I’m also a non-reductionist and I agree with a lot of what he says. I think he oversteps the mark at the end of his essay when he talks about “New Atheists.” Generalising doesn’t appear to be a case of “concretising the abstract” at all and it’s a stretch to say a straw man is an example of a simplifying abstraction. The argument would probably be more convincing without the final two paragraphs.
I think between the engineer’s mindset and the philosopher’s mindset that you identify there’s a third option which is to acknowledge the limitations of your model but to not say anything more. So your engineer (assuming he’s a reductionist) is essentially saying “these abstractions are imperfect, but we can’t do better, therefore let’s take them to be all that is”. The philosopher is saying “these abstractions are imperfect, so there must be something else, therefore x.” The third option is “these abstractions are imperfect, let’s be vigilant and try to remember that.”
Note that in the essay Feser explicitly gives name to this third option before dismissing it: “The Aristotelian strain in Western thought formed a counterpoint to this “concretizing” tendency within the context of ancient philosophy, and also more or less inoculated Scholasticism against the tendency. But it came roaring back with a vengeance with Galileo, Descartes, and their modern successors, and has dominated Western thought ever since. Wittgenstein tried to put an end to it, but failed; for bad metaphysics can effectively be counteracted only by good metaphysics, not by no metaphysics.” The last line is dismissing the third option but it’s not clear what he thinks Wittgenstein’s failure was (lack of recent popularity?).
The last line is dismissing the third option but it’s not clear what he thinks Wittgenstein’s failure was (lack of recent popularity?).
Feser seems to be saying that Wittgenstein could not completely demolish the “‘concretizing’ tendency” just by pointing out its inadequacies. He had to offer a metaphysics of his own to replace it, and this he failed to do.
I’m also a non-reductionist and I agree with a lot of what he says. I think he oversteps the mark at the end of his essay when he talks about “New Atheists.” Generalising doesn’t appear to be a case of “concretising the abstract” at all and it’s a stretch to say a straw man is an example of a simplifying abstraction. The argument would probably be more convincing without the final two paragraphs.
I think between the engineer’s mindset and the philosopher’s mindset that you identify there’s a third option which is to acknowledge the limitations of your model but to not say anything more. So your engineer (assuming he’s a reductionist) is essentially saying “these abstractions are imperfect, but we can’t do better, therefore let’s take them to be all that is”. The philosopher is saying “these abstractions are imperfect, so there must be something else, therefore x.” The third option is “these abstractions are imperfect, let’s be vigilant and try to remember that.”
Note that in the essay Feser explicitly gives name to this third option before dismissing it: “The Aristotelian strain in Western thought formed a counterpoint to this “concretizing” tendency within the context of ancient philosophy, and also more or less inoculated Scholasticism against the tendency. But it came roaring back with a vengeance with Galileo, Descartes, and their modern successors, and has dominated Western thought ever since. Wittgenstein tried to put an end to it, but failed; for bad metaphysics can effectively be counteracted only by good metaphysics, not by no metaphysics.” The last line is dismissing the third option but it’s not clear what he thinks Wittgenstein’s failure was (lack of recent popularity?).
Feser seems to be saying that Wittgenstein could not completely demolish the “‘concretizing’ tendency” just by pointing out its inadequacies. He had to offer a metaphysics of his own to replace it, and this he failed to do.
Presumably, the failure of the Tractatus in the face of the color-correspondence problem.
I took him to be speaking of late Wittgenstein.
Feser’s claim seems to be that Wittgenstein failed to offer a metaphysics of his own to replace the reductionist one he demolished.
The problem with “no metaphysics” usually tends to be the impossibility of sealing off “metaphysics” from the rest of knowledge and practice.