Given the accuracy of predictions, the overwhelmingly likely conclusion is that there is something outside and independent of our beliefs about the world.
I was under the impression that, according to you, this “something” is completely inaccessible to us, as evidenced by the incommensurability of our models. But maybe I’m wrong.
Maybe with some very technical definition of “inaccessible.” We know enough about what’s out there to be able to make predictions, after all.
I do think that many scientists assert that certain facts are in the territory when they are actually in the map. Over and above the common errors that non-scientists make about the map/territory distinction.
We know enough about what’s out there to be able to make predictions, after all.
As far as I understand (and I could be wrong), you believe that it’s possible to construct two different models of “what’s out there”, both of which will yield good predictions, but which will be incommensurate. If this is true, how can you then say that we “know enough” about what’s out there ? Sure, we may have a model, but chances are that there’s another model out there which yields predictions that are just as accurate, and yet has nothing whatsoever to do with the first model; thus, we’re no closer to understanding what’s actually real than we were before. That’s not “knowledge”, as I understand it, but perhaps you meant something else ?
I was under the impression that, according to you, this “something” is completely inaccessible to us, as evidenced by the incommensurability of our models. But maybe I’m wrong.
Maybe with some very technical definition of “inaccessible.” We know enough about what’s out there to be able to make predictions, after all.
I do think that many scientists assert that certain facts are in the territory when they are actually in the map. Over and above the common errors that non-scientists make about the map/territory distinction.
As far as I understand (and I could be wrong), you believe that it’s possible to construct two different models of “what’s out there”, both of which will yield good predictions, but which will be incommensurate. If this is true, how can you then say that we “know enough” about what’s out there ? Sure, we may have a model, but chances are that there’s another model out there which yields predictions that are just as accurate, and yet has nothing whatsoever to do with the first model; thus, we’re no closer to understanding what’s actually real than we were before. That’s not “knowledge”, as I understand it, but perhaps you meant something else ?