particular problem that is strictly within its scope, you don’t really have a moral system.
This seems to be to be a rephrasing and clarifying of your original claim, which I read as saying something like ‘no true moral theory can allow moral conflicts’. But it’s not yet an argument for this claim.
I’m suddenly concerned that we’re arguing over a definition. It’s very possible to construct a decision procedure that tells one how to decide some, but not all moral questions. It might be that this is the best a moral decision procedure can do. Is it clearer to avoid using the label “moral system” for such a decision procedure?
This is a distraction from my main point, which was that asserting our morality changes when our economic resources change is an atypical way of using the label “morality.”
Is it clearer to avoid using the label “moral system” for such a decision procedure?
No, but if I understand what you’ve said, a true moral theory can allow for moral conflict, just because there are moral questions it cannot decide (the fact that you called them ‘moral questions’ leads me to think you think that these questions are moral ones even if a true moral theory can’t decide them).
This is a distraction from my main point, which was that asserting our morality changes when our economic resources change is an atypical way of using the label “morality.”
You’re certainly right, this isn’t relevant to your main point. I was just interested in what I took to be the claim that moral conflicts (i.e. moral problems that are undecidable in a true moral theory) are impossible:
If we have four people on a life boat and food for three, morality must provide a mechanism for deciding who gets the food.
This is a distraction from you main point in at least one other sense: this claim is orthogonal to the claim that morality is not relative to economic conditions.
If we have four people on a life boat and food for three, morality must provide a mechanism for deciding who gets the food. This is a distraction from you main point in at least one other sense: this claim is orthogonal to the claim that morality is not relative to economic conditions.
Yes, you correct that this was not an argument, simply my attempt to gesture at what I meant by the label “morality.” The general issue is that human societies are not rigorous about the use of the label morality. I like my usage because I think it is neutral and specific in meta-ethical disputes like the one we are having. For example, moral realists must determine whether they think “incomplete” moral systems can exist.
But beyond that, I should bow out, because I’m an anti-realist and this debate is between schools of moral realists.
This seems to be to be a rephrasing and clarifying of your original claim, which I read as saying something like ‘no true moral theory can allow moral conflicts’. But it’s not yet an argument for this claim.
I’m suddenly concerned that we’re arguing over a definition. It’s very possible to construct a decision procedure that tells one how to decide some, but not all moral questions. It might be that this is the best a moral decision procedure can do. Is it clearer to avoid using the label “moral system” for such a decision procedure?
This is a distraction from my main point, which was that asserting our morality changes when our economic resources change is an atypical way of using the label “morality.”
No, but if I understand what you’ve said, a true moral theory can allow for moral conflict, just because there are moral questions it cannot decide (the fact that you called them ‘moral questions’ leads me to think you think that these questions are moral ones even if a true moral theory can’t decide them).
You’re certainly right, this isn’t relevant to your main point. I was just interested in what I took to be the claim that moral conflicts (i.e. moral problems that are undecidable in a true moral theory) are impossible:
This is a distraction from you main point in at least one other sense: this claim is orthogonal to the claim that morality is not relative to economic conditions.
Yes, you correct that this was not an argument, simply my attempt to gesture at what I meant by the label “morality.” The general issue is that human societies are not rigorous about the use of the label morality. I like my usage because I think it is neutral and specific in meta-ethical disputes like the one we are having. For example, moral realists must determine whether they think “incomplete” moral systems can exist.
But beyond that, I should bow out, because I’m an anti-realist and this debate is between schools of moral realists.