That’s a good point. It’s still not clear to me that he’s talking about precisely the same thing in both quotes. The point also remains that if you’re not associating “understanding” with a class as broad as turing-completeness, then you can construct things that humans can’t understand, e.g. by hiding them in complex patterns, or by using human blind spots.
But that creates it’s own problem: there’s no longer a strong reason to believe in Universal Explanation. We don’t know that humans are universal explainers, because if there is something a human can’t think of … well a human can’t think of it! All we can do is notice confusion.
If you read the quote carefully you will find that it is incompatible with the position you are attributing to Deutsch. For example, he writes about
which would hardly be necessary if computational universality was equivalent to universal explainer.
That’s a good point. It’s still not clear to me that he’s talking about precisely the same thing in both quotes. The point also remains that if you’re not associating “understanding” with a class as broad as turing-completeness, then you can construct things that humans can’t understand, e.g. by hiding them in complex patterns, or by using human blind spots.
But that creates it’s own problem: there’s no longer a strong reason to believe in Universal Explanation. We don’t know that humans are universal explainers, because if there is something a human can’t think of … well a human can’t think of it! All we can do is notice confusion.