The premise here is that the second-mover decided to commit soon after the first-mover did, because the proof of the first-mover’s initial commitment didn’t reach the second-mover quickly enough.
That’s a very critical deviation from the standard problem statement, which should be made very clear. Also, re-reading the timeline, it appears to introduce side-payments (at 0:37 in the timeline), which is also a MAJOR deviation from the standard problem.
These two things (speed of information and ability to negotiate outside of the given payoff matrix) should be separated—both are fairly easy to model, and there will be much simpler solutions to integrate each of them into the decisions, which will be better than the combination of the two limited to a revocation window.
I edited the post to make it clearer that Bob throws out the wheel because he didn’t notice in time that Alice threw.
Yup, side payments are a deviation, that’s why I have this disclaimer in game definition (I edited the post now to emphasize it more):
there also may be some additional actions available, but they are not obvious
Re separating speed of information and negotiations: I think here they are already pretty separate. The first example with 3 protocol rules doesn’t allow negotiations and only tackles the information speed problem. The second example with additional fourth rule enables negotiations. Maybe you could also have a system tackling only negotiations and not the information speed problem, but I’m not sure now how would it look like, or if it would be much simpler.
Another problem (closely tied to negotiations) I wanted to tackle is something like “speed of deliberation” where agents make some bad commitments because they didn’t have enough time to consider their consequences, and later realize they want to revoke/negotiate.
That’s a very critical deviation from the standard problem statement, which should be made very clear. Also, re-reading the timeline, it appears to introduce side-payments (at 0:37 in the timeline), which is also a MAJOR deviation from the standard problem.
These two things (speed of information and ability to negotiate outside of the given payoff matrix) should be separated—both are fairly easy to model, and there will be much simpler solutions to integrate each of them into the decisions, which will be better than the combination of the two limited to a revocation window.
I edited the post to make it clearer that Bob throws out the wheel because he didn’t notice in time that Alice threw.
Yup, side payments are a deviation, that’s why I have this disclaimer in game definition (I edited the post now to emphasize it more):
Re separating speed of information and negotiations: I think here they are already pretty separate. The first example with 3 protocol rules doesn’t allow negotiations and only tackles the information speed problem. The second example with additional fourth rule enables negotiations. Maybe you could also have a system tackling only negotiations and not the information speed problem, but I’m not sure now how would it look like, or if it would be much simpler.
Another problem (closely tied to negotiations) I wanted to tackle is something like “speed of deliberation” where agents make some bad commitments because they didn’t have enough time to consider their consequences, and later realize they want to revoke/negotiate.