To what degree should the lack of good contrarians be taken as evidence that LW “consensus” (scare quotes because the like-mindedness of this community is overestimated [1]) is true?
People are always talking about how the Less Wrong arguments are good viewed from the inside but not theoutside, so this question is important as it is an outside-view consideration that, unlike most others, strikes favorably on the Less Wrong mentality, which is usually only justified inside the arguments.
Asymmetrical motivation is the problem. If you disagree with a mainstream position, arguing against it feels worth while. If you agree with a fringe position, arguing in favour of it feels worth while. But if you disagree with a fringe position, why bother?
Where the LW “consensus” agrees with the mainstream, then the lack of good contrarians (who would feel their time well spent) is evidence of a sort that the LW “consensus” is true. But such weak evidence is hardly needed.
But where the LW “consensus” is itself the fringe position, we expect that good contrarians would have better things to do than try to set us straight. Thus the lack of good contrarians is both what we expect when a fringe LW “consensus” position is true (which makes it hard to dispute) and when it is false (why bother?). Consequently the lack of good contrarians tells us nothing at all in exactly the case when we look to it for clues.
To what degree should the lack of good contrarians be taken as evidence that LW “consensus” (scare quotes because the like-mindedness of this community is overestimated [1]) is true?
People are always talking about how the Less Wrong arguments are good viewed from the inside but not the outside, so this question is important as it is an outside-view consideration that, unlike most others, strikes favorably on the Less Wrong mentality, which is usually only justified inside the arguments.
Asymmetrical motivation is the problem. If you disagree with a mainstream position, arguing against it feels worth while. If you agree with a fringe position, arguing in favour of it feels worth while. But if you disagree with a fringe position, why bother?
Where the LW “consensus” agrees with the mainstream, then the lack of good contrarians (who would feel their time well spent) is evidence of a sort that the LW “consensus” is true. But such weak evidence is hardly needed.
But where the LW “consensus” is itself the fringe position, we expect that good contrarians would have better things to do than try to set us straight. Thus the lack of good contrarians is both what we expect when a fringe LW “consensus” position is true (which makes it hard to dispute) and when it is false (why bother?). Consequently the lack of good contrarians tells us nothing at all in exactly the case when we look to it for clues.
Good point.