It’s a bit of a nonstandard definition of the supernatural, but I took it to mean mental phenomena as causeless nodes in a causal graph: that is, that mental phenomena (thoughts, feelings, “souls”) exist which do not have physical causes and yet generate physical consequences. By this interpretation, libertarian free will and most conceptions of the soul would both fall under supernaturalism, as would the prerequisites for most types of magic, gods, spirits, etc.
I’m not sure I’d have picked that phrasing, though. It seems to be entangled with epistemological reductionism in a way that might, for a sufficiently careful reading, obscure more conventional conceptions of the “supernatural”: I’d expect more people to believe in naive versions of free will than do in, say, fairies. Still, it’s a pretty fuzzy concept to begin with.
OK, thanks. I also tend to interpret “ontologically basic” as a causeless node in a causal graph. I’m not sure what is meant by ‘mental’. (For example, in the case of free will or a soul.) I think this is important, because “ontologically basic” in of itself isn’t something I’d be skeptical about. For example, as far as I know, matter is ontologically basic at some level.
A hypothesis: Mental perhaps implies subjective in some sense, perhaps even as far as meaning that an ontologically basic entity is mental if it is a node that is not only without physical cause but also has no physical effect. In which case, I again see no reason to be skeptical of their existence as a category.
Could someone break down what is meant by “ontologically basic mental entities”? Especially, I’m not certain of the role of the word ‘mental’..
It’s a bit of a nonstandard definition of the supernatural, but I took it to mean mental phenomena as causeless nodes in a causal graph: that is, that mental phenomena (thoughts, feelings, “souls”) exist which do not have physical causes and yet generate physical consequences. By this interpretation, libertarian free will and most conceptions of the soul would both fall under supernaturalism, as would the prerequisites for most types of magic, gods, spirits, etc.
I’m not sure I’d have picked that phrasing, though. It seems to be entangled with epistemological reductionism in a way that might, for a sufficiently careful reading, obscure more conventional conceptions of the “supernatural”: I’d expect more people to believe in naive versions of free will than do in, say, fairies. Still, it’s a pretty fuzzy concept to begin with.
OK, thanks. I also tend to interpret “ontologically basic” as a causeless node in a causal graph. I’m not sure what is meant by ‘mental’. (For example, in the case of free will or a soul.) I think this is important, because “ontologically basic” in of itself isn’t something I’d be skeptical about. For example, as far as I know, matter is ontologically basic at some level.
A hypothesis: Mental perhaps implies subjective in some sense, perhaps even as far as meaning that an ontologically basic entity is mental if it is a node that is not only without physical cause but also has no physical effect. In which case, I again see no reason to be skeptical of their existence as a category.