If just the conceptual possibility of the universe is enough to experience it, as some have suspected to be the case, you still have to consider the possibility that the part of the universe you’re conceptually in is a simulation inside of another conceptual universe.
Looking at it from another angle, I’m pretty sure we all accept that our minds are running on computers known as human brains, and we don’t just experience the conceptual possibility of that brain. Mind you, the entire universe might just be some kind of conceptual possibility, but there is a conceptual universe out there that our minds are running on a tiny part of. Once you accept this, it would seem hypocritical to reject the possibility of another layer of conceptual computation out of hand.
In short, just because we’re in a mathematical construct doesn’t mean that we’re not part of a simulation within that mathematical construct. Simulation argument and the universe being a mathematical construct are not mutually exclusive.
But if all that’s required for a simulation is a mathematical form for the true laws of physics, and knowledge of some early state of the universe
Why would you even need that much? If we’re just talking about the mathematical idea of this universe, it exists whether or not we know how to define it. It’s not inconsistent to say that someone defining but not necessarily calculating the math is the necessary and sufficient condition for us to experience it, but I don’t see why you’d draw the line there.
In short, just because we’re in a mathematical construct doesn’t mean that we’re not part of a simulation within that mathematical construct. Simulation argument and the universe being a mathematical construct are not mutually exclusive.
Sure, but if anything it seems like they both apply—we are overwhelmingly likely to be simulated humans in a mathematical-construct universe.
Why would you even need that much? If we’re just talking about the mathematical idea of this universe, it exists whether or not we know how to define it. It’s not inconsistent to say that someone defining but not necessarily calculating the math is the necessary and sufficient condition for us to experience it, but I don’t see why you’d draw the line there.
I was trying to make it clear where the tradeoff with mathematical Platonism is. If you believe mathematical things exist eternally, or exist when defined, or exist when explicitly calculated, that affects what limit you have to place on human civilization’s achievements (and if you’re a straight-up Platonist then you can’t make this objection at all, because as you say, the idea of the universe already exists).
If just the conceptual possibility of the universe is enough to experience it, as some have suspected to be the case, you still have to consider the possibility that the part of the universe you’re conceptually in is a simulation inside of another conceptual universe.
Looking at it from another angle, I’m pretty sure we all accept that our minds are running on computers known as human brains, and we don’t just experience the conceptual possibility of that brain. Mind you, the entire universe might just be some kind of conceptual possibility, but there is a conceptual universe out there that our minds are running on a tiny part of. Once you accept this, it would seem hypocritical to reject the possibility of another layer of conceptual computation out of hand.
In short, just because we’re in a mathematical construct doesn’t mean that we’re not part of a simulation within that mathematical construct. Simulation argument and the universe being a mathematical construct are not mutually exclusive.
Why would you even need that much? If we’re just talking about the mathematical idea of this universe, it exists whether or not we know how to define it. It’s not inconsistent to say that someone defining but not necessarily calculating the math is the necessary and sufficient condition for us to experience it, but I don’t see why you’d draw the line there.
Sure, but if anything it seems like they both apply—we are overwhelmingly likely to be simulated humans in a mathematical-construct universe.
I was trying to make it clear where the tradeoff with mathematical Platonism is. If you believe mathematical things exist eternally, or exist when defined, or exist when explicitly calculated, that affects what limit you have to place on human civilization’s achievements (and if you’re a straight-up Platonist then you can’t make this objection at all, because as you say, the idea of the universe already exists).