I think this goes too far. We can give an account of counterfactuals from assumptions of symmetry. This account is unsatisfactory in many ways—for one thing, it implies that counterfactuals exist much more rarely than we want them to. Nonetheless, it seems to account for some properties of a counterfactual and is able to stand up without counterfactual assumptions to support it. I think it also provides an interesting lens for examining decision theory paradoxes.
I think this goes too far. We can give an account of counterfactuals from assumptions of symmetry. This account is unsatisfactory in many ways—for one thing, it implies that counterfactuals exist much more rarely than we want them to. Nonetheless, it seems to account for some properties of a counterfactual and is able to stand up without counterfactual assumptions to support it. I think it also provides an interesting lens for examining decision theory paradoxes.