It’s an appealing notion, but i think the logic doesn’t hold up.
In simplest terms: if you apply this logic and choose to cooperate, then the machine can still defect. That will net more paperclips for the machine, so it’s hard to claim that the machine’s actions are irrational.
Although your logic is appealing, it doesn’t explain why the machine can’t defect while you co-operate.
You said that if both agents are rational, then option (C,D) isn’t possible. The corollary is that if option (C,D) is selected, then one of the agents isn’t being rational. If this happens, then the machine hasn’t been irrational (it receives its best possible result). The conclusion is that when you choose to cooperate, you were being irrational.
You’ve successfully explained that (C, D) and (D, C) arw impossible for rational agents, but you seem to have implicitly assumed that (C, C) was possible for rational agents. That’s actually the point that we’re hoping to prove, so it’s a case of circular logic.
It’s an appealing notion, but i think the logic doesn’t hold up.
In simplest terms: if you apply this logic and choose to cooperate, then the machine can still defect. That will net more paperclips for the machine, so it’s hard to claim that the machine’s actions are irrational.
Although your logic is appealing, it doesn’t explain why the machine can’t defect while you co-operate.
You said that if both agents are rational, then option (C,D) isn’t possible. The corollary is that if option (C,D) is selected, then one of the agents isn’t being rational. If this happens, then the machine hasn’t been irrational (it receives its best possible result). The conclusion is that when you choose to cooperate, you were being irrational.
You’ve successfully explained that (C, D) and (D, C) arw impossible for rational agents, but you seem to have implicitly assumed that (C, C) was possible for rational agents. That’s actually the point that we’re hoping to prove, so it’s a case of circular logic.