Quantum mechanics makes no mention of “multiple universes” or the measure of a universe.
Intuitively, I can draw a distinction between having two copies of me in the same Everett branch and having one copy in each of two Everett branches (as your proposal would). Physically, though, this is no more valid than speaking of the continuity of the atoms in my brain. I can interpolate smoothly between these two states of the universe. What do we say about the intermediates?
If one situation can be continuously transformed into another, that doesn’t imply that they are equivalent. The relevant features (observer-weight, etc.) can also change continuously, though I don’t know how they will change in the situation you described.
Most universes you can describe don’t break up nicely into Everett branches. My point was that in between having two of you in one branch and having one each in two, there are many less well divided worlds in which your two copies have complicated relationships (you can go between them smoothly, though its not informative). It seems like you should also make predictions in these intermediates.
Quantum mechanics makes no mention of “multiple universes” or the measure of a universe.
Intuitively, I can draw a distinction between having two copies of me in the same Everett branch and having one copy in each of two Everett branches (as your proposal would). Physically, though, this is no more valid than speaking of the continuity of the atoms in my brain. I can interpolate smoothly between these two states of the universe. What do we say about the intermediates?
If one situation can be continuously transformed into another, that doesn’t imply that they are equivalent. The relevant features (observer-weight, etc.) can also change continuously, though I don’t know how they will change in the situation you described.
What continuity is there between having another copy in the same Everett branch and in a different Everett branch?
Most universes you can describe don’t break up nicely into Everett branches. My point was that in between having two of you in one branch and having one each in two, there are many less well divided worlds in which your two copies have complicated relationships (you can go between them smoothly, though its not informative). It seems like you should also make predictions in these intermediates.
Can’t we define an operator counting the number of humans and enumerate its eigenstates, at least in principle?
Could you show an experiment where “two copies in the same branch” and “a copy in each of two branches” behave differently, according to the proposal?