Or in other words, that rationality is completely dependent on the motives of the actor.
In the sense I think you mean it, yes. Two equally rational actors with different motives will perform different acts.
That as long as what I say or do works towards my personal motives it is rational?
Yes.
So if I want to convince the world that God is real, it is rational to make up whatever lies I see fit to delegitimize other belief systems?
If that’s the most effective way to convince the world that God is real, and you value the world being convinced that God is real, yes.
So religious zealots are rational because they have a goal that their lies and craziness is helping them achieve?
Not necessarily, in that religious zealots don’t necessarily have such goals. But yes, if a religious zealot who in fact values things that are in fact best achieved through lies and craziness chooses to engage in those lies and craziness, that’s a rational act in the sense we mean it here.
If someone told you that the moon was made of cheese, being a rational person, without providing any evidence of the fact, if they had no reason to believe that, they just believed it, you would think they were being irrational.
Sure, that’s most likely true.
You just want to pick a fight.
You may be right about thomblake’s motives, though I find it unlikely. That said, deciding how likely I consider it is my responsibility. You are not obligated to provide evidence for it.
(nods) I was taking the “if they had no reason to believe that, they just believed it” part of the problem specification literally. (e.g., it’s not a joke, etc.)
Aha—I glossed over that bit as irrelevant since the scenario is someone saying some words, which is clearly a case for instrumental rather than epistemic rationality. I should probably have read the “someone told you” as the irrelevant bit and answered as though we were talking about epistemic rationality.
(nods) Of course in the real world you’re entirely correct. That said, I find a lot of thought experiments depend on positing a situation I can’t imagine any way of getting into and asking what follows from there.
In the sense I think you mean it, yes. Two equally rational actors with different motives will perform different acts.
Yes.
If that’s the most effective way to convince the world that God is real, and you value the world being convinced that God is real, yes.
Not necessarily, in that religious zealots don’t necessarily have such goals. But yes, if a religious zealot who in fact values things that are in fact best achieved through lies and craziness chooses to engage in those lies and craziness, that’s a rational act in the sense we mean it here.
Sure, that’s most likely true.
You may be right about thomblake’s motives, though I find it unlikely. That said, deciding how likely I consider it is my responsibility. You are not obligated to provide evidence for it.
Thanks—much more concise than my reply. Though I disagree about this bit:
for reasons I’ve stated in a sibling.
(nods) I was taking the “if they had no reason to believe that, they just believed it” part of the problem specification literally. (e.g., it’s not a joke, etc.)
Aha—I glossed over that bit as irrelevant since the scenario is someone saying some words, which is clearly a case for instrumental rather than epistemic rationality. I should probably have read the “someone told you” as the irrelevant bit and answered as though we were talking about epistemic rationality.
(nods) Of course in the real world you’re entirely correct. That said, I find a lot of thought experiments depend on positing a situation I can’t imagine any way of getting into and asking what follows from there.