That’s true, and not something I thought of, since I was focused on ontological rather than statistical asymmetries. Of course, it could turn out to be a temporary condition, once Foomy starts converting its future light-cone to computronium! Also, although most of the bottom levels fail to generate interesting (knowledge-containing) structures, such structures on the higher levels might have the property that—because they squeeze the future—they tend to become present across whole swathes of Everett branches, making them in a full-multiversal sense actually less fragile.
Interesting corollary: one or more levels above morality, in which most moral agents are nonparticipants. I’m not sure where to go with that, so I’m going to just stroke my beard and say “Hmmm” in a wise-sounding way.
That’s true, and not something I thought of, since I was focused on ontological rather than statistical asymmetries. Of course, it could turn out to be a temporary condition, once Foomy starts converting its future light-cone to computronium! Also, although most of the bottom levels fail to generate interesting (knowledge-containing) structures, such structures on the higher levels might have the property that—because they squeeze the future—they tend to become present across whole swathes of Everett branches, making them in a full-multiversal sense actually less fragile.
Interesting corollary: one or more levels above morality, in which most moral agents are nonparticipants. I’m not sure where to go with that, so I’m going to just stroke my beard and say “Hmmm” in a wise-sounding way.