We already are able to simulate “universes” simpler than our own (e.g. videogames), but this doesn’t imply, even probabilistically, that our universe is itself a simulation.
Why not? Because you assign them a low anthropic weighting, or some other reason?
(I also had an argument that the Dyson computation applies, but I think that’s actually beside the point)
If the simplest possible explanation for our sensory observations includes a universe that contains simulations of other universes, it’s a reasonable question which kind we are in, even if they don’t all have the same physical laws or the same amount of matter. There’s no a propi reason to privilege one hypothesis or the other.
The hypothesis that there exist another universe, certainly much different from ours in many aspects, quite possibly with a different set of physical laws, is more complex that the hypothesis that no such universe exists.
Futhermore, you could iterate the simulation argument ad infinitum, “turtles all the way down”, yielding an infinitely complex hypothesis.
A description of our own universe necessarily includes inner universes, certainly much different from ours in many aspects, quite possibly with different sets of physical laws, and many complex enough to have their own inner universes. So it’s not at all obvious that the minimum message length to describe an outer universe containing ours as a simulation is greater than that to describe our universe.
A description of our own universe necessarily includes inner universes, certainly much different from ours in many aspects, quite possibly with different sets of physical laws, and many complex enough to have their own inner universes.
Yes, but we observe our own universe.
So it’s not at all obvious that the minimum message length to describe an outer universe containing ours as a simulation is greater than that to describe our universe.
Why not? Because you assign them a low anthropic weighting, or some other reason? (I also had an argument that the Dyson computation applies, but I think that’s actually beside the point)
If the simplest possible explanation for our sensory observations includes a universe that contains simulations of other universes, it’s a reasonable question which kind we are in, even if they don’t all have the same physical laws or the same amount of matter. There’s no a propi reason to privilege one hypothesis or the other.
The hypothesis that there exist another universe, certainly much different from ours in many aspects, quite possibly with a different set of physical laws, is more complex that the hypothesis that no such universe exists. Futhermore, you could iterate the simulation argument ad infinitum, “turtles all the way down”, yielding an infinitely complex hypothesis.
A description of our own universe necessarily includes inner universes, certainly much different from ours in many aspects, quite possibly with different sets of physical laws, and many complex enough to have their own inner universes. So it’s not at all obvious that the minimum message length to describe an outer universe containing ours as a simulation is greater than that to describe our universe.
Yes, but we observe our own universe.
It is.
This discussion is getting boring.