Terminology definitely varies. FWIW, the breakdown of normative/meta-normative views I prefer is roughly in line with the breakdown Parfit uses in OWM (although he uses a somewhat wonkier term for “realism”). In this breakdown:
“Realist” views are ones under which there are facts about what people should do or what they have reason to do. “Anti-realist” views are ones under which there are no such facts. There are different versions of “realism” that claim that facts about what people should do are either “natural” (e.g. physical) or “non-natural” facts. If we condition on any version realism, there’s then the question of what we should actually do. If we should only act to fulfill our own preferences—or pursue other similar goals that primarily have to do with our own mental states—then “subjectivism” is true. If we should also pursue ends that don’t directly have to do with our own mental states—for example, if we should also try to make other people happy—then “objectivism” is true.
It’s a bit ambiguous to me how the terms in the LessWrong survey map onto these distinctions, although it seems like “subjectivism” and “constructivism” as they’re defined in the survey probably would qualify as forms of “realism” on the breakdown I just sketched. I think one thing that sometimes makes discussions of normative issues especially ambiguous is that the naturalism/non-naturalism and objectivism/subjectivism axes often get blended together.
Terminology definitely varies. FWIW, the breakdown of normative/meta-normative views I prefer is roughly in line with the breakdown Parfit uses in OWM (although he uses a somewhat wonkier term for “realism”). In this breakdown:
“Realist” views are ones under which there are facts about what people should do or what they have reason to do. “Anti-realist” views are ones under which there are no such facts. There are different versions of “realism” that claim that facts about what people should do are either “natural” (e.g. physical) or “non-natural” facts. If we condition on any version realism, there’s then the question of what we should actually do. If we should only act to fulfill our own preferences—or pursue other similar goals that primarily have to do with our own mental states—then “subjectivism” is true. If we should also pursue ends that don’t directly have to do with our own mental states—for example, if we should also try to make other people happy—then “objectivism” is true.
It’s a bit ambiguous to me how the terms in the LessWrong survey map onto these distinctions, although it seems like “subjectivism” and “constructivism” as they’re defined in the survey probably would qualify as forms of “realism” on the breakdown I just sketched. I think one thing that sometimes makes discussions of normative issues especially ambiguous is that the naturalism/non-naturalism and objectivism/subjectivism axes often get blended together.